State v. Lopez

                                                              Office of the Director
                                                               15:56:17 2023.05.26         New Mexico
                                                                                           Compilation
                                                                             '00'06-       Commission
                                                                   2020.005.30467
             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: March 30, 2023

No. S-1-SC-38802

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TITO LOPEZ,

       Defendant-Petitioner.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Cristina T. Jaramillo, District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Steven James Forsberg, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Walter M. Hart III, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

                                       OPINION

ZAMORA, Justice.

{1}      In this opinion, we address whether the tolling provision contained in Rule 7-
506.1(D) NMRA of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Metropolitan Courts applies
to cases that are dismissed without prejudice by the court in addition to cases
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. In the metropolitan court, “[t]he trial of a
criminal citation or complaint shall be commenced within one hundred eighty-two (182)
days after” the date of arraignment or after the date of one of six other events
enumerated in the rule, whichever occurs last. Rule 7-506(B) NMRA. However, “[i]f a
citation or complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the charges are later refiled,”
“[t]he time between dismissal and refiling shall not be counted as part of the unexpired
time for trial under Rule 7-506.” Rule 7-506.1(D). We hold that this tolling provision
applies with equal force to cases dismissed by the court and to cases voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution and conclude that, with the benefit of the tolling provision
here, the time for the State to bring Defendant Tito Lopez to trial did not expire before
Defendant entered into his conditional plea agreement. We therefore affirm Defendant’s
conviction.

I.     BACKGROUND

{2}    On January 19, 2018, Defendant was arraigned in the metropolitan court on
charges including aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI) and reckless driving. As
applied to this case, Rule 7-506(B) required Defendant’s trial to commence within 182
days of arraignment, which would have run on July 20, 2018, assuming that no
extensions of time were granted under Rule 7-506(C) and that no tolling was warranted
under Rule 7-506.1(D).

{3}    The case was initially set for trial on April 30, 2018, but was continued to June 4,
2018, because Defendant had not received a police lapel video. The arresting officer did
not appear on June 4, and the State could not explain his absence. The State requested
a continuance, and Defendant moved to dismiss. The metropolitan court dismissed the
case without prejudice because the State was not prepared for trial.

{4}      On June 14, 2018, the State filed a notice of refiling of the dismissed complaint.
Several days later, the metropolitan court sent a notice of jury trial to the parties, setting
trial for July 18, 2018, but on the following day issued sua sponte a new notice to the
parties resetting trial for July 24, 2018, with instructions to disregard the previous
setting.

{5}     On July 23, 2018, one day before the scheduled trial date, Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 7-506(B), arguing
that the State’s deadline to try Defendant was July 20. At the July 24 trial setting,
Defendant argued that the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) applies only to voluntary
dismissals, and that to apply the tolling provision in circumstances where the court
dismisses a case as a sanction against the State would lead to an absurd result
because the State would benefit from its own mistake. The State argued that the tolling
provision of the rule does not itself differentiate between voluntary and court-ordered
dismissals and that applying the tolling provision equally to court-ordered dismissals
and voluntary dismissals would not affect the substantial rights of Defendant. The
metropolitan court agreed with the State and concluded that the 182-day rule was tolled
for ten days under Rule 7-506.1(D)⸺stating that “time between dismissal [on June 4]
and refiling [on June 14] shall not be counted as part of the unexpired time for trial” and
accordingly ruled that the extended deadline to bring Defendant to trial was July 30,
2018. Defendant then entered a conditional plea, reserving the right to challenge the
tolling issue on appeal.

{6}    Defendant timely appealed to the district court, which affirmed the metropolitan
court. The district court reasoned that because any dismissal without prejudice can be
refiled and because Rule 7-506.1 applies to “both voluntary dismissals and refiled
proceedings,” the provisions of the rule addressing refiled complaints apply to a
dismissal without prejudice “regardless of whether it is initiated by the State or the
court.”

{7}    Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court,
agreed with the analysis of the district court, and concluded that Defendant “failed to
demonstrate error by the district court.” State v. Lopez, A-1-CA-38049, mem. op. ¶ 4
(N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2021) (nonprecedential). We granted certiorari to address
whether the metropolitan court’s dismissal of the case without prejudice tolled the trial
deadline under Rule 7-506.1(D).

II.    DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review

{8}    The outcome of this appeal turns on the proper interpretation of Rule 7-506.1(D),
a legal question that we review de novo. See State v. Sanchez, 

,

.

