Commonwealth v. Moose’s Empirical Analysis
1992
Citation profile
80 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 80 later decisions — most recently January 2021 · most notably Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal (1998), Commonwealth v. Morales (1997)
80 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · United States v. Agurs · Giglio v. United States · Napue v. People of the State of Illinois · Massiah v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 80 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In essence, what the district attorney appears to have attempted to do was to try his case with last minute disclosures. Such a plan was fundamentally unfair and violated the discovery rules. The purpose of the discovery rules is to permit the parties in a criminal matter to be prepared for trial. Trial by ambush is contrary to the spirit and letter of those rules and cannot be condoned. We agree with the statement of the Superior Court in a similar instance, remarking that “[o]ur court has condemned such gamesmanship in criminal prosecutions.” Commonwealth v. Thiel, 323 Pa.Super. 92, 100 , 470 A.2d 145, 149 (1983). In Thiel , the Commonwealth “left the [evidence] conspicuously out of its short pretrial list of tangible evidence in its possession, and used the [evidence] skillfully in rebuttal.” Id. See also Comment to Rule 305.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“The actions of the trial judge in this instance are rather inexplicable, as he indicated during the colloquy about the rebuttal evidence that he had excluded the evidence. {See infra excerpts of testimony). The judge’s decision to reverse himself without explanation during the middle of trial constituted an abuse of discretion. What is particularly harmful about this case is that the appellee evidently relied upon the agreement not to use the statement of Oglesby. In fact, defense counsel stated during a conference with the judge at the commencement of trial that he did not need a copy of the statement, since Oglesby would not be testifying. Furthermore, in reliance upon the agreement that the statement would not be used, the appellee took the stand— unaware of the precise content of Ogles-by’s statement and certainly not knowing that it would be used to impeach him. This reasonable reliance on the statements of the district attorney and the prior ruling of the trial court deprived the appellee of due process of law. Once the district attorney stated unconditionally that he would not use the statement and the trial court permitted the trial to proceed on that basis, it was fair to assume the statement was not to be used for any purpose, including rebuttal. “Discovery decisions ... recognize that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose possible impeachment or rebuttal evidence may highly prejudice the defendant’s case and lead to reversible error when the evidence is sprung on ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Although the district attorney denied that he instructed [the informant] to gather information, it is clear from the testimony that [the informant] was acting as an agent of the Commonwealth when he was in jail. [The informant] had been in the county jail for three years waiting to be sentenced; the Commonwealth repeatedly delayed sentencing every time [the informant] produced a new confession. Although the district attorney may not have given [the informant] specific instructions, it is clear that [the infor mant] was well aware of what he had to do while in jail to get a good recommendation at his sentencing. It is not significant that [the informant] was not planted for the purpose of gaining information from a targeted defendant. The fact that the Commonwealth intentionally left him there to harvest information from anyone charged with a crime and awaiting trial is the villainy. The vast majority of people in county jail are charged with crimes and awaiting trial and they have a right to counsel when interrogated about the crimes with which they are charged.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.