53 N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Volume 53 — New York Supreme Court Reports
282 opinions
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1Getty v. Town of Hamlin (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon a nonsuit ordered at the Monroe Circuit, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial made upon a case. . •</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 6Bouton v. Thomas (1887)
<p>Discretionary power of sale — when it does not vest the title in the exeautors — right of the remaindermen to maintain an action for waste against the life tenant.</p> <p>This action was brought by the plaintiffs, claiming as remaindermen under the will of one Legern, to recover for waste alleged to have been committed or directed by a tenant for life. The will, after directing the payment of debts and specifying certain bequests and devises, among which was an estate for life in certain real estate, gave the residue of his estate, real and personal, to his “heirs, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike, including my wife,” and by a subsequent clause gave all his real and personal estate, of whatever nature or kind, to his executors in trust for the payment of the debts and legacies, with power to sell and dispose of the same at public or private sale, at such time or times, and upon such terms and in such manner, as to them should seem meet. Upon the trial a motion to dismiss the complaint was made by the defendants, upon the ground that the plaintiffs had not shown either title or possession of the premises and could not maintain the action.</p> <p>Held, that the court erred in granting the motion.</p> <p>That tbe trust to pay debts and legacies vested no estate in the trustees, as they were not authorized to receive the rents arid profits, nor entitled to the possession of the real estate, and that, until the execution of the power, the fee was in the heirs subject to the estate of the tenant for life.</p> <p>It seems, that if this were a case in equity the judgment appealed from might have been sustained upon the doctrine of equitable conversion, as the gift of the use of the land to the tenant for life was accompanied by an imperative direction that upon his death such land should be sold by the executors, or the survivor of them, and be divided equally among the heirs.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 9Earl v. Lefler (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment of tbe Monroe County Court, affirming a judgment of tbe Municipal Court of tbe city of Rochester.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 12Wright v. Eldred (1887)
Motion by' plaintiff for a new trial on exceptions taken at the Caynga Circuit, and ordered to be heard at the General Term in the first instance. The action was brought to recover for injury to the plaintiff’s premises, alleged to have been caused by the act of the defendant in setting water back onto them.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 19Sargent v. Eureka Spund Apparatus Co. (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon tbe decision of tbe court at tbe Monroe Equity Term dismissing tbe complaint on tbe merits.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 22Sterrett v. Third National Bank (1887)
Appeal by tbe defendant from an order of tbe Circuit Court of Erie county, denying a motion for a new trial made upon tbe minutes. Tbe cause of action alleged was for tbe conversion of four certificates of tbe United Pipe Line Company, eacb representing 1,000 barrels of patroleum oil.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 32Wilcox v. Wilcox (1887)
Tbe plaintiff alleges tbat sbe is tbe widow of Otis N. Wilcox, deceased, and brings tbis action for dower in certain premises of wbicb he died seized. Tbe defendant Wilcox is bis heir and devisee, and tbe other defendant is in tbe possession of tbe premises.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 41Farman v. Town of Ellington (1887)
Appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment entered on tbe verdict of a jury at tbe Chautauqua Circuit, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon a case and exceptions. ■ Tbe action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries to tbe plaintiff, and for injury to bis horse and carriage, occasioned by tbe defective condition of a highway on which be was driving on tbe evening of September 5, 1885.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 48Chamberlain v. Darrow (1887)
Motion by tbe plaintiff for a new trial on exceptions taken at the Cattaraugus Circuit and ordered to be heard at General Term in the first instance. The action was brought for the alleged conversion of personal property consisting of a horse, cow and heifer, some farming utensils, growing crops, etc. The defendant alleged, by way of justification, the levy and sale of the property by virtue of an execution issued upon a judgment in favor of one Murphy against the plaintiff.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 52Agar v. Tibbets (1887)
The following is the form of the transcript so filed: STATE OF NEW YORK, Wyoming- County, Transcript of a judgment rendered by and béfore D. N. Jencks, a justice of the peace of the town of Warsaw in said county. IN JUSTICE’S COURT Wilson Agar and Alanson Burr against Jasper Keeney. On the 30th day of April, A. D. 1869, judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs against defendant for a cause of action arising on contract.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 57Case v. Perew (1887)
Appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of the Erie County Court entered on the verdict of a jury. The action was brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by injury to the plaintiff’s canal boat occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant in running his steam barge into it in Buffalo harbor on October 2, 1881, for which injury the plain tiff obtained a verdict for $500.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 64In re Wheeler (1887)
<p>Appeal by the petitioner from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Niagara county dismissing the petition.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 66Schwander v. Birge (1887)
<p>Evidence— when the opinion cf an expert, as to whether an employer has provided suitable means of escape for employees, should not be received— the question is one for the jury.</p> <p>This action was brought to recover damages resulting from the death of ’the plainsifE’s intestate, an employee of the defendant, which was alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to provide suitable means or facilities for his employees to escape from a building which was used by the defendant in the manufacture of paper, and especially from the fifth floor thereof. There was only one stairway leading from the fifth story, while from the fourth, third and second floors there were two descending stairways. There was, however, a door leading from the fifth floor to the roof of an adjoining building, and there was a scuttle to which there was no stairs or ladder. The building was destroyed by fire on December 17, 1880. Most of the employees, but not the plaintiff’s intestate, escaped, several of them, who were on the fifth . floor, doing so through the door leading to the roof.