Volume 529 — United States Reports

This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 529 of the United States Reports:

United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case. Johnson was sentenced in federal court for multiple violations of federal criminal provisions. He was sentenced terms of imprisonment for the violations and, in addition, a three-year mandatory term of supervised release for the drug possession offenses. After he had served 2½ years in federal prison, two of his convictions, not including the drug possession convictions, were declared invalid; as a result, he had served too much prison time, which resulted in his being eligible for immediate release. He argued that his time in federal prison should be credited against his three years of supervised release.

Respondent was convicted on New York criminal charges after a trial that required the jury to decide whether it believed the testimony of the victim and her friend or the conflicting testimony of… Held: The prosecutor's comments did not violate respondent's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that certain state regulations regarding oil tankers and oil barges are preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in deference to the extensive body of federal regulations affecting these classes of vessels.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), is an important United States Supreme Court case in U.S. administrative law. It ruled that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products as "drugs" or "devices." This was later superseded by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, which granted the FDA the authority to regulate such products.

Petitioner Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., and respondent Bill Harbert Construction Company agreed, inter alia, that any disputes arising from Harbert's construction of a Mississippi mill for Cortez Byrd… Held: The FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute. Pp. 3-11.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that product design is not inherently distinctive trade dress.

Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), is a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that public universities may subsidize campus groups by means of a mandatory student activity fee without violating the students' First Amendment rights.

Respondent escaped while serving a life sentence for murder, committed another murder, and was sentenced to a second life term. Held: The Court of Appeals' analysis failed to reveal whether retroactive application of the amendment to Rule 475-3-.05(2) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The controlling inquiry is whether such application creates a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. Morales, supra, at 509.

Florida v. J. L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court determined that a police officer may not legally stop and frisk someone based solely on an anonymous tip that describes a person's location and appearance, but does not furnish information as to any illegal conduct.

Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding nude dancing as free speech. The court held that an ordinance banning public nudity did not violate the free speech rights of a nude entertainment establishment's operator, employees, or customers.

Bond v United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case that applied the ruling of Minnesota v. Dickerson to luggage, which held that police may not physically manipulate items without a warrant without violating the Fourth Amendment. The Court ruled that this satisfied the two prong test established by Katz v. United States that, (1) a subjective expectation of privacy in the area in question and (2) that the expectation is reasonable in order for the protections of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the Court ruled that since the Defendant tried to preserve his privacy by using an opaque bag and that it is reasonable for the Defendant to believe that his bag would not be felt in an "exploratory manner" that the two prongs were satisfied.

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate regulations and issue orders for railroad safety, and it requires the Secretary to maintain a… Held: The FRSA, in conjunction with 646.214(b)(3) and (4), pre-empts state tort claims concerning a railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning devices at crossings where federal funds have participated in the devices' installation.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case decided on April 18, 2000. It concerned a federal habeas corpus petition brought by convicted murderer Terry Williams, who alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Supreme Court's prior decision in Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court's decision in this case was split across two majority opinions, one authored by John Paul Stevens and joined by five other justices, and the other authored by Sandra Day O'Connor and joined by four other justices.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the interpretation of a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The case was argued on February 28, 2000, and decided on April 18, 2000. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the provision at issue only bars evidentiary hearings by state prisoners in federal habeas proceedings if "there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or his counsel". This case concerned a convicted murderer, Michael Wayne Williams, who was incarcerated at Sussex State Prison in Waverly, Virginia. It was decided on the same day as another case called Williams v.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a certificate of appealability must be issued by a circuit Justice of judge before an appeal can proceed. The certificate of appealability (COA) may only be issued if the applicant "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right."

Held: “RICO was enacted with an express target — racketeering activity — and only those injuries that are proximately caused by racketeering activity should be actionable under the statute.” Ibid. 5 *500 We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1158 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy…

In 1996, petitioner was convicted on 15 counts of committing sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, Tex. Code Crim. Held: Petitioner's convictions on the counts at issue, insofar as they are not corroborated by other evidence, cannot be sustained under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Pp. 6_40. (a) In Calder v.

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), is a Supreme Court of the United States case holding that a county's policy of requiring employees to schedule time off to avoid accruing time off was not prohibited by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision that found unconstitutional parts of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 for exceeding powers granted to the US Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Along with United States v. Lopez (1995), it was part of a series of Rehnquist Court cases that limited Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with supervised release overseen by the sentencing court. Held: Section 3583(h) does not apply retroactively, so no ex post facto issue arises in this case. To prevail on his ex post facto claim, Johnson must show, inter alia, that the law operates retroactively.

Fischer v United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that the scope of the federal bribery statute 18 U.S.C. § 666(b), which applied to organizations that received "benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program", included funds received through Medicare.

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the rights of those serving federal probation and supervised release were more clearly defined. The court ruled that "Although such violations often lead to reimprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."

The Taylor Grazing Act, inter alia, grants the Secretary of the Interior authority to divide the public rangelands into grazing districts, to specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district,… Held: The regulatory changes do not exceed the Secretary's Taylor Grazing Act authority. Pp. 10_21.

Petitioner Ohler was tried on drug charges. Held: A defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not challenge the admission of such evidence on appeal.

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a private individual may not bring suit in a federal court on behalf of the United States against a State (or state agency) under the False Claims Act.

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required that cable television operators completely scramble or block channels that are "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" or limit their transmission to the hours of 10 pm to 6 am.

Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied by his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. The ensuing fire severely damaged the home. Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under §844(i). Pp. 3_10.

Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, 529 U.S. 861 (2000), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a federal automobile safety standard pre-empted a stricter state rule. The Court held that Alexis Geier, who suffered severe injuries in a 1987 Honda Accord, could not sue Honda for failing to install a driver-side airbag – a requirement under District of Columbia tort law but not Federal law – because Federal law pre-empted the District's rule.