B.     The Tolling Provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) Applies to All Criminal Cases
       Dismissed Without Prejudice in the Metropolitan Court

{9}    Defendant argues that the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) is not intended to
apply to dismissals without prejudice by the court because the overall purpose of the
metropolitan court rules and the court’s authority to dismiss cases without prejudice as a
sanction against the state would be undermined if the tolling provision applied to court-ordered dismissals without prejudice. The State counters that the plain language of Rule
7-506.1(D) applies to all dismissals without prejudice “and is not in any way limited to
voluntary dismissals filed by the State.” We agree with the State.

{10} We interpret our rules of procedure “by seeking to determine the underlying
intent of the enacting authority.” State v. Villanueva, 

, 

. “When construing our procedural rules, we use the same rules of construction
applicable to the interpretation of statutes. We begin by examining the plain language of
the rule as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the
rule and the object and purpose.” Sanchez, 

 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Our plain language review is not mechanical, however, as
“[w]e interpret the Rules of Criminal Procedure with logic and common sense to avoid
absurd results.” Walker v. Walton, 

, 

, 

.

{11} Rule 7-506.1, titled “Voluntary dismissal and refiled proceedings,” provides in
Rule 7-506.1(D):

       If a citation or complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the charges
       are later refiled, the case shall be treated as a continuation of the same
       case, and the trial on the refiled charges shall be commenced within the
       unexpired time for trial under Rule 7-506 NMRA, unless the court, after
       notice and a hearing, finds the refiled complaint should not be treated as a
       continuation of the same case. The time between dismissal and refiling
       shall not be counted as part of the unexpired time for trial under Rule 7-
       506 NMRA.

Under the rules of construction, “we first turn to the plain meaning of the words at issue,
often using the dictionary for guidance.” State v. Boyse, 

, 

. “The plain language of the statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent.”
State v. Olsson, 

, 

. The term “dismissal” is not
defined in our Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor does our case law directly define the
term in this context. Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines “dismissal without prejudice”
as a “dismissal that does not bar the plaintiff from refiling the lawsuit within the
limitations period.” Dismissal, Black’s Law Dictionary, 589-90 (11th ed. 2019). This
definition includes dismissals initiated by either party or the court in a criminal case. See

{12} Additionally, our rules and case law reflect that dismissals without prejudice are
commonly understood to include both voluntary dismissals initiated by the prosecution
and dismissals ordered by the court. See Rule 7-506.1(A) (“The prosecution may
dismiss a citation or criminal complaint by filing a notice of dismissal . . . . Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice.”); Walker, 2003-
NMSC-014, ¶¶ 1, 3 (explaining that a metropolitan court judge dismissed a case without
prejudice because witness interviews had not been completed at the time of the
scheduled trial date). Moreover, our appellate courts have referred to “dismissals
without prejudice” in the civil context as inclusive of both dismissals ordered by a court,
see Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque v. Nelson, 

, 

, 

, and dismissals initiated by a plaintiff, see Becenti v. Becenti, 2004-
NMCA-091, ¶¶ 2, 5, 

, 

. We presume this Court was aware of
existing rules and case law when we amended Rule 7-506.1(D). Cf. State v. Thompson,

, ¶ 18, 

 (“We . . . presume that the Legislature is well
informed and aware of existing statutory and common law.”). Thus, from a textual
perspective, it is clear that the term “dismissed without prejudice” as used in Rule 7-
506.1(D) was intended to apply to both voluntary and involuntary dismissals.

{13} Beyond the plain meaning of the term “dismissed without prejudice” as it appears
in Rule 7-506.1(D), we also examine the rule in its entirety, “constru[ing] each part in
connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole and consider[ing] the
practical effects of our interpretation.” Reule Sun Corp. v. Valles, 

, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 7-
506.1(A) and (B) by their terms apply only to voluntary dismissals initiated by the state.
Rule 7-506.1(A) sets out the procedure for the prosecution to dismiss a citation or
criminal complaint, referring to those dismissals as “[v]oluntary dismissal[s].” The bail
bond provisions of Rule 7-506.1(B) follow suit, referring specifically to “notice[s] of
dismissal under Paragraph A of this rule.” In contrast, Rule 7-506.1(C) and (D) of the
rule do not distinguish between dismissals by the state and court-ordered dismissals in
delineating the form and procedure to be followed by the state in refiling a citation or
complaint that has been “dismissed without prejudice.”

