¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by
¶2A stock of goods was seized upon attachment by the sheriff of Cowley county as the property of M. S. Hasie, with a view of appropriating the same to the payment of the claims of several of the creditors of M. S. Hasie. An action of replevin was soon brought by George E. Hasie, a brother of M. S. Hasie, to recover the same goods. He claimed them upon a mortgage executed November 29,1888, to secure an indebtedness of his brother to him, which had existed for a period of eight months. The debt was evidenced by a note for $12,978.93, given on March 10, 1888, and upon which there was a credit of $5,690.69, purporting to have been made on November 1, 1888. The mortgage, was recorded on November 30, and possession of the goods was soon afterward taken by the plaintiff. The sheriff answered, denying the allegations of the petition, and alleging that the goods levied upon belonged to M. S. Hasie, and were held under orders of attachment issued in an action wherein George E. Hasie was a party, which action was pending when the replevin action was begun. And he further averred, that the mortgage was fraudulent, without consideration, and void. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the sheriff, and several grounds of error are assigned for reversal.
¶3It is first contended that the action was not maintainable, because it was commenced while the attachment suits against *719him and his brother were pending and undetermined. It appears that George E. Hasie was named as a party defendant in the two attachment suits wherein the sheriff levied upon the goods in question. The levy, however, was made to satisfy the debt of M. S. Hasie, and the goods were attached as the property of M. 8. Hasie.
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¶6The next assignment of error is based upon instructions to the effect that actual or constructive notice of a purpose on the part of the plaintiff’s mortgagor to hinder, delay or defraud his other creditors would defeat the plaintiff’s mortgage. The jury were advised that if M, S. Hasie made the mortgage with the intent to delay and defraud his creditors, and George E. Hasie knew of such intent, or of such facts as ought to put him on inquiry as to the wrongful intention of his brother, then the plaintiff cannot recover. There were several repetitions of this view included in the charge, and the court refused an instruction to the effect that fraud on the part of the mortgagor does not affect the mortgagee, unless he was a party to it, and received the mortgage with the intent to delay or defraud the creditors of the mortgagor; that both parties must participate in the fraudulent intent to *721make the mortgage void, if the mortgage is taken in good faith, to secure an actual indebtedness existing at the time the mortgage is taken. In another instruction the court, in effect, charged that the preference could not be sustained unless both parties acted in good faith, and that constructive notice of the bad faith of the debtor would defeat the security which the creditor obtained.
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¶8In National Bank v. Ridenour. 46 Kas. 717. the court, in *722considering the effect of a mortgage given to secure a bona fide debt, said that “ the plaintiff bank knew nothing of any wrongful intent; and it is probably true, under the authorities, that any amount of knowledge of the intent of the mortgagors, on the part of the plaintiff, would not render the mortgage void in its hands in favor of liens created after the recording of the mortgage, so long as the debt to secure which it was given was bona fide, and it got by its security no more than the fair value in property of the debt secured. ( Worland v. Kimberlin, 6 B. Mon. 608; 44 Am. Dec. 785, and cases there cited; Covanhovan v. Hart, 21 Pa. St. 495; Cooper v. National Bank, 40 Kas. 5.)” See, also, Chase v. Walters, 28 Iowa. 469; Kohn v. Clement, 58 id. 589; Owens v. Clark, 78 Tex. 547. Although there is considerable testimony agaiust the validity of the transaction, there was sustaining evidence offered by the plaintiff which entitled him to have his theory of the case fairly put to the jury, and from the record we cannot say that the error in the charge was without prejudice.
¶9Complaint is made that undue prominence was given in the instructions to the relationship of the parties to the transaction. Of course, a failing debtor may prefer a brother or other relative, and no inference of wrong or fraud is to be drawn from the relationship alone. The fact, however, that they are closely related is a proper consideration for the jury, in connection with the other facts of the ease, to aid them in determining the honesty and validity of the transaction. The charge of the court appears to have substantially embodied this view, and we cannot say (hat the court placed too much importance on the matter of relationship.
¶10There are other questions suggested which we do not deem of importance; but, for the errors pointed out, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.