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← 526 F.3d 903 - Harris v. Haeberlin

Harris v. Haeberlin’s Empirical Analysis

526 F.3d 903 · 2008

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
1
states following
June 2021
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently June 2021 · most notably Montgomery v. Bobby (2011), Rice v. White (2011)

19 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

340200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Kentucky Eastern District Court)

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Wainwright v. Witt · Lindh v. Murphy

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    14 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In [Rice ], when the defendant opposed the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge against juror 16, the prosecution explained that it disqualified her because she had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the court, was young and possibly too tolerant of drug crimes, and lacked sufficient connections to the community. The trial court [which did not observe the complained-of demeanor] subsequently affirmed the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons. During the defendant’s habeas appeal before the Ninth Circuit, however, that court disagreed with the trial court’s credibility determination and found it factually unreasonable to accept the prosecution’s justifications based on juror 16’s demeanor and youth. Conducting its own review of the underlying facts, the Ninth Circuit found the prosecutor lacking in credibility because she had previously referred to another juror as “young” despite that juror’s status as a grandmother, had attempted impermissibly to employ gender as a race-neutral basis for striking juror 16, and had claimed juror 16 would be too lenient toward a drug crime even though juror 16 expressed an affirmative belief that the crime at issue should be illegal. After assessing the Ninth Circuit’s reasons for doubting the prosecutor’s credibility, the Supreme Court disagreed that the trial court’s factual findings were unreasonable. At most, the Supreme Court explained, “the trial court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding [j]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““[T]he Batson opinion is replete with references to the trial court’s central role in assessing the facts necessary to conduct the three-step inquiry into allegations of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. For example, Bat-son maintains that ‘[i]n deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.’ Id. at 96 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Batson Court vests its ‘confidence’ in ‘trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, ... to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges create a prima facie case of discrimination.’ Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ([some] emphasis added). Batson further holds ‘the trial court mil then have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.’ Id. at 98 ([some] emphasis added). In explaining its assignment of .the Batson inquiry to trial courts, the Court emphasizes that findings in the context wider consideration here will largely turn on evaluation of credibility.’ Id. at 98 n. 21,. 106 S.Ct. 1712 . Accordingly, the Court informs ..reviewing courts that they ‘ordinarily should give those findings great deference.’ Id. “In emphasizing the holdings of Bat-son, the Hernandez [v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991),] plurality explains “ ‘In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for' a peremptory challenge should be believ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.