Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
524 F.3d 754 · 2008
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 82 later decisions — most recently June 2025 · most notably Conlin v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013), La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Properties LLC (2010)
16 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005)
Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Erie Co v. Tompkins · M/s Bremen v. Zapata off-Shore Company · Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 82 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Contractual language is ambiguous “only where its meaning cannot be de termined from the four corners of the agreement or where the language is susceptible of two or more reasonable interpretations.” Covington v. Lucia, 151 Ohio App.3d 409 , 784 N.E.2d 186 , 190 (2003) (quoting Potti, 938 F.2d at 647 ); see also King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208 , 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (1988); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 129 Ohio App.3d 45 , 716 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (1998). “[C]ourts may not use extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity; rather, the ambiguity must be patent, i.e., apparent on the face of the contract.” Covington, 784 N.E.2d at 190 . In determining whether contractual language is ambiguous, the contract “must be construed as a whole,” Tri-State Group, Inc. v. Ohio Edison Co., 151 Ohio App.3d 1 , 782 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (2002) (quoting Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Gerwick, 50 Ohio App. 277 , 197 N.E. 923, 926 (1934)), so as “to give reasonable effect to every provision in the agreement.” Stone v. Nat’l City Bank, 106 Ohio App.3d 212 , 665 N.E.2d 746, 752 (1995); see also Burris v. Grange Mut. Co., 46 Ohio St.3d 84 , 545 N.E.2d 83, 88 (1989) (“The meaning of a contract is to be gathered from a consideration of all its parts, and no provision is to be wholly disregarded as inconsistent with other provisions unless no other reasonable construction is possible.” (quoting Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ohio St.3d 163 , 462 N.E.2”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Under Ohio law, the interpretation of written contract terms, including the determination of whether those terms are ambiguous, is a matter of law for initial determination by the court. Parrett v. Am. Ship Bldg. Co., 990 F.2d 854 , 858 (6th Cir.1993) (applying Ohio law); Potti v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 938 F.2d 641, 647 (6th Cir.1991) (applying Ohio law); see also Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321 , 474 N.E.2d 271, 272-73 (1984) (“If a contract is clear and unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter of law and there is no issue of fact to be determined. However, if a term cannot be determined from the four corners of a contract, factual determination of intent or reasonableness may be necessary to supply the missing term.”). “The role of courts in examining contracts is to ascertain the intent of the parties.” City of St. Marys v. Auglaize Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 387 , 875 N.E.2d 561, 566 (2007). “The intent of the parties is presumed to reside in the language they choose to use in their agreement.” Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311 , 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (1996); accord State ex. rel Petro v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 104 Ohio St.3d 559 , 820 N.E.2d 910, 915 (2004). “Where the terms in a contract are not ambiguous, courts are constrained to apply the plain language of the contract.” City of St. Marys, 875 N.E.2d at 566 ; accord Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 , 374”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“We generally apply the substantive law of the forum state to actions brought pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction.”) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). When interpreting contracts in a diversity action, the federal courts also”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.