Volume 526 — United States Reports

This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 526 of the United States Reports:

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze Construction Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a state may tax the revenue of a government contractor received from work for the federal government. The states are not allowed to issue taxes where the legal incidence of the tax is on the federal government, but they can issue taxes where the economic burden of the tax falls on the federal government; i.e., the existence of the tax may indirectly increase the federal government's expenses.

Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the related services provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required public school districts to fund "continuous, one-on-one nursing care for disabled children" despite arguments from the school district concerning the costs of the services." The judges relied heavily on Irving Independent School District v. Tatro. Under the Court's reading of the IDEA's relevant provisions, medical treatments such as suctioning, ventilator checks, catheterization, and others which can be administered by non-physician personnel come within the parameters of the special education law's related services.

Held: 5 "[T]he duty to bargain in good faith imposed by the Statute requires an agency to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement on negotiable union-initiated proposals concerning matters which are not addressed in the [basic] agreement and were not clearly and unmistakably waived by the union during negotiation of the agreement." Id., at 167. 6 The Fourth Circuit has taken a different view of the…

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case that applied the Daubert standard to expert testimony from non-scientists.

Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), was a United States Supreme Court decision concerning the usufructuary rights of the Ojibwe (Chippewa) tribe to certain lands it had ceded to the federal government in 1837. The Court ruled that the Ojibwe retained certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land.

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case interpreting the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, to set forth three distinct crimes, each with distinct elements. The Court drew this conclusion from the structure of the statute, under which two subsections provided for additional punishment if the defendant inflicts more serious harm. The Court also distinguished Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), because that case allowed for sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction.

Held: and decline to do so here, that verbs are the sole consideration in identifying the conduct that constitutes an offense. While the "verb test" certainly has value as an interpretative tool, it cannot be applied rigidly, to the exclusion of other relevant statutory language.

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that absent exigency, the warrantless search of a passenger's container capable of holding the object of a search for which there is probable cause is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is justified under the automobile exception as an effect of the car.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case that considered two Fifth Amendment privileges related to a criminal defendant’s rights against self-incrimination in a Federal District Court. The court ruled (1) that a defendant who waives the privilege against self-incrimination by pleading guilty does not also waive the privilege at sentencing, and (2) that the court cannot draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence when determining facts related to the crime which affect the severity of the sentence.

Held: because it is "law . . . which regulates insurance." See Ward v. Management Analysis Co. Employee Disability Benefit Plan, 135 F.3d 1276 , 1280 (1998). 4 The Court of Appeals announced a further ground for reversing the District Court's judgment for UNUM, one that would come into play if the insurer proved prejudice due to the delayed notice.

United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court holding that Chevron deference is appropriate for regulations issued by Customs on behalf of the Treasury. The statutes authorizing customs classification regulations were found consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation in question persuaded the Court that the Customs Service intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect. The statutory scheme did not support the importer's argument that the regulation only applied to customs officers themselves as opposed to the adjudication of importers' refund suits in the Court of International Trade.

(headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. Held: In order to establish a §201(c)(1)(A) violation, the Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a federal official and a specific "official act" for or because of which it was given.

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999), examined a doctrinal question last presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca. In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court determined that federal courts had to defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals's interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court.

Held: initially, that federal courts have authority to determine, as a matter "arising under" federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 whether a tribal court has exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction. See 471 U.S., at 852-853.

Sáenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), was a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States discussed whether there is a constitutional right to travel from one state to another. The case was a reaffirmation of the principle that citizens select states and not the other way round.

Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999), was a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the exclusionary rule of evidence under the Fourth Amendment.

Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding North Carolina's 12th congressional district.

Held: for example, that "[BCMR] decisions are subject to judicial review [by federal courts] and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence." Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 , 303 (1983).

Held: jurisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order, must subject-matter jurisdiction precede personal jurisdiction on the decisional line? Or, do federal district courts have discretion to avoid a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the absence of personal jurisdiction is the surer ground?

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that unanimously held the entrance of a third-party not directly involved in aiding a search warrant into a private household unconstitutional. Sparked by a case where law enforcement officers were accompanied by the press during the execution of a warrant, the Court ruled that bringing along independent representatives of the media during the search of a private household does not serve a legitimate government interest and violates the Fourth Amendment, as such a third party does not legitimately contribute to the objectives of a search warrant.

Held: A private Title IX damages action may lie against a school board in cases of student">student -on-student">student harassment, but only where the funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which the recipient has actual knowledge, and that harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or…

Held: so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the [federal] courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . ." In applying this provision, the Court identified as one of the steps necessary for its analysis resolution of precisely the question I have been discussing here: "We must . . . decide whether all § 1983 claims should be…

Held: The Commission's jurisdiction extends to an association that, like the CDA, provides substantial economic benefit to its for-profit members. The Act gives the Commission authority over a "corporatio[n]," 15 U.S. C. §45(a)(2), "organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members," §44.

Held: Pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop a recipient from pursuing an ADA claim or erect a strong presumption against the recipient's ADA success.

Held: the purpose of our waiver doctrine is to cultivate comity by respecting state procedural rules, then I agree with the Court of Appeals that we should not create procedural obstacles when state prisoners follow those rules.

After suffering a stroke and losing her job, petitioner Cleveland sought and obtained Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, claiming that she was unable to work due to her disability. Held: Pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop a recipient from pursuing an ADA claim or erect a strong presumption against the recipient's ADA success.