In re Cushman Bakery’s Empirical Analysis
526 F.2d 23 · 1975
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 72 later decisions — most recently January 2019 · most notably Weinstock v. Columbia University (2000), Max Sugarman Funeral Home, Inc. v. A.D.B. Investors (1991)
20 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 107 · 11 U.S.C. § 110 · 11 U.S.C. § 701
Relies on Katchen v. Landy · Katchen v. Landy · Josiah Coder v. William Arts · Dean v. Davis · Herget v. Central Nat Bank & Trust Co of Peoria
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 72 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(A) financing statement is not intended to enable other creditors to learn the 'true nature' of the secured transaction. The provisions of the ... statutes do not support (the) premise that the system of notice filing is designed to do more than apprise creditors that the secured party may have a security interest in the collateral described in the financing statement.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The case law makes it abundantly clear that a financing statement is intended merely 'to put a searcher on notice that an underlying security agreement may be outstanding. A properly filed financing statement would thus serve its intended purpose if a subsequent party would have been put on notice of an outstanding security agreement.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“To decide whether § lie should be applicable, we consider the scheme of the Act as a whole and the nature and objectives of § 57’s allowance process. The scheme of the Bankruptcy Act seems to us to support appellant’s contention that § lie is inapplicable to an objection to the allowance of a creditor’s claim under § 57. Under § lie the statute of limitations begins to run on the ‘date of adjudication’. As regards the allowance process, however, the date of adjudication has no significance whatsoever, and to treat a trustee’s objection as barred if not made within two years would in some circumstances be anomalous. Under § 57n, a creditor must file his claims within six months after the first date set for the first creditor’s meeting — which § 55, 11 U.S.C. § 91 , provides must be held not less than ten nor more than thirty days after the date of adjudication. Thus it is possible that a creditor might not file his claim until seven months after the date of adjudication. It would, at least, be incongruous to have a two year statute of limitations begin to run before the trustee had any cause to file objections. More importantly, there are circumstances in which a creditor may file his claim more than two years after the date of adjudication. Section 57n permits creditors, whose claims were not filed within six months of the date of the first creditor’s meeting, to file claims against any surplus remaining after all duly filed claims have been allowed and paid in full. To hold ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.