Reeves v. Astrue’s Empirical Analysis
526 F.3d 732 · 2008
Citation profile
7 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 7430 · 28 U.S.C. § 2412 · 31 U.S.C. § 3701 (Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996) · 31 U.S.C. § 3716 · 42 U.S.C. § 406 (§ 206 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Equal Access to Justice Act)
Relies on Bonner v. City of Prichard · Ratzlaf et Ux United States · Christopher Artuz Superintendent Green Haven Correctional Facility v. Tony Bruce Bennett · United States v. Gonzales · Barnhart Commissioner of Social Security v. Walton
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Reeves’ second textual argument is based on an uncodified clause of the EAJA, which harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under § 406(b) of the Social Security Act. The EAJA and the Social Security Act both contain provisions commonly relied upon by successful social security claimants and their attorneys to secure the payment of attorney’s fees. The uncodified clause of the EAJA requires an attorney that receives fees for the same work under both the EAJA and the Social Security Act to refund the smaller amount to the claimant. Reeves argues this clause can only logically be read to contemplate that the EAJA award will be paid to the attorney. Otherwise, he asserts, it makes no sense to direct the attorney to refund an amount he has not received. We find this argument unpersuasive because the clause, by its own terms, only comes into play after the attorney actually receives double fees for the same work. Our reading of the plain text of § 2412 is not altered by the uncontroversial proposition that Congress anticipated attorneys will often be the ultimate beneficiaries of the attorney’s fees awarded under the EAJA. When an attorney actually receives the proceeds of an EAJA award from his client, the clause is implicated. The clause is not implicated, in a case like this, where the attorney never receives the proceeds of an EAJA award. The unambiguous text of the EAJA resolves the issue before us; therefore, we refrain from embarking on a supe”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“While we acknowledge there is a risk that individuals who owe debts subject to offset by the government may ultimately have a more difficult time paying the bill for litigation, we cannot use Congress’s general statements of findings and purpose to override the plain meaning of specific provisions of the Act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Stephens v. Astrue“the statute's explicit reference to the 'prevailing party' unambiguously directs the award of attorney's fees to the party who incurred those fees and not to the party's attorney”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.