</p> <p>.Upon the trial the defendant’s superintendent was ashed, “Was that, in your judgment, a proper and sufficient mode of access and egress from the building under any circumstances? ”; to which question an objection, taken by the plaintiff upon the ground that it was a question for the jury and was incompetent and improper, was overruled. Without taking any answer the same witness was asked, and against the plaintiff’s objection and exception allowed to answer, the following question: “ From the experience that you had, and in exercising your judgment in relation to the preparing of this building and this room for the ■work and manufacturing carried op there, did you regard this stairs and this door as a sufficient and proper mode of egress if any accident occurred? ”</p> <p>Meld, that the court erred in admitting the evidence, as the question whether the means of egress were reasonably sufficient, and all that due care required of the defendant to provide for his employees, was one for the jury.</p> <p>(Cases bearing upon this question cited and considered by Bradley, J.)</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 71Hovey v. Hovey (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon tbe dismissal of tbe complaint at tbe Wyoming Circuit.</p> <p>Tbe defendant having presented to tbe plaintiff a claim wbicb was rejected by tbe latter, tbe matter was referred under tbe statute and tried before tbe referee, wbo made a report against tbe defendant for $506.26. Tbe plaintiff, treating it as an award of an arbitrator, brought this action to recover tbe amount of it. Tbe trial court held that bis remedy was by application for confirmation, and dismissed tbe complaint.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 75Thomas v. Harmon (1887)
<p>Mistake in the description of a lot in a mortgage — the County Court cannot correct such mistake in an action for its foreclosure.</p> <p>The complaint in this action, brought in a County Court to foreclose a mortgage conveying an undivided one-half of a lot in the village of Batavia, given by the defendant Harmon to the county treasurer, alleged that a mistake was made in drawing the mortgage; that, as drawn, it conveyed only the undivided one-half of the lot therein described, while it was intended, and had been agreed by the parties before the execution of the mortgage, that the whole of the lot should be conveyed by it. Upon the trial the County Court found in favor of the plaintiff on this issue, and a decree was entered correcting the mistake and directing a sale of the whole lot.</p> <p>Meld, that the County Court had no power to correct the mistake or direct the sale of any greater interest in the lot than was described in the mortgage, and that those portions of the decree were void for want of jurisdiction in the court.</p> <p>(Bradley, J., dissenting.)</p> <p>Avery v. Willis (24 Hun, 548) followed.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 82Standart v. Burtis (1887)
<p>Appeal by the defendants Bnrtis from an interlocutory judgment, entered in this action in Cayuga county, and from an order of the Special Term of this court overruling a demurrer interposed by the defendants to the plaintiffs’ complaint.</p> <p>The complaint contains the necessary averments showing that the plaintiffs are entitled to bring this action under chapter 531 of the Laws of 1881. The complaint states that a former board of excise of the city of Auburn recovered a verdict against the appellants for $1,800' for selling liquor without á license; and that judgment was entered against the appellants thereon for damages and costs, $1,944.80; that the defendants are pecuniarily responsible and the judgment collectible; and that the amount of the judgment, when collected, is to be paid to the treasurer of the city of Auburn for the support of the poor of that city, thereby lessening the amount of taxes to be paid for the support of the poor by the taxpayers; that an appeal was taken from the judgment to the General Term of the Supreme Court by the Burtises only; that the judgment was affirmed by that court, and an appeal was taken therefrom to the Court of Appeals; and that the case would probably be shortly decided by that court; that while the defendants did not, upon the trial of the action, deny that they had violated the excise law and incurred the penalties recovered, they did raise questions which it is important to the city of Auburn should be settled by an adjudication of the highest court; that the defendant commissioners are taking steps without notice to respondents’ attorney, to substitute some other attorney in his place as the .respondents’ attorney, not on account of any charges of want of skill or conduct in said action, which they do not make, but so as the more easily to consummate said plan and discharge, or if that be prevented, the better and more effectually to prevent the collection of such judgment and the final success of said action; and that the defendants, the said Burtises, are engaged with the other defendants in such plans and attempt of 'settlement; that they are planning with the judgment debtors to compromise the judgment for a nominal sum with the avowed purpose of settling a doubtful litigation, when in point of fact their sole and only purpose is to favor and benefit the judgment debtors and to enable them to accomplish the scheme ; that they are seeking to remove .the attorney for the, plaintiffs and substitute another in his stead, as tbeir attorney does not favor tbeir plans; tbat the conduct of tbe defendants is illegal and improper, and if they succeed in consummating their plans irreparable injury will be done to the city of Auburn and its taxpayers; and judgment is demanded that the defendants and each of them and their attorneys and agents be perpetually restrained and enjoined from doing any of the acts complained of, and from settling or discontinuing the action or discharging the judgment, excepting upon full payment by the judgment debtors of the judgment and costs ; and that a perpetual injunction issue out of this court to that end; and that the defendants, composing the board of excise, be enjoined from substituting any attorney in the place of respondents’ attorney, and that in case said defendants, the board, shall have discharged and satisfied said judgment and have consummated said settlement that the same be vacated and set aside and made of no effect; and that the defendants, composing the board of excise, be made personally responsible for the judgment and be required to indemnify the city of Auburn and the taxpayers out of their own property by reason of any loss arising by their acts aforesaid, and that the plaintiffs have such other and further relief in the premises as may be just. The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, and that two causes of action had been improperly united.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 87Vanderbeck v. City of Rochester (1887)
Appeal by tbe plaintiff from a judgment of tbis court entered in Moni’oe county, in favor of tbe defendant and against tbe plaintiff, upon tbe report of a referee dismissing plaintiff’s complaint upon tbe merjts with costs; and also from an order granted at a Special Term of tbis court permitting tbe defendant to make and serve a supplemental answer.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 94In re the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railway Co. (1887)
Appeal by botb parties from an order made at tbe Erie Special Term denying to tbe petitioner tbe riglit to condemn certain lands, and appointing commissioners to appraise tbe' value of certain other lands in proceedings instituted to condemn lands for tbe use of tbe petitioner. Tbe lands mentioned in the petition are described as being in two separate parcels.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 100Button v. Ely (1887)
