Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 528 F.3d 624 - Butler v. Curry

Butler v. Curry’s Empirical Analysis

528 F.3d 624 · 2008

Citation profile

117
cited by 117 later decisions
5
states following
July 2019
most recently cited

32 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (§ 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (§ 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · United States v. Booker · Apprendi v. New Jersey · Blakely v. Washington · Almendarez-Torres v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]aken together, Apprendi , Blakely , and Booker , firmly established that a sentencing scheme in which the maximum possible sentence is set based on facts found by a judge is not consistent with the Sixth Amendment.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In People v. Sandoval, 41 Cal.4th 825 , 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 (2007), the California Supreme Court addressed the appropriate procedure for resentencing individuals who had been sentenced under the prior version of the law, and concluded that it need not decide whether the 2007 amendments to the penal code were retroactive, because it could simply judicially “reform” the previous law to require sentencing in accordance with the principles of the 2007 amendments. Id. at 849, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 161 P.3d 1146 . [Petitioner] argues that applying this judicial reformation of the law violates the ex post facto principles contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 , 352-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697 , 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). As [Petitioner] acknowledges, however, this question is controlled by United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916 (9th Cir.2005), in which we held that retroactive application of the remedial opinion in Booker does not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 921 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “First, “[t]he fact of a prior conviction is the only fact that both increases a penalty beyond the statutory maximum and can be found by a sentencing court.” [citation]. Second, the narrow prior conviction exception applies only to facts directly reflected in the documents of conviction, not to secondary “facts that are derived or inferred” from a prior conviction or from the conviction documents. [citation]. Third, as the prior conviction exception is justified by the reliability of court documents created as part of a process with Sixth Amendment safeguards, it does not extend to facts that may be proven only by reference to documents that were not developed as a result of such a process, [citation].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.