¶1Paula C. Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. Atty., Gaynell G. Jones, U.S. Atty., Houston, TX, Jonathan C. Drimmer, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Sol. Gen., U.S. Dept, of Justice, William C. Bryson, Deputy Sol. Gen., Sol. Gen. Office, Washington, DC, for appellant.
¶2Dana Livingston, Houston, TX (Court-appointed), for appellee.
¶3Before. WISDOM, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
¶5The defendant/appellee was charged, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, with possession of a firearm in an area he knew or should have known was a school zone. While the case against the defendant was still pending, this Court, in its decision United States v. Lopez, held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) was unconstitutional on the ground that it was outside Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.1 We reserved decision, however, on whether the statute could be constitutionally applied if the required nexus to interstate commerce were alleged. As we stated in dicta, “[cjoncievably, a conviction under section 922(q) might be sustained if the govern*94ment alleged and proved that the offense had a nexus to commerce”.2
¶6The government attempted to salvage its case against Murphy in reliance on this language when it tried to file a criminal information which alleged a nexus to interstate commerce.3 The criminal information alleged:
... defendant herein, did knowingly possess, in and affecting interstate commerce, in an area that the defendant knew or should have known was a school zone, a firearm — specifically, a Mossberg 12 gauge pistol grip shotgun; In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(q).4
¶7The district court refused to file the criminal information and the government appealed that decision to this Court.
¶8The Lopez decision has since been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided to affirm the decision of this Court and held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is not within the constitutional power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.5 The Supreme Court decided that “[t]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.”6 In light of this decision, we need not address the question we previously reserved. We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.