State v. Blanton

                                                        Office of the
                                                            Director                        New Mexico
                                                                                            Compilation
                                                         2023.05.15                         Commission
                                                    '00'06- 10:38:32
          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: October 17, 2022

No. A-1-CA-38808

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DALE BLANTON,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Christina P. Argyres, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Santa Fe, NM
Luz C. Valverde, Assistant Appellate Defender
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                                       OPINION

IVES, Judge.

{1}    The question in this appeal is whether the State’s use of a peremptory strike to
exclude the only Black member of the jury panel was substantially motivated by racial
discrimination. Defendant Dale Blanton objected to the strike pursuant to Batson v.
Kentucky, 

 (1986). The district court overruled the objection, and the jury
found Defendant guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-3-5(A), (C) (1969). We agree with Defendant that the district court
erred by rejecting his Batson claim and hold that (1) Defendant made a prima facie case
of racial discrimination; (2) the State proffered two race-neutral justifications for the
challenged peremptory strike; and (3) those justifications were pretexts for
discrimination in light of the State’s treatment of panel members similarly situated to the
member that the State struck. We therefore reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand
for a new trial. 1

BACKGROUND

{2}     A grand jury indicted Defendant for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon,
and the case proceeded to trial. During jury selection, the State used a peremptory
strike to exclude a potential juror, Belva Stamps, from serving as an alternate. Defense
counsel objected, arguing that allowing the strike would violate Batson when Ms.
Stamps was the only Black person in the venire, she had not spoken during voir dire,
and the State had not directed any questions to her. The prosecutor responded that his
reason for striking Ms. Stamps was that she had not spoken during voir dire, adding that
he had not realized Ms. Stamps is Black. After defense counsel contended that Ms.
Stamps’s silence was not a legitimate reason for exercising a peremptory strike under
the circumstances, the district court admonished the State, “Let’s have some more.”
The prosecutor then reiterated that Ms. Stamps had not spoken during voir dire and
added that, because Ms. Stamps indicated on her juror questionnaire that she had
some paralegal training, the State was “afraid she might use some of her legal
knowledge.” In response, defense counsel called Ms. Stamps’s silence a “sham reason”
when the State had not asked her any questions and argued that the explanation that
Ms. Stamps had legal knowledge did not hold up to scrutiny either when the State had
not sought to exclude a police officer from serving as a juror. The district court overruled
the Batson challenge, stating that the court did not have an issue with the State’s
explanation and reasoning that, because Ms. Stamps would have been seated as the
second alternate juror, it was unlikely she would have deliberated on the case in any
event. Defendant was convicted, and he appeals.

DISCUSSION

{3}     Peremptory strikes may not be used “to exclude otherwise unbiased and wellqualified individuals solely on the basis of their race, gender, economic status, or any
other similar discriminatory characteristic.” State v. House, 

, 

, 

. When the prosecution does so in a criminal case, it “violates
[the] defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies . . . the protection that a trial
by jury is intended to secure:” that one’s rights be determined by one’s peers or equals.
Batson, 

. “In the eyes of the Constitution, one racially discriminatory
peremptory strike is one too many.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 

(2019). The defendant suffers an equal protection violation when “the prosecution use[s]
any of its peremptory challenges” to exclude a member of a protected class from the
jury because of that membership, even if the petit jury turns out to be a representative
one. State v. Gonzales, 

, ¶ 17, 

, 

. The
accused is not the only person harmed by discriminatory jury selection. Every person

1Because we reverse under Batson, we do not address Defendant’s argument that fundamental error
resulted from a mistake in the instructions the jury received on the doctrine of self-defense.
who is excluded from jury service is deprived of the constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws, id. ¶ 15, and, in addition, suffers “a profound personal humiliation
heightened by its public character.” Powers v. Ohio, 

 (1991). The
courthouse walls do not contain this harm. It spills out and “touch[es] the entire
community,” Batson, 

, “cast[ing] doubt on the integrity of the judicial
process,” Powers, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and
“undermin[ing] public confidence in the system.” Gonzales, 

, ¶ 15.