{14} In general, courts “presume differences in language . . . convey differences in
meaning” when interpreting statutes. Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582
U.S.79, 86 (2017); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (Thomson/West 2012) (observing that, under the
presumption of consistent usage, “a material variation in terms suggests a variation in
meaning”); State v. Jade G., 

, 

, 

(“[W]hen the Legislature includes a particular word in one portion of a statute and omits
it from another portion of that statute, such omission is presumed to be intentional.”).
The textual differences between the specific provisions of Rule 7-506.1(A) and (B) and
the generic provisions of Rule 7-506.1(C) and (D) strongly suggest that the former were
meant to apply only to voluntary, state-initiated dismissals without prejudice while the
latter were meant to apply more broadly to all dismissals without prejudice. Were the
tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) intended to apply only to voluntary dismissals
without prejudice, it presumably would have contained language to that effect, such as
the language of Rule 7-506.1(B) referring to a citation or complaint that is voluntarily
dismissed without prejudice by the state “under Paragraph A of this rule.”

{15} The title of Rule 7-506.1, “Voluntary dismissals and refiled proceedings,” does
not affect our conclusion that Rule 7-506.1(D) applies to both voluntary and court-ordered dismissals without prejudice for two reasons. First, we will only use the title of
an act if it is necessary to the act’s construction. See Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. D’Antonio, 

, ¶ 18, 

. Second,
even if we were to consider the title of Rule 7-506.1, the title refers to voluntary
dismissals and refiled proceedings. The coordinating conjunction “and” links
independent ideas. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 

 (2011); see also
N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp. v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 

, 217 (2d Cir. 2021)
(“A coordinating [con]junction like ‘and’ is typically used for linking independent ideas.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, the title of Rule 7-506.1
addresses the independent procedures of voluntary dismissals and refiled proceedings;
“voluntary dismissals” does not qualify or modify “refiled proceedings.” These
independent procedures may overlap: refiled proceedings may include cases refiled
after dismissal by the court, not just after voluntary dismissal by the prosecution. The
plain language of Rule 7-506.1(D), when read in the context of the rest of the rule,
indicates that we intended to apply the tolling provision to all dismissals without
prejudice, including those ordered by the metropolitan court.

{16} The history of Rule 7-506.1(D) further supports our conclusion that a case
dismissed without prejudice under this rule includes dismissals ordered by the court in
addition to those initiated by the state. In Walker, this Court considered the application
of Rule 7-506(D) (1999) to a dismissal without prejudice ordered by the metropolitan
court. 

. At that time, Rule 7-506(D) (1999) stated,

       If criminal charges are dismissed without prejudice and later refiled, the
       trial on the refiled charges shall be commenced within the unexpired time
       for trial pursuant to Paragraph E of this rule, unless the court, after notice
       and a hearing, finds good cause for the trial to commence within one
       hundred eighty-two (182) days.

Rule 7-506(E) (1999) mandated that a case be dismissed with prejudice if it was not
brought to trial within 182 days of the defendant’s arrest or filing of a complaint or
citation against the defendant, whichever occurred later. In Walker, the metropolitan
judge dismissed the case without prejudice after the state was unprepared for jury trial
for the second time. 

. The state subsequently filed a notice of
refiling and a complaint identical to the original. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant then filed a notice
of excusal of the original judge. Id. ¶ 5. A second metropolitan court judge held that the
notice of excusal was invalid for reasons including that it was not timely filed. Id.; see
also Rule 7-106(D) NMRA (1999) (setting out timing for filing an excusal). This Court
held that the refiled charges were to be considered a continuation of the original
charges under Rule 7-506(D) NMRA (1999) and that the time for the defendant to file
his notice of excusal had therefore expired. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Although Walker concerned
the predecessor to the rule at issue in this case, its holding rested on the premise that a
dismissal without prejudice ordered by the metropolitan court was governed by Rule 7-
506(D) (1999). See Walker, 

. Rule 7-506(D) (1999) is
substantially similar to Rule 7-506.1(D) except for the additional tolling provision, the
last sentence of Rule 7-506.1(D).

{17} Despite subsequent amendments and technical changes, the substance of
current Rule 7-506.1(D) is the same as prior versions of the rule—that is, when charges
are refiled after a dismissal without prejudice, the default rule is that the case is treated
as though it were the same case as the one originally filed. Compare Rule 7-506(D)
(1999) with Rule 7-506.1(D); see also Walker, 

. Nothing in the
amendments to the rule since Walker was decided suggests that the rules committee or
this Court intended to exclude dismissals by the metropolitan court from this continuity
rule. Cf. State v. Chavez, 

, 

, 

 (“This
Court presumes that the Legislature is aware of existing case law and acts with
knowledge of it.”). Thus, just as Walker applied Rule 7-506(D) (1999) to a dismissal
without prejudice ordered by the metropolitan court, we conclude that this Court
intended to apply Rule 7-506.1(D), including the tolling provision added to this rule in
2017, to dismissals of that type as well.