The defendant Ely is the supervisor of the town of Eranldinville, Cattaraugus county, and the other defendants are the justices of the peace of the same town. The plaintiffs prosecute the action as taxpayers of the town under the provision of chapter 531, Laws of 1881.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 105Adams v. Ash (1887)
land contract, for the specific performance of which this action was brought. The appellant was the vendee and the plaintiff occupied the position of vendor, he having taken a conveyance of the premises and assignment of the contract subsequent to its execution. The defendant, appeared in the action but suffered a default.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 112Dorsey v. Pike (1887)
Judgment was rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Rochester, in the appellant’s favor, for six dollars and thirty cents costs, and from the same the present respondent appealed to the Monroe County Corn't.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 114In re the Final & Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Heath (1887)
Pettit, presented to the assignee as an indebtedness owing to Pettit, as an employee of the assignor, and claiming a preference in payment over the general creditors, as provided in chapter 283 of the Laws of 1886. The assignment was made and executed on the 10th day of April, 1885.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 120Sperry v. Baldwin (1887)
Appeal by tbe plaintiffs from so much of the judgment entered in Steuben county upon the report of a referee as dismissed their complaint and denied them any relief as against the defendants, James Baldwin, Henry Baldwin and Sarah Weatherly. , In October, 1883, Frank S. Epunter was doing business as a country merchant in the village of Jasper, in the county of Steuben, having a stock of goods of the value of $16,000.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 129Boots v. Ferguson (1887)
<p>Motion for-a ¿new .trial-on exceptions taken at the Tates Circuit, ^nd ordered .to be lieard at' the General Term in the first instance.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 134People ex rel. Rundell v. Wilson (1887)
<p>Incorporated villages —1870, chap. 291, tit. 7 — the price paid for land acquired for widening streets ca/nnot be paid from the highway tax.</p> <p>tinder the provision of title 7 of .chapter 291 of 1870, providing for the incorporation of villages, authorizing the trustees of the village to’take and appropriate land in the village for the purpose of opening, widening or changing the streets therein, the price agreed to be paid therefor cannot be paid from the moneys raised by the highway tax, as that is required by section 6 of the said title to be devoted to the purposes of working and improving the roads, avenues, streets, etc., of the village, and is to be kept apart as- a separate and distinct fund by the treasurer.</p> <p>If the treasurer of the village has notice that a warrant, drawn by the board of trustees, and made payable from the highway tax, was given to pay the price agreed to be paid for land acquired for the opening and improving of a street, he may and should refuse to pay the same therefrom.</p> <p>Held, further, that the village was not estopped by the action of the former board of trustees, in drawing and delivering the warrant, from now questioning the right of the claimant to have the order paid out of the moneys raised for highway purposes.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 138Burdick v. Freeman (1887)
<p>Jurisdiction of the courts of this State, over actions between foreigners, where the acts complained of were done in other States — the trial court will not retain jurisdiction unless special reasons exist.</p> <p>While the courts of this Slate have jurisdiction, of an action brought to recover damages for enticing away the plaintiff’s wife, and for harboring and debauching her by the defendant, when all of the parties reside in another State, and when none of the acts relied upon to sustain the action occurred in this State, yet the question as to whether or not the court will retain jurisdiction of and determine the action rests in its sound discretion, and it; will not be done unless special reasons are shown to exist which make it necessary and proper so to do.</p> <p>It seems, that where, as in this case, the only reasons alleged by the plaintiff for bringing the action in this State were that the defendant was a man of means and might have something to do with the jury “ in our place, he being acquainted,” and that he was advised by his attorney that if he instituted the action in this State he could have the defendant arrested, the court should not retain jurisdiction of it.</p> <p>That in such a case, however, it was the duty of the defendant to present such question for the determination of the court at as early a stage of the trial as practicable.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 144Hampton v. Hamsher (1887)
<p>Assessment of lands lying in two adjoining towns and assessed in one of them — apportionment and assessment of highway taxes — 1 B. S., chap. 16, art. 2, tit. 1, sees. 19, 24.</p> <p>The plaintiff was a resident of the town of Ossian, living upon a farm partly in that town and partly in the town of Hunda, the whole of the farm being assessed for town, county and State purposes in the town of Ossian. In the year 1885 the defendant, as commissioner of highways, in apportioning the amount of highway work chargeable against the plaintiff in the road district in which he lived in the town of Ossian, included, for the purpose of such apportionment and assessment for highway labor, that portion of his farm lying in the town of Hunda, following the last assessment-roll of the town of Ossian. The plaintiff, claiming that the defendant had no jurisdiction to do this, brought this action to recover the damages suffered by reason of this assessment.</p> <p>Held, that, under the 'provision of section 24 of'title 1, articled, chapter 16 of the Revised Statutes, the commissioner was bound, in making the apportionment, to follow the last assessment-roll and that having done so this action could not be maintained.</p> <p>The several statutes relating to this matter considered, and the conclusion reached that the system of taxation was intended to be harmonious and did not contemplate that farms, intersected by town lines, were to be assessed in one town for one x>urpose and in another town for another.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 149Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg Terminal Railroad v. City of Rochester (1887)
<p>Motion for an injunction — the complaint and answer are Pt'eated as affidavits— assertions upon information and belief prove nothing.</p> <p>Upon this appeal, from an order denying a motion for an injunction pendente lite, it appeared that the application was heard upon the pleadings that all of the allegations in the complaint were positive and direct, and were made and verified as within the personal knowledge of the affiant, and if true clearly presented a case entitling the plaintiff to the relief sought, while the allegations of the answer, as to all material matters, were made upon information and belief only.</p> <p>Held, that as the complaint and answer were to be treated as, and have only the effect of, affidavits, the statements and allegations contained in the complaint were not controverted by the defendant and that the court erred in denying the motion.</p> <p>Mowrg v. Sanborn (65 N. Y. 584), followed</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 151Hampton v. Boylan (1887)
