Commonwealth v. Kriston’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 66 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The legislature has expressly removed from consideration sentencing alternatives such as probation and partial confinement in cases, such as the present one, where a mandatory minimum sentence is provided by law. We believe this demonstrates an intent that a mandatory sentence of imprisonment is to be carried out through actual imprisonment in an institutional setting rather than through a lesser means, (pp. 6-7) (Emphasis added). This conclusion was sufficient to dispose of this issue in that case because it concerned the propriety of a credit awarded for time served in a home monitoring program, which clearly did not involve service in an “institutional setting.” In Kriston we were concerned with the non-custodial nature of a sentence being served in a personal residence. While it is true that one subject to home monitoring has his liberty restrained and risks being sent to prison if he violates the terms of the program, we could not hold that such a sentence was sufficient to satisfy the goals of the Legislature given the abundant amenities and non-rehabilitative temptations present in the home. However, in the case sub judice our definition of “imprisonment” compels a different result. Conahan voluntarily committed himself to inpatient custodial alcohol rehabilitation, which he successfully completed after devoting ninety-five continuous days towards overcoming his disease. We find that his successful completion of this custodial inpatient rehabilitation, which took place”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Conahan · 406 Pa. Super. 42 - Commonwealth v. Cozzone

2. “The easiest application of [42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1)] is when an individual is held in prison pending trial, or pending appeal, and faces a sentence of incarceration: in such a case, credit clearly would be awarded. However, the statute provides little explicit guidance in resolving the issue before us now, where [the defendant] spent time [somewhere other] than in prison. This difficulty results in part from the fact that neither Section 9760, nor any other provision of the Sentencing Code, defines the phrase “time spent in custody.” The difficulty is also a function of the fact that there are many forms of sentence, and many forms of pre-sentencing release, which involve restrictions far short of incarceration in prison. [[Image here]] The plain and ordinary meaning of imprisonment is confinement in a corree- tional or similar rehabilitative institution!;.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2008 Pa. Super. 106 - Commonwealth v. Griffith · 2007 Pa. Super. 270 - Commonwealth v. Maxwell

3. “[h]ome monitoring programs bear some similarities to both probation and partial confinement programs. The degree of confinement experienced by one who undergoes home monitoring is certainly greater than is normally experienced under probation, but clearly less than is experienced through confinement in an institution.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Wegley