{18} Defendant argues that it would be absurd to apply the tolling provision of Rule 7-
506.1 (D) to involuntary dismissals without prejudice because to do so would effectively
render a dismissal without prejudice a mere “de fact[o] continuance,” benefitting the
prosecution for its own mistake. This would require a metropolitan court judge to resort
to the drastic step of dismissing a case with prejudice in order to punish a “dilatory
prosecution.” We are unpersuaded. Dismissals without prejudice remain an effective
sanction even if the 182-day rule is tolled under Rule 7-506.1(D) because they serve as
a cautionary warning to the state that more severe sanctions may be in order if it
continues to be unprepared for trial. Our Court of Appeals emphasized this same
concept in the context of local discovery rules in State v. Seigling, 

, 

. In Seigling, the district court excluded witnesses and suppressed all
audio and video evidence after the state failed to satisfy the discovery requirements of
LR 2-400(D) (2014). Id. ¶¶ 6-7. On the state’s appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the
defendant’s argument that the local rule conflicted with State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC-
044, ¶ 21, 

, 

, which requires courts to consider lesser
sanctions before excluding witnesses or dismissing a case without prejudice for
violating discovery orders. Seigling, 

. The Court reasoned that
the local rule “clearly contemplate[d] that dismissals without prejudice will be utilized” by
the district court and would “warn[] the [s]tate that further failures to adhere to the
requirements of the local rule may result in the [s]tate being disallowed from prosecuting
[the d]efendant.” 

 As Seigling appropriately recognized, dismissals without prejudice
can be a useful deterrent against dilatory prosecutions by putting the state on notice
that any further delay in trial caused by the state would likely result in a harsher
sanction, including the outright dismissal of the case with prejudice. See 

{19} Rather than accepting the State’s interpretation of Rule 7-506.1(D) as absurd, we
submit that adopting Defendant’s reading of Rule 7-506.1(D) and excluding involuntary
dismissals without prejudice from the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) could lead to
the unwanted result of insulating the state from the refiling requirements of Rule 7-
506.1(C) for court-ordered dismissals. This Court interprets “identical words used in
different parts of the same act as having the same meaning.” Jade G., 2007-NMSC-
010, ¶ 28 (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). By their plain
language, Rule 7-506.1(C) and (D) both apply to citations or complaints that are
“dismissed without prejudice.” See Rule 7-506.1(C) (providing the procedure for refiling
complaints after “a citation or complaint is dismissed without prejudice”); Rule 7-
506.1(D) (“If a citation or complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the charges are
later refiled, the case shall be treated as a continuation of the same case, and the trial
on the refiled charges shall be commenced within the unexpired time for trial under Rule
7-506 NMRA.”). If the phrase “dismissed without prejudice” is interpreted to exclude
court-ordered dismissals without prejudice under Rule 7-506.1(D), there would be no
principled reason to include such dismissals without prejudice within the ambit of Rule
7-506.1(C). We reject this inconsistent reading of Rule 7-506.1(C) whereby the refiling
requirements would apply to the prosecution’s voluntary dismissals without prejudice
but not to court-ordered dismissals without prejudice.

{20} We conclude that giving effect to the plain language of Rule 7-506.1(D) by
including court-ordered dismissals in the tolling provision of the rule would not lead to an
absurd or unjust result but rather is necessary to promote a consistent reading of the
language of the rule. Therefore, we hold that the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D)
applies equally to dismissals without prejudice ordered by the metropolitan court as it
does to dismissals filed by the prosecution.

C.     The Time for Trial Under Rule 7-506 Did Not Expire Before Defendant
       Entered His Guilty Plea

{21} Having determined that the time for trial under Rule 7-506 is tolled between a
dismissal without prejudice by the metropolitan court and the refiling of the complaint,
we conclude that the time to bring Defendant to trial had not expired before he entered
into the conditional plea agreement. The metropolitan court dismissed the complaint
against Defendant without prejudice on June 4, 2018. At that point, the deadline to bring
Defendant to trial was July 20, 2018. The State refiled the complaint against Defendant
on June 14, 2018. The ten days between dismissal and refiling did not count toward the
unexpired time for trial under Rule 7-506. See Rule 7-506.1(D). Therefore, the deadline
to bring Defendant to trial was July 30, 2018. The July 24 trial setting was within the
unexpired time to bring Defendant to trial, and the conditional plea agreement was
therefore timely.

III.   CONCLUSION

{22} We hold that the tolling provision of Rule 7-506.1(D) applies to cases that are
dismissed without prejudice including cases dismissed by the metropolitan court and
cases voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution. We affirm Defendant’s conviction
because the time to bring him to trial had not expired prior to entry of his conditional
guilty plea.

{23}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice

DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice

JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice