Rugan v. Sabin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

35 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “‘‘Has the complainant been guilty of such laches that he may not invoke the aid of a court of equity? Courts of chancery are not bound by, but in the application of the doctrine of laches they usually act or refuse to act in analogy to, the statute of limitations relating to actions at law of like character. Under ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will not be stayed for laches before, and will be stayed after, the time fixed by the analogous statute of limitations at law. But if unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances make it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after a longer, period than that fixed by the statute, the chancellor will not be bound by the statute, but will determine the extraordinary case in accordance with the equities which condition it. When a suit is brought within the time fixed by the analogous statute, the burden is on the defendant to show, either from the face of the bill, ■or by his answer, that extraordinary circumstances exist, which require the application of the doctrine of laches. And when such a suit is brought after the statutory time has elapsed, the burden is on the complainant to show, by suitable averments in his bill, that it would be inequitable to apply it to his case.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Stevenson

2. ““Where a party desires to rescind upon the ground of mistake or fraud, he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose, and adhere to it. ft he be silent, and continue to treat the property as his own, he will be hold to have waived the objection, and will be conclusively bound by the contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not occurred. He is not permitted .to play fast and loose. Delay and vacillation are fatal to the right which had before subsisted. These remarks are peculiarly applicable to speculative property like that here in question, which is liable to large and constant fluctuations in value. Thomas v. Bartow, 48 N. Y. 200 ; Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare, 622; Jennings v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 139; Lloyd v. Brewster, 4 Paige, 537; Railroad Co. v. Row, 24 Wend. 74 ; Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y. 220 ; 7 Rob. Pr. c. 25, § 2, p. 432; Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Adol. & E. 41; Sudg. Vend. (14th Ed.) 335; Diman v. Railroad Co., 5 R. I. 130 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Kinne v. Webb

3. “■ “ ‘Whatever is notice enough to excite attention' and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry, is. notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it. * * * The presumption is that if the party affected by any fraudulent transaction or management might, with ordinary care and attention, have seasonably detected it, he seasonably had actual knowledge of it.’ * * * A party seeking to avoid the bar of the statute [laches] on account of fraud must aver and show that he used due diligence to detect it, and if he had the means of discovery in his power, he will be held to have known it.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Scott v. Empire Land Co.