{4}     In analyzing Defendant’s claim that a discriminatory strike occurred here, we
defer to the district court’s factual determinations but review its conclusion on
constitutionality de novo. State v. Salas, 

, 

, 

; see also Bustos v. City of Clovis, 

, 

(clarifying that, while a district court’s findings are to be given great deference, the
conclusion as to the constitutional propriety of the peremptory challenge is reviewed de
novo because the ultimate issue in Batson challenges relates to conduct, which requires
the reviewing court to consider “evaluative judgments, . . . which are also inherently
factual”); State v. Jones, 

, 

, 

 (explaining
that “an appellate court need not defer to a trial court on whether a reason [given by a
party for exercising a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror] is constitutionally
adequate”).

{5}     A three-part test guides our analysis. First, we ask whether Defendant carried his
burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State’s use of
the strike. Salas, 

. If we conclude that he did, the second step is
to ask whether the State carried its burden of coming forward with a race-neutral
explanation for its use of the strike. Id. ¶ 32. If it did, we proceed to the third step and
ask whether Defendant showed that the State’s race-neutral explanation “is in fact
pretext for a racially discriminatory motive.” State v. Martinez, 

,

, 

.

{6}    In this case, we conclude that both a prima facie showing of discrimination and
race-neutral explanations are present and that those explanations are pretexts for racial
discrimination. We therefore reverse. 2

I.      Defendant Made a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination

{7}    A prima facie case of discrimination has two elements: (1) the excluded juror
must be a member of a protected class, and (2) the surrounding circumstances must
suggest that the sole motive for using the strike was the juror’s membership within that
class. Salas, 

. The State essentially concedes that Defendant
made a prima facie case here. And, although this Court is not bound by the State’s

2Contrary to a remark the district court made when it rejected Defendant’s Batson challenge, it is legally
insignificant that Ms. Stamps was a prospective alternate juror. When a prospective juror is struck
because of membership within a protected class, it does not matter whether the juror who takes the
excluded juror’s place ultimately deliberates on the case, and, thus, even the discriminatory exclusion of a
prospective alternate requires reversal. Bustos, 

.
concession on appeal, see State v. Montoya, 

, 

,
we believe that concession is appropriate because (1) the stricken juror, Ms. Stamps, is
Black and is thus a member of a protected racial group, see generally Batson, 

; and (2) Ms. Stamps was the only Black person in the venire, raising a
presumption of discriminatory motive in the State’s decision to exclude her from the jury.
See Martinez, 

 (“Courts are in near universal agreement . . . that
a party’s decision to strike all the members of a particular race establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination.”). We therefore proceed to the second step of the analysis.

II.    The State Gave Two Race-Neutral Explanations for the Strike

{8}     The State bears the burden at Batson’s second step, and the question is whether
“a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [State’s] explanation” for using a peremptory
strike to exclude Ms. Stamps. Salas, 

 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Because neither of the State’s explanations—that Ms. Stamps did
not speak during voir dire and that she had paralegal training—is inherently
discriminatory, we conclude that both are race-neutral and proceed to step three.

III.   Defendant Proved the State’s Race-Neutral Explanations Were Pretextual

{9}     Having concluded that the parties carried their respective burdens at the first two
steps of the analysis, we reach the third step and the dispositive issue in this case:
whether Defendant proved purposeful racial discrimination in the State’s attempt to
exclude Ms. Stamps from the jury. 

 Our task is to determine whether the State “was
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent,” Flowers, 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and the State’s “proffer of [a] pretextual
explanation naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Snyder v.
Louisiana, 

 (2008). “By far the most common factor noted by courts
holding a state’s explanations to be pretextual is a varying treatment of [panel members
of different races].” State v. Goode, 

, ¶ 11, 

, 

. “When a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a [B]lack panelist applies just as
well to an otherwise similar, [non-Black] panelist who is permitted to serve, that is
evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Flowers, 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Potential jurors need not be “identical in
all respects” to allow for a meaningful comparison. Miller-El v. Dretke, 

,
247 n.6 (2005). Here, a comparative-juror analysis suggests that each of the State’s
race-neutral explanations was pretextual, and we therefore conclude that Defendant
carried his burden of proving discriminatory intent.

A.     Ms. Stamps’s Silence Was Pretext

{10} To determine whether the State’s proffered justifications for excluding Ms.
Stamps were pretexts for racial discrimination, we begin by examining the plausibility of
the justification that the State proffered first. See 

 (recognizing that it can be
difficult to explain one’s reasons for exercising a peremptory strike but that, “when
illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his
reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives”); 

(“A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational
basis.”). We recognize that it may be constitutionally permissible to use a peremptory
strike to exclude a potential juror of a protected class based on an “assertion of
unresponsiveness,” State v. Bailey, 

, 

, 

, so long as that justification is not pretextual. But in this case, the limited record
before us compels a conclusion that Ms. Stamps’s silence during voir dire was a
pretextual reason for excluding her.

{11} Here, the empaneled jury included three other venire members who never spoke
during voir dire. 3 These jurors were H.D. and E.C., who were seated, respectively, as
jurors eleven and twelve, and D.J., who was seated as the first alternate. Thus, we are
able to conclude that, before the State sought to exclude Ms. Stamps, offering that she
had not spoken during voir dire as its reason for doing so, at least two other venire
members who had not spoken during voir dire were empaneled as jurors. The State had
three peremptory strikes available in seating the twelve-person jury and one peremptory
strike available in seating the two alternate jurors. Rule 5-606(D)(1)(c), (3) NMRA. The
State used its third and final strike for the twelve-person jury in seating juror eleven,
evidencing a willingness to empanel H.D. and E.C., the next two jurors in line. And the
State did not use a peremptory strike in seating the first alternate, evidencing a
willingness to empanel D.J. But none of these three venire members (H.D., E.C., and
D.J.) spoke during voir dire. 4 Our review of the record thus leads us to conclude that the
State’s initial justification was pretextual.

B.      Ms. Stamps’s Legal Knowledge Was Also Pretext

{12} Having determined that the State’s first explanation for excluding Ms. Stamps
applied with equal force to other venire members whom the State accepted, we have a
good reason to be skeptical of the State’s other explanation: her legal knowledge. See
Snyder, 

 (declining to sustain a peremptory strike of a Black juror
based on one of two proffered race-neutral justifications when the Court had concluded
that the other was pretextual because it also applied to non-Black panel members
whom the prosecution had not sought to exclude). But this is not the only reason for
skepticism here. The State did not offer legal knowledge as an explanation until after
defense counsel objected to the State’s first explanation, which suggests that Ms.
Stamps’s legal knowledge was a pretextual justification. See Miller-El, 

-
46 (reasoning that the timing of a proffered justification, given only after defense
counsel pointed out that the prosecutor’s first justification had been premised on a


3We identified these jurors by comparing the audio recording of voir dire with the court reporter’s log.
4We decline to treat silence during voir dire as a quality that any other venire member must have for us to
consider that member similarly situated to Ms. Stamps. Because the juror questionnaires are not part of
the record, we are unable to determine whether any prospective juror other than Ms. Stamps both did not
speak during voir dire and had legal knowledge. Although it may have benefitted from that information,
our comparative-juror analysis does not require it for two reasons. First, a meaningful comparative-juror
analysis does not require perfect similarity among the jurors under comparison. Miller-El, 

n.6. Second, Ms. Stamps’s silence is attributable in part to the State’s failure to ask any questions of her.
mischaracterization of what the potential juror said during voir dire, signaled that the
justification was pretext).

{13} Our conclusion regarding pretext is also supported by the State’s choices about
whether to question members of the venire who had legal knowledge. Although several
had legal knowledge, the State only questioned some of them, and the State chose not
to question Ms. Stamps. During voir dire, the State acknowledged that some members
of the venire, such as a probation officer and a former police officer, had “worked within
the judicial system” and proceeded to question some of those people about how their
work experience might impact their ability to be impartial. Of one potential juror who
worked closely with law enforcement, the State asked whether she would be biased in
favor of law enforcement witnesses. The State also asked a former police officer in the
venire about the officer’s potential biases. A prosecutor was also on the panel, and the
State asked him whether he could be fair given his “knowledge of the legal system.”
Although the State raised a concern about Ms. Stamps’s legal knowledge, it did not ask
her a single question. Cf. Miller-El, 

 (noting that prosecutors did not
question further non-Black potential jurors about their self-reported disavowal of the
death penalty whereas they “expressed apprehension” about one Black potential juror
who expressed his approval of the death penalty). This contrasts with the State’s
conduct during voir dire with respect to other potential jurors who also had legal
experience. The State’s disparate questioning suggests that its concern about legal
knowledge is pretext for discrimination. See Goode, 

, ¶ 12; Flowers,

.

{14} Finally, we note that the State did not know anything about the nature or extent of
Ms. Stamps’s legal knowledge that would have given it reason to doubt her
qualifications to serve or that would have suggested that her service would have been
detrimental to the State. As the district court recognized, the parties knew from Ms.
Stamps’s juror questionnaire only “that her major area of study was paralegal studies”;
they did not know whether she had completed those studies or anything about her work
experience. In our view, an indeterminate amount of paralegal training in an unknown
area of the law in no way suggests that a juror is unqualified or biased. See Batson, 

 (explaining that peremptory challenges “traditionally have been viewed as
one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury”).

{15} Because the record in this case gives us several reasons to doubt that the State
excluded Ms. Stamps because of her legal knowledge, we conclude that the justification
was pretext. We next ask whether the exclusion of Ms. Stamps was motivated in
substantial part by racial discrimination. Flowers, 

.

C.     The Circumstances Require Reversal

{16} The State’s reliance on “pretextual explanation[s] naturally gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent.” Snyder, 

. The State argues that it
could not have had discriminatory intent because the prosecutor had not noticed Ms.
Stamps’s race when he exercised the challenged peremptory strike. But the law
ordinarily does not recognize claims of ignorance in this context. “[A] prosecutor’s bald
assertion that he or she did not know the [stricken] panel member’s race” is not an
explanation for exercising a peremptory strike and thus generally “should have no effect
on the court’s assessment of the nature of the state’s use of its peremptory challenges.”
Goode, 

, ¶ 20. However, in Goode, we recognized an exception to this
general rule. Goode involved “an unusual factual situation” in which it was “manifestly
reasonable” that the prosecutor lacked knowledge of the panel member’s race, and that
“militate[d] against a determination that the challenge was racially motivated.” 

 We
think Goode is distinguishable.

{17} In Goode, “the unusual fact that the prosecutor, defense counsel and the trial
judge all failed to recognize [the stricken juror’s race]” “buttressed” the Court’s holding
that the state had not given a pretextual explanation for using a peremptory strike to
exclude the only Black person in the venire. Id. ¶¶ 2, 19-20. But the Court explained that
in a case involving “some evidence that similarly-situated [Black and non-Black] panel
members were treated differently, [the Court] could conclude that a peremptory
challenge exercised without questioning a [Black] panel member was a mere pretext for
a racially-motivated exclusion.” Id. ¶ 19. As we have explained, this is such a case. And,
in light of the evidence that the prosecutor gave a pretextual justification for excluding
Ms. Stamps after defense counsel identified Ms. Stamps’s race in raising a Batson
challenge, we do not think it matters whether the prosecutor knew Ms. Stamps’s race
when he exercised the peremptory strike. Even if we credit the prosecutor’s assertion
that he did not know Ms. Stamps’s race when he first sought to exclude her, we are in
no position to reject the claim of discrimination where the State, once made aware of
Ms. Stamps’s race, relied on pretext to justify the peremptory strike.

{18} In sum, because Defendant made a prima facie case of discriminatory motive
and because the only race-neutral justifications that the State has offered are
pretextual, purposeful discrimination is the presumptive explanation for striking Ms.
Stamps. Cf. Bustos, 

 (reasoning that “[t]here may have been
proper, race-neutral reasons why [the proponent of a peremptory strike] wanted another
juror ‘further down the line’” but that the record “fail[ed] to disclose what those reasons
might have been,” leaving this Court no “constitutionally permissible, race-neutral
reason[]” for affirming the peremptory excusal of a prospective juror of a protected
class). Absent any other explanation for the State’s use of a peremptory strike against
the only prospective Black juror, we hold that the peremptory excusal of Ms. Stamps
violated equal protection principles and that Defendant’s conviction must be reversed.

CONCLUSION

{19}   We reverse and remand for a new trial.

{20}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge