Colin K. v. Schmidt’s Empirical Analysis
1981
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 7 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently July 2010 · most notably Department of Education v. Katherine D. (1983), Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2009)
3 federal appellate · 7 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 20 U.S.C. § 1401 · 20 U.S.C. § 1412 · 20 U.S.C. § 1415 · 28 U.S.C. § 1441 · 28 U.S.C. § 1445 · 28 U.S.C. § 1446 · 29 U.S.C. § 794
Relies on Minnesota v. United States · Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co. · John T. Witherow v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, a Corporation · Federal Deposit Insurance v. Otero · 420 F. Supp. 859 - Haun v. Retail Credit Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““While it may be tempting to suppose that there are only two logical possibilities, that is, that a case is either removable or not removable, and that the first paragraph of § 1446(b) covers the former and the second paragraph the latter, it is evident that such is not the situation. Rather, there are actually three possibilities. The case on the initial pleadings may be removable on its face, or indeterminate in the sense that it does not on its face supply sufficient information to determine whether or not it is removable. The third possibility exists because the criteria determining removability are not necessarily required of or relevant to the plaintiff’s state court complaint. Where the defendant’s petition for removal is based on diversity, it must contain in its ‘statement of the facts which entitle [the defendant] ... to removal’ the citizenship of the parties, a necessary jurisdictional fact in federal court, but a fact irrelevant to jurisdiction in the state court. The question then becomes which paragraph of § 1446(b) is applicable to that third category of cases in which the initial pleading does not on its face provide the necessary information for removal. If one reads the second paragraph’s opening proviso — ‘[i]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, ... . ’— to mean “[i]f the initial pleading does not set out the required elements of a removable case, ....”, then the second paragraph of § 1446(b) seemingly would apply. However, if the se”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“However, this court does not believe that it is necessary for all defendants actually to sign the petition. Requiring all defendants to sign would be a senseless formalism. As long as all defendants consent to removal within 30 days after service upon them of the complaint, (footnote omitted), the requirement that all defendants “join” in the petition is satisfied. See, Crompton v. Park Ward Motors, Inc., 477 F.Supp. 699, 701 (E.D.Pa. 1979) (“all defendants must join in or consent to removal” within 30 day period); Sicinski v. Reliance Funding Corp., 461 F.Supp. 649, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (removal valid despite failure of all defendants to sign petition where petition stated that all consented and non-signing defendants submitted affidavit of consent after 30 day period had expired); Crawford v. Fargo Mfg. Co., 341 F.Supp. 762, 763 (M.D.Fla.1972) (recognizing that all defendants must join in petition but not requiring all to sign); Stangard Dickerson Corp. v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 33 F.Supp. 449, 451 (D.N.J. 1940) (removal valid although only one defendant signed, remaining defendants filed separate paper consenting to petition).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[T]he Court can think of no compelling policy reasons for denying ... the right to remove [the] state appeal to this Court. Moreover, neither comity nor state court expertise weighs in favor of denying removal. Given the highly complex nature of special education of the handicapped, the state courts can certainly claim no greater expertise in determining what is an “appropriate” special education than this court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.