¶1(dissenting).
¶2I respectfully dissent. By casting Kjos’ suppression claim as statutory rather than constitutional, I believe the majority has steered away from the correct analysis and endorsed an exclusionary rule application that is neither warranted nor wise.
¶3I. Kjos’ counsel argued at trial that “the test was not voluntary under the circumstances, and because of that the test ought to be suppressed and not allowed into evidence.” Again, in his motion for new trial, Kjos claimed he was coerced into taking the test by the officer’s false advice that his license could be revoked if he refused to consent. “When questions of voluntariness are raised, an examination of the totality of the circumstances is made.” State v. Stanford, 474 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1991). “Deception by law officers — while never condoned — will not, standing alone, render consent involuntary as a matter of law.” State v. Gravenish, 511 N.W.2d 379, 381 (Iowa 1994). The various factors to be considered on the voluntariness question are outlined in Gravenish. The court of appeals, tacitly weighing these factors, found that the officer’s tardy use of the form did not thereby render Kjos’ consent involuntary. I would agree.
¶4II. Even if this case turned strictly on a statutory violation, exclusion of competent evidence would not be the appropriate remedy. We have long held that chapter 321J’s procedural requirements are designed to protect the accuracy of test results and the health of the subject. State v. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1988) (citing State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95, 97 (Iowa 1972)). Lack of compliance with the chapter’s dictates has heretofore resulted in licensing con*198cessions, not exoneration of criminal penalties. Id. at 431.
¶5Given the majority’s view that Kjos’ claim is not constitutional in nature, use of the exclusionary rule is highly unusual. See State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1992) (application of exclusionary rule usually required only for a violation of constitutional right or where statute specifically requires exclusion). Such an extraordinary remedy should be reserved, I believe, for situations evidencing bad faith by the State’s agents or violation of a statute with constitutional overtones, as in Vietor. See Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 830 (claimed denial of statutory right to counsel). Neither circumstance is present here.
¶6Iowa Code section 321J.18 specifically permits introduction of test results procured more than two hours after arrest notwithstanding other provisions of chapter 321J. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d at 431. I would affirm the district court’s refusal to suppress the evidence.