¶1dissenting:
¶2I would affirm both judgments. The concurrent-sentences question was never raised in the trial court and ought not to be considered here. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 122—3; People v. Clements (1967), 38 Ill.2d 213, 216; People v. Eldredge (1969), 41 Ill.2d 520, 528.) But if it is to be considered, the majority is, in my judgment, wrong in concluding that only one offense was committed.
¶3Defendant predicates his argument against the concurrent sentences on his assertion that the sexual intercourse and the oral-genital activity were “one act”. Since defendant pleaded guilty to these charges we have no testimony precisely describing the interval of time elapsing between the acts. It seems clear, however, that defendant did not immediately proceed from one to the other (if that makes any difference), and that the acts were in fact and in time separate and distinct. They constitute, in my judgment, separate offenses for which concurrent sentences are a permissible punishment. (Ebeling v. Morgan (1915), 237 U.S. 625, 59 L. Ed. 1151, 35 S. Ct. 710; Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306, 52 S. Ct. 180.) As is apparent from both the language and history of section 11—4 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 11—4), our legislature has proscribed indecent acts committed upon children, not a course of conduct.