Hines v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis
1999
Citation profile
17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently August 2011
17 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Doe v. Manheimer · Stewart v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. · Cranston Print Works Co. v. City of Cranston · Mahoney v. Beatman · Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he test for determining whether particular conduct is a proximate cause of an injury [is] whether it was a substantial factor in producing the result. . . . Speed alone, even rapid speed, does not suffice to establish proximate cause in a negligence action. . . . The fact that the defendant's particular speed resulted in his collision with the plaintiff at a specific point and time does not create a sufficient causal link to impose liability. The offer of proof does not indicate that the [defendant's] speed prevented him from avoiding a collision that he could have avoided if he were traveling at [the posted speed limit]. The defendant's particular speed is too remote and attenuated to constitute proximate cause.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Q: If we assume under any of your scenarios that [the plaintiff] would have applied his brakes in the same manner at the same point that he did in your opinion, but we change his speed from forty nine to fifty one, we take it down to thirty five, in your opinion would there have been a collision there? "A: I believe I opined to that in my deposition and it most probably would have been a miss. (Tr., 10/22/99, pp. 154-55.) Because "speed alone . . . does not suffice to establish proximate cause in a negligence action,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“brake squeak — most in reverse also when coming to a stop. " (Plaintiff's Exhibit E.) This evidence gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact. The defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate because the plaintiff has failed to produce expert testimony concerning the issue of general causation. "An expert witness ordinarily may not express an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, which must be decided by the trier of fact.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.