Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

526 So. 2d 780

Docket No. 87-984.

Feder v. Feder

George Neil FEDER, Appellant, v. Maria Eugenia Valdes FEDER, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1988-06-21

Relies on 458 So. 2d 381 - Mouzon v. Mouzon · 495 So. 2d 904 - Hargrave v. Hargrave · Shammay v. Shammay

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1988-06-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently April 2014

6 state decisions

201988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*781 Magill & Lewis and R. Fred Lewis, Miami, for appellant.

¶2Gilberto V. Fort, Miami, for appellee.

¶3Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Husband appeals a Final Judgment of Dissolution requiring him to pay wife $40,000 as lump sum rehabilitation alimony.

¶6Maria Eugenia Valdes Feder filed a petition of dissolution to end her marriage to George Feder. No children were born of the marriage. Maria had two children from a prior marriage. From the record Maria had property she had purchased and fully paid for before the marriage which after the marriage had been encumbered with a mortgage for $15,700 to support the family because George had become disabled due to an automobile accident. It further appeared that a second mortgage was later placed on the property for $25,000 to pay George's attorney in a federal case. The trial court awarded Maria $40,000 in lump sum rehabilitative alimony in the nature of a repayment of the two loans on her property.

¶7We find that the trial court erred in holding it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The wife herein failed to allege that the couple had maintained a marital domicile in Florida at the time that the action was brought or that the husband had resided in Florida prior to its commencement. Failure to so allege results in void service of process under Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1985) and the final judgment of dissolution should be reversed. See Hargrave v. Hargrave,495 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mouzon v. Mouzon,458 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).[1]

¶8Therefore, the judgment of dissolution entered herein is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the complaint with leave to amend by adding proper jurisdictional facts, if such facts exist. See Shammay v. Shammay,467 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

¶9Reversed and remanded with directions.

NOTES

¶10[1] In holding a lack of personal jurisdiction it was not necessary to reach that portion of the final judgment awarding lump sum alimony. However, nothing contained herein should be construed as approving that portion of the judgment.

/526/so2d/780 · .json · Public domain