53 Md. App. 35 - Quailes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Nor is the prosecution’s use of its peremptory challenges a violation of appellant’s sixth amendment right to an impartial jury, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that right in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 5221 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ] (1975), as requiring that the jury be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. The Court, in construing the constitutionality of the state’s exclusion of women from jury service, emphasized that: “[While] holding that petit juries must be draw from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” (Citations omitted.) Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538 [, 95 S.Ct. at 702 ]. There is no contention here, however, that the jury pool systematically excluded a distinctive group, specifically blacks, and thus there was no denial of appellant’s sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. In Lawrence v. State, 51 Md.App. at 583 [, 444 A.2d 478 ], this Court flatly held that the use of peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the petit jury was not a violation of Articles 21 or 24 of”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 116 Md. App. 113 - Bridges v. State

2. “"We have decided that it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime charged. But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance. In these circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted. If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population. These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or justify.” 380”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lawrence v. State

3. “Inasmuch as appellant does not contend that the jury pool from which the petit jury was drawn systematically excluded blacks, the use of peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the petit jury was not a violation of Article 21 or 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 116 Md. App. 113 - Bridges v. State