53 N.J. Eq. 270 - Daly v. Ely’s Empirical Analysis
1895
Citation profile
5 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently February 2005
5 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““But the further point was taken that neither the sheriff nor the special master are within the class to whom the power of increased payment is given, and that if the sheriff be properly classed-as an officer of the county, still, :in procuring this advertisement, he was not acting as such, but was acting as the special officer of the Court of Chancery, and that the true construction of the act of 1891 is that the advertisement for which the officer is authorized to pay the price therein named must be an advertisement by or on behalf of the county or municipality of which he is an officer, and does not apply to an advertisement made by the sheriff when acting as the officer of the Court of Chancery. “I am inclined to think that this point is well taken. The Court of Chancery is not obliged by law to send its process to any particular officer. It may send it to one of its own officers, as a special master, or to a person specially appointed, and when a process is sent to a sheriff he does not execute it by virtue of his office as sheriff of the county, but as an officer of the Court of Chancery. The advertisement is not made by or on behalf of the county or any municipality.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"The property in this case was duly and fully advertised for sale; but as soon as the defendant heard of the advertisement he appeared at the sheriff’s office and paid the execution, thereby stopping the sale; and he now contends that although the sheriff has done all the work required by the statute to be done in the way of advertising in order to earn the fee of $3.50, he is yet not entitled to receive it unless, in point of fact, he does actually attend in person or by deputy in pursuance of the advertisement. “I do not think that construction is the proper and fair one. The proviso was intended to prevent the sheriff from charging the fee where he advertises and then of his own accord voluntarily abandons the sale and pays no attention to it. It ought not to be construed as giving the defendant the power to permit the sheriff to incur the labor and trouble of advertising, and then come in and pay the debt and thereby prevent the sheriff from receiving the fee given by the statute. Such construction ought not to be adopted unless it is unavoidable. “I think the sheriff is entitled to that fee.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“shall be forty cents per folio (one hundred words) for the first insertion and twenty cents per folio for each subsequent insertion after the first.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.