<p>Constable — duty of, as to making a return of an execution, when the justice issuing it leaves the county before the expiration of the time to make it— Code of Oml Procedure, sees. 3144, %l4S — ‘the plaintiff is bound by instructions given by his attorney to the constable — the admission of the testimony of the attorney as to his employment does not violate ’Section -835.of the -Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>The plaintiff having recovered a judgment against one Mundy, before a justice of the peace, an execution was issued thereon to the defendant Boylan, a constable. Before the return day of the execution the justice filed his docket with the town clerk, together with the certificate required by section 3144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and removed from the county. Within sixty-five days from the day the execution was issued, the constable duly made his return, upon the execution and filed the same with the town clerk.</p> <p>This action was brought by the plaintiff against the constable, and the sureties upon his bond, to recover the amount of the execution upon the ground that the constable had failed to return the execution to the justice within the time prescribed by law.</p> <p>Held, that as the justice had, by removing from the county, surrendered his office the town clerk became entitled, under the provisions of sections 3144 and 3146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to demand and receive the execution as one of the papers in the custody of the justice relating to an action which had been heard by him.</p> <p>The execution was in the usual form against the property of the judgment debtor, and in case sufficient property could not be found it commanded the arrest of the judgment debtor and his confinement in the county jail until the judgment was paid or he was discharged according to law. The failure of the constable to arrest the debtor was alleged as one of the grounds for bringing this action. Upon the trial it appeared that the action was for a breach of contract, and the justice testified that he issued the body' execution through mistake. It also appeared that the defendant Boylan was advised by Mr. Windsor, the attorney who tried the case for the plaintiff and procured the execution to be issued, not to arrest the defendant upon it, and that he had better hold it and do nothing further under it.</p> <p>Held, that the plaintiff was estopped by the acts of his attorney, and that the constable was not responsible to him for doing that which his attorney requested him to do.</p> <p>-That the admission of the testimony of Windsor as to his employment’ by the plaintiff was not a violation of the provisions of section 835 of the Code of Civil Procedure, preventing an attorney from disclosing communications made to him by his client.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 156Benham v. Emery (1887)
'Motion by plaintiff for a new trial founded on a case and exceptions, ordered to be heard at the General' Term, in the first instance after a trial at the. Cayuga Circuit. The defendant was permitted to enter judgment for his costs as security.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 164Young v. Johnson (1887)
The action was brought for an alleged assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff, who was at the time under twenty-one years of age.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 172Simms v. Wallace (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 174Blakely v. Weaver (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 176Savery v. Ingersoll (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 180Hill v. Peekskill Savings Bank (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 184Stone v. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery Railroad (1887)
The deceased was, at the time of her death, a child of seven years and three or four months old, and upon the day upon which she was injured had been at play in the basement of her father’s store, in the house No. 39 Canal street, one block distant from the scene of the accident. The deceased left this basement and proceeded to the southeasterly corner of Orchard and Canal streets, and attempted to cross the street.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 188De Montsaulnin v. Mayor of New York (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the trial of the action at a Special Term.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 190Knapp v. Knapp (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 196Hine v. Bowe (1887)
<p>Bmnsf&t' of dll the assets of an insolvent firm — when treated as an absolute sale and not as an assignment.</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action, in which the real question involved was the validity of a transfer of all the property of the firm of Epstein & Hine to the plaintiff Charles S. Hine, it appeared that, on June 13, 1883, that firm, being then in embarrassed circumstances, executed a bill of sale to the said Charles S. Hine, transferring to him all the assets belonging to it, amounting in all to $16,304.14. On the same day Hine executed a paper which recited that, in consideration of the sale made to him by the firm, he agreed to cancel their indebtedness to him for borrowed money, amounting to $9,850, and to pay $3,800 to another person, and also to pay four items, “ which are entitled to preference,” the names and amount to be paid to each being stated, and, also, such other claims as Epstein & Hine might direct to be paid, as entitled to preference, not exceeding $750.</p> <p>At the close of the case the counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge that “if the jury found that the firm of Epstein & Hine was insolvent on June 13, 1883, and by the bill of sale, and agreement or receipt, intended to make an assignment for the benefit of creditors, it is void, in that it is not in compliance with the general assignment act of 1877.”</p> <p>Held, that the court did not err in denying the request.</p> <p>That, as there was evidence tending to show an intention to make an out and out sale, and that the indebtedness due to Charles S. Hine was to be extinguished, and that he was to pay other sums as the consideration of the purchase, not out of the proceeds of the property sold, but absolutely and without reference to the source from which the money to make the payments should be derived, the intent with which the two papers were executed and delivered was to be determined by the intention of both the seller and purchaser, and would depend as much upon the intent of the latter as upon that of the former.</p> <p>Britton v. Lorem (3 Daly, 33; affirmed, 45 N. Y., 51); Wallace v. Wainwright (87 Penn., 363) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 201United States Life Insurance v. Jordan (1887)
<p>Appeal from an interlocutory judgment claimed to bave been entered in pursuance of an order overruling a demurrer to tbe complaint, and also an appeal from an order of tbe Special Term, wbicb denied witb costs a motion to vacate and set aside tbe interlocutory judgment.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 206New York Steam Co. v. Stern (1887)
This action was commenced for the specific performance by defendant of a contract for the purchase of certain real estate on the south side of Thirtieth street in New York, seventy-five feet east of Seventh avenue, containing 115 feet, front and rear, by half the block. On the day fixed for- closing the title, June 15, 1886, the defendant refused to accept the deed tendered, on the ground that the plaintiff’s title to a portion of the premises was defective.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 212Reed v. Reed (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order denying a motion made by tlie purchaser Abraham Bernheimer to be relieved from his purchase of certain real estate sold under a decree in partition and from an cirder directing him to complete such purchase, pursuant to the terms of sale subscribed by him.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 216Straus v. Chicago Glycerine Co. (1887)
<p>Attachment — when an indebtedness of one foreign corporation to another foreign corporation cannot be seized — the person or the thing attached must be within this State — Code of OwAl Procedure, secs. 641, 644.</p> <p>The Commercial Union Insurance Company (limited) of London, a corporation created and existing under the laws of the kingdom of Great Britain, had issued a policy of insurance upon property situated in the city of Chicago and owned by the defendant, a corporation created by and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois. Under this policy a loss had been sustained by Are, affecting the property insured by the policy.</p> <p>In this action, brought against the defendant, the Illinois corporation, the plaintiffs, who reside and carry on business in the-city of New York, procured an attachment to be issued, which was served, and the indebtedness of the insurance company to the defendant attempted to be attached, by delivering a copy of it at the office of an agent which the insurance company had, for the transaction of its business in the city of New York.</p> <p>Held, that as the negotiations for the policy took place in the city of Chicago, and it was there delivered to and held by the defendant, the indebtedness was not property which the defendant had within this State and could not be seized under the attachment.</p> <p>Plimpton v. Bigelow (98 N. Y., 592) followed; Myers v. Liverpool, etc., Insurance Company (40 Md., 595) wAWillettv. Equitable Insurance Company (10 Abb., 198) distinguished, and cases in other States holding that it could be seized, cited .</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 219Reed v. Cruikshank (1887)
Case agreed upon and submitted pursuant to section 1291 of the-Code of Civil Procedure.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 223Biglin v. Friendship Ass'n (1887)
<p>Order'directing the issue of stock certificates to replace others lost or destroyed,— the loss or destruction and ownership must he proved —1873, dhap. 151.</p> <p>To confer upon the court jurisdiction to make an order in a proceeding instituted under chapter 151 of 1873, requiring a corporation to issue and deliver new certificates of stock to replace certificates which have been lost or destroyed, it must be proved that the petitioner is the owner of the shares, and that such shares have been lost or destroyed and cannot, after due diligence, be found.</p> <p>Where it appears that the shares which the petitioner claims to own were issued to two persons named therein as trustees, and that a portion of the said shares are in the possession of the petitioner unindorsed; and that the other shares were held by the persons named as trustees, who declined to give up the same because the beneficiaries refused to consent to their surrendering them to the person from whom the petitioner’s title was acquired, the application should be denied.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 227Raynor v. Lyon (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment recovered on the trial of this action, at the Special Term, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 232People ex rel. Bolster v. French (1887)
<p>Case submitted on an agreed state of facts pursuant to section 1279 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 237Gutta Percha & Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Mayor of Houston (1887)
<p>Attachment — it cannot be issued upon a judgment recovered in another State and. not shown to ha/ve been recovered on a contract — Gode of Civil Procedure, sec. 635,</p> <p>Upon a complaint and affidavit which showed' the recovery of a judgment by the plaintiff against the defendant, in the District Court of Harris county, in the State of Texas, an attachment was issued in this action brought upon such judgment, as being a contract for the payment of the sum of money. It was not stated in either the complaint or the affidavit, that the judgment was recovered upon a contract, nor was the cause of action, upon which it was recovered, stated in either</p> <p>Held, that the attachment should be vacated, without costs.</p> <p>That while, in a general sense, a judgment has been declared by the authorities to he a contract of record, it has not been so considered or construed as to create such a contract as is referred to in the first subdivision of section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for the issuing of attachments.</p> <p>Taylor v Boot (4 Keyes, 335); Haesro v. McCaVmont Oil Company (36 Hun, 396); Donnelly v. Corbett (3 Seld., 500) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 239Hendricks v. Isaacs (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment, entered on tlie report of a referee dismissing the appellant’s claim, on a reference under the statute of a claim against the estate of the defendant’s intestate.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 245Dunham v. Boston & Albany Railroad (1887)
Motion by tie defendant for a new trial on exceptions ordered to bs first beard at tbe General Term after a verdict bad been directed in favor of tbe plaintiffs at the circuit.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 248National Tube Works Co. v. Gilfillan (1887)
<p>Issue of stock fm' the purchase of property to be used by a coiporation — 2 JR. S. (6 th ed.), 504, 505, secs. 88-40 — knowledge by the stockholder of an alleged overvaluation of the property must be proved.</p> <p>This action was brought by the plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the Brooklyn Marine Power Company, against the defendant, who was a stockholder in, and trustee and president of, the said company, to recover the amount of the indebtedness from the defendant personally, on the ground that the capital stock fixed and limited by the company had not been paid in. Upon the trial it appeared that the company was organized with a capital 'stock of $800,000 in shares of $500 each; that these shares were all issued for certain inventions of one A. Perry Bliven, relating to marine steam generators and other articles adapted to marine purposes, for none of which Bliven had then received, nor did he or the com. pany thereafter receive, a patent, although it was agreed by him that he would make and prepare all the necessary plans, drawings and specifications, and make every reasonable effort to procure patents in the United States and other countries.</p> <p>A certificate for the entire 800 shares of the stock was, on the day it was issued by the defendant, as president, canceled and new certificates were issued, pursuant to an agreement made between the defendant and Bliven, one for 200 shares to the defendant and another person, as co-trustees for the company; one for 100 shares to the defendant in payment of an indebtedness, owing to him from Bliven, in the sum of $15,000. It also appeared that twenty-seven shares were-given to other persons to enable them to become interested in, or act as trustees of, the company. Upon the trial the jury found that the inventions, for which the shares were issued, were not worth more than $75,000.</p> <p>Held, that the jury were justified in finding not only that the inventions were worth less than the prices agreed to be paid for them but that it was so understoodby the defendant and the other parties to the transactions.</p> <p>That as no patent was at any time issued for any of the inventions, and the company acquired no exclusive right to use, employ or vend them, the right to the inventions scarcely rose to the dignity of property.</p> <p>That evidence showing that the defendant had been connected with two preceding corporations, having something to do with the use of these inventions, was properly admitted as the jury might infer that he had thereby acquired such a knowledge of the inventions as to impress him with the conviction that they were not worth the prices that the company agreed to pay for them.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 253Owerre v. Mayor of New York (1887)
<p>Appeal from art order and from an interlocutory judgment sustaining a demurrer to portions of the defendant’s answer.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 258De Witt v. De Witt (1887)
<p>Mmdence — in an action brought to recover the reasonable value of services as a nurse — testimony as to the scale of prices fixed by the nurses of training schools, not admissible.</p> <p>Upon a reference of a disputed' claim, made by the plaintiff for nursing and caring for the defendant’s testatrix, under an agreement that she should be reasonably paid for so doing, a witness, called by the plaintiff, having stated that a scale of prices had been fixed by nurses in the New York Hospital, was asked and allowed, against the objection and exception of the defendant, to state, in answer to the question, “What are the prices?’’that “the prices established by several of the principal training schools vary from twenty to twenty-five dollars per week, according to whether the case is contagious or non-contagious; the board is also expected and also the washing of the nurse.”</p> <p>Held, that .the evidence was inadmissible.</p> <p>That as her claim was unliquidated she was not entitled to recover interest on the value .of the services as fixed by the referee.</p> <p>Holmes v. Sankin (17 Barb., 454); Smith v. Velie ( 60 N. Y., 106) followed.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 261Graham v. New York Life Insurance (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon an order sustaining a demurrer interposed to the answer of the defendant, and from the said order and every part thereof.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 268McCoy v. Mayor of New York (1887)
<p>Evidence — a properly addresed and post-paid letter will be presumed to have been received — the denial of its receipt by the plaintiff raises an issue for the jury.</p> <p>Proof of the mailing of a notice properly addressed and post-paid raises a presumption that it was received by the person to whom it was directed.</p> <p>When such proof of mailing is met by the testimony of the plaintiff that the notice never reached him, the issue of fact thus raised should be submitted to the jury and not be decided by the court.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 270Danziger v. Hoyt (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered on the report of a referee.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 274Hale v. Brooklyn Life Insurance (1887)
<p>Agent of a life insurance company — when'he is entitled to receive a commission on premiums received by the company on the renewal of policies issued by him, while in its employ.</p> <p>On or about the 13th day of February, 1880, a contract was made between the defendant and the plaintiff for the continuation of the plaintiff’s services as its agent, by which it agreed to pay him a monthly salary at the rate of $2,000 per annum, to give him “regular renewal commissions on the policies obtained by (him) you when the premiums shall have been paid to the company,” and, also, to give him a bonus of seventy-five dollars in eaoh quarter, if thirty-five policies, averaging $1,000 or more each, were placed by him, provided that the issue should only be reckoned for the quarters commencing, respectively, on the first day of May, or August, or November or February, and, also, an additional bonus of $100, if, in the twelve months commencing February 1, 1880, he should have accepted and issued for the company 150 policies as above; and that if the gross insurance on such policies should amount to $225,000 an additional $100 would be given. The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant, and had issued policies for it in the years 1878 and 1879, some of which were renewed in 1880. The plaintiff continued in the employment of the defendant under this contract until December 31, 1880, when the contract was terminated by the agreement or consent of ' the parties.</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action, brought to recover commissions upon premiums received by the defendants in the years 1881, 1882, 1883 and 1884, upon the renewals of policies issued by the plaintiff after February 13, 1880, and before December thirty-first of that year, the referee held that he was entitled -to recover them.</p> <p>Held, that the judgment should be affirmed. (Daniels, J., dissenting.)</p> <p>Edwards v. Chapman (1 Mees. & W., 231) followed, and Slum v. Home Life Insurance Company (49 N. Y., 681) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 281New York Dyeing & Printing Establishment v. De Westenberg (1887)
This action was brought to recover the sum of $20,000, as the value of improvements placed by the plaintiff’s assignor upon the lands of the defendant in Duane street, in the city of New York,… Held: and to have the same adjudged to be a lien on the property and satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale thereof.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 283Lewke v. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery Railroad (1887)
<p>A juror in an action to recover damages for an injury, incompetent by reason of bid» towa/rds an expert witness — Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 1166 — testimony as to complaints of pain made by a person immediately after receiving the injury complained of.</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action, brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries sustained because of the negligence of the defendant in running him dowru ■with one of its street cars, a juror, in answer to questions put by the plaintiff’s: counsel, testified, in substance, that his life had been saved by a physician who-was expected to, and subsequently actually did, take the stand as an expert witness in behalf of the defendant, and that he would place more faith in the. opinion of that witness than in the opinion of any other doctor who might testify, if a. difference should arise between them. On his cross-examination by the defendant he testified that he would try to act according to his conscience,, and was capable of doing so, and he thought he could take the testimony of the; other doctor into consideration.</p> <p>Held, that he was properly excluded from the jury.</p> <p>Hildreth v. The City of Troy (101 ÍT. Y., 234) distinguished.</p> <p>A grocer, whose store was in the immediate' vicinity of the place where the plaintiff was hurt, testified that the plaintiff was picked up from the spot where he received the injury, and that the plaintiff then came to his store and the witness noticed the condition of his clothes, and that bjs left leg seemed to be. swelling; that the plaintiff, at that time, complained of pain and said he had pains in his leg.</p> <p>Held, that this testimony as to the complaints made by the plaintiff was properly admitted.</p> <p>HagenlocherY. Coney Island Railroad (99 N.Y., 136) followed; RocheY. The Brooklyn. City and Newton Railroad Company (7 Central Iiep., 702) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 287Ayer v. Getty (1887)
. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, entered on the report of a referee. The action was brought to recover against the defendant, as surety on a lease made by J. 0. Ayer & Co., to Samuel E. Getty, dated July 17, 1874, to run from August 1, 1874, to May 1, 1877. J. 0. Ayer, one of the firm of J. C. Ayer & Co., became insane, and this action was brought in the name of his co-partner, Frederick Ayer, and the committee of said J. C. Ayer.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 289Geissmann v. Wolf (1887)
<p>Testimony of a mortgagor tis to personal transactions with a deceased mortgagee, inadmissible in favor of a judgment-creditor of the mortgage»'— Code of Oivil Procedure, see. 829 — the recording of a mortgage is sufficient proof of its delivery— the delivery of the bond may be inferred from a reference to it in the moi'tgage.</p> <p>This action, was brought to foreclose a mortgage made by tbe defendant Wolf to Daniel Heyman, now deceased, which was assigned to the plaintiff by Wolf himself who was the executor of Heyman’s will. Upon tbe trial, testimony of Wolf as to personal' transactions had with Heyman, the deceased mortgagee, tending to prove that tbe mortgage was fraudulent and without consideration, was offered by defendant Cormier, who had recovered a judgment against Wolf, after the giving and recording of the mortgage, but such testimony was excluded by the court as coming within the prohibition of section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Held, that the court did not err in so doing, as the judgment-creditor derived title through his judgment-debtor, within the meaning of that section.</p> <p>Taylor v. Meldrum (6 Civil Pro., 285) followed.</p> <p>The answer admitted the making and recording of the bond and mortgage, but denied that either was ever delivered. Upon the trial a certified copy of the mortgage, as recorded in the register’s office, was put in evidence, but the bond was not produced.</p> <p>Held, that sufficient proof of the delivery of the mortgage was furnished by showing that it had been placed on record; and that, in the absence of any other evidence on the subject, a delivery of the bond might be inferred from the fact that a mortgage was delivered referring to the bond as a valid and subsisting obligation.</p> <p>It seems, that if the defense had been payment, the non-production of the bond, unexplained, would have been fatal to the plaintiff’s ease.</p> <p>Bergen v. Urbáhn (83 N. Y.; 49).</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 291Breen v. Locke (1887)
<p>Controversy submitted under section 12Y9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 296People ex rel. McMackin v. Board of Police (1887)
<p>MotioN for judgment on tlie return of the board of police to a writ of alternative memdamus ¡ and appeal from an order of the Special Term denying a motion for a peremptory memdamus and directing the issuing of an alternative writ.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 306Cauhape v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint entered on the report of a referee.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 308Hanover Insurance v. Germania Insurance (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 310Gilman v. Healy (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 313Smith v. Taber (1887)
' Appeal from a judgment of the Chemung County Court, granting a nonsuit. The action was brought to recover the value of certain personal property taken by the defendant. The plaintiff relied upon a farm lease containing provisions giving him a lien upon, title to and an interest in the property. The lease in question was made February 18, 1885, and was filed in the town clerk’s office, with chattel mortgages, July 24, 1885.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 317Knapp v. O'Neill (1887)
The action was commenced to recover the value of a horse owned by the plaintiff, which had been sold by the defendant, as sheriff,, upon a judgment and execution against the plaintiff.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 320People ex rel. Duffus v. Brown (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order, made at the Onondaga Special Term, adjudging the defendant guilty of a contempt and imposing a fine of fifty dollars.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 323Finck v. Mannering (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order granted by the Cortland County Judge punishing the defendant for contempt of court in failing to appear before a referee and to submit to an examination, as a judgment debtor, in proceedings supplementary to execution.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 324Bowles v. Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg Railroad (1887)
<p>Action by an administrator to recover damages for the negligent Mlling of his daughter — when a verdict in his favor will not be set aside on the ground that the damages are excessive..</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action, brought by the plaintiff, as the administrator of his deceased daughter, to recover damages sustained by reason of her death, which was alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, it appeared that she died intestate, leaving no husband or descendant, and leaving her father, the plaintiff, her sole heir-at-law and next of kin. Evidence was given showing that the father was sixty-six years of age; that he was in infirm health; that his wife was fifty-eight years of age, and that both were without property; that, since 1866, the decedent had contributed from $800 to $400 per arinum towards the support of her parents; that, at the time of her death, she was thirty-six years of age, in good health, and in receipt of a salary of from eight dollars,to nine dollars per week, which she had received for five or six years prior to her death.</p> <p>Held, that a vbrdict of $4,000 would not be set aside as excessive.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 328Vanderhoef v. Agricultural Insurance (1887)
This action was brought on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant, which contained the following proviso: “ If the dwelling-house or houses hereby insured shall cease to be occupied by the owner or occupant, in the usual and ordinary manner in which dwelling-houses are occupied as such _ * * * this policy shall be void, until the written consent of the company at the home office is obtained.” It was procured through Crane & Mosher, who were agents of the defendant, to…
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 336Pierson v. Ells (1887)
<p>Injunction restraining the defendant from doing several acts specified in the order — a surety on the undertaking is liable altlwugh the injUnetion be sustained as to one of such, acts.</p> <p>This action was brought upon an undertaking, executed by the present defendant as surety on an application for an injunction, made in an action brought by one Briggs against Pierson, the plaintiff in this action. The injunction order granted in that action enjoined the defendant from doing nine particular acts which were specified in the order.</p> <p>Upon the trial of that action it was .determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on the livery business on certain premises specified in the order, but was not -entitled to an injunction restraining him from doing or performing any of the other acts mentioned ip the said order of injunction.</p> <p>Held, that a judgment of the trial court allowing the plaintiff herein to recover in this action the damages which he had sustained by reason of such order, excepting any damages he might have sustained by reason of that portion of the order which enjoined him from carrying on the livery business, should be affirmed.</p> <p>That when the court in the first action finally decided that the .plaintiff was not entitled to the particular injunction granted therein, but only to an injunction restraining one of the acts therein enumerated, the defendant became liable on his undertaking.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 339Hungerford v. Syracuse, Binghamtom & New York Railroad (1887)
<p>Failure of a railroad company to Iceep ba/r-ways at farm crossings in repair — it is not liable unless shown to have had notice that the bears were down. <</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action, brought to récover damages sustained by the plaintiff for the hilling of four hors.es which had, on December 14, 1885, escaped frpm his barn-yard and entered upon the defendant’s railroad tracks, where they were killed by a passing train, it appeared that three, lengths of the fence erected by the defendant along the tracks, which had been destroyed by fire in July, 1885, had not, at the time of the accident, been replaced. The plaintiff claimed, and introduced evidence tending to prove, that the horses entered upon the tracks through this burned portion of the fence. The defendant denied this and intro.dueed evidence tending to show that the horses came through a bar-way at a farm crossing, the bars of which were shown to have been down at the time of the accident.</p> <p>Eeld, that the court erred in refusing to charge, as requested by the .defendant’s counsel, “ that if the cattle passed through the bars then the defendant is not liable,” as there was no proof showing that the bars had been down for a single moment before the horses reached the bar-way, and no proof showing that the defendant had actual or constructive notice that they were down.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 342In re the General Assignment of Stowell (1887)
On the 9th day of June, 1876, Stowell Brothers, who were partners, made a general assignment for the benefit of their creditors, without preference, to Samuel W. Perry, who duly qualified as such assignee. Their debts amounted to $79,756.34. In February, 1878, Stowell Brothers were duly adjudged bankrupts, - on their own petition.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 346Wall v. Bulger (1887)
<p>Appeal from an interlocutory judgment, entered in Oswego county upon an order sustaining a demurrer interposed to tbe complaint.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 349Betsinger v. Schuyler (1887)
On the 1st of January, 1877, George Clarke leased to Sarah Evans a farm situate in the city of Rome, N. Y. The lease was for four-years, from April 1, 1877 The annual rent reserved was the sum of $350, which was payable in advance on the first day of April in each year.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 354People ex rel. Russell v. Board of Supervisors (1887)
German Flats is one of the towns of Herkimer county. Anna Conklin, William Ryan, Mike McGuire and Hannah Dodge, were residents of and had legal settlement in that town. They were lunatics in indigent circumstances, but not paupers.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 363Meacham v. New York State Mutual Benefit Ass'n (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 366Sipfle v. Isham (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 368Flynn v. Hancock (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 370Redford v. Snow (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 372Sutherland v. Troy & Boston Railroad (1887)
Tbe action was to recover damages under the statute for the pecuniary loss to the widow and next of kin, sustained by the death of the plaintiff’s intestate who was killed, as was alleged, in consequence of the negligence of the defendant. IVIark Sutherland, the plaintiff’s intestate, was a locomotive engineer in the employment of the defendant.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 377Clements v. Griswold (1887)
Appeals from a judgment, entered in Washington county upon ' the trial of this action before a referee. The action was brought to foreclose a mortgage executed by Samuel and James Lamb to the plaintiff for $5,000, dated March 1, 1862. The complaint is in the usual form. The defendants Rice and Barnett are tenants in common with the defendants Griswold and Keith, as owners of the mortgaged premises.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 383People ex rel. Ostrander v. Chapin (1887)
Chapin, as comptroller of the State of New York, denying an application of the relators to have refunded to them certain moneys in the State treasury by reason of the cancellation of a tax sale theretofore made.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 386Graham v. President of the Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. (1887)
Appeal from a judgment in favor of tlie plaintiffs, entered in Washington county, upon the verdict £>f a jury, and from an order •denying a motion for a new trial made upon tne minutes of the justice before whom tlie action was tried
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 390People ex rel. Russell v. County Board of Canvassers (1887)
At an election held November eighth, the inspectors of election of the eleventh election district of Watervliet, Albany county, made out two statements of the result of the election in that district, one of which was filed with the town clerk and the other filed with the county clerk the second day after the election.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 394People v. Platt (1887)
<p>Action in the nature of a quo warranto — Cods of Civil Procedure, sec. 1948 — ths attorney-general may designate the county in which the action is to he tried.</p> <p>Tlie complaint in this action, brought by the People of the State of New York against the defendant Thomas C. Platt, alleged that the defendant had been appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy in the office of quarantine commissioner; that his appointment had been confirmed by the senate, and that the defendant thereupon entered upon, and has since held and occupied, the office, and still continues to do so, and from that date to this has acted as such officer, and still continues to do so. It then recited statutes tending to show that a person, to be eligible to the office of quarantine commissioner, ought, at the time of his ' appointment or during his continuance in office, or both, to be a resident of the metropolitan district, and then alleged that the defendant, all the time in question, did not reside in that district, but did reside in the county of Tioga.</p> <p>It also alleged that the defendant, as such officer, ought to have subscribed and taken the oath of office before some one of certain officers named, and ought to have filed such oath in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, but instead thereof that he subscribed and took the oath before a notary public and filed it in the office of the secretary of state in Albany county.</p> <p>Judgment was demanded that the defendant be adjudged guilty of usurping the office, that he has forfeited the office, that he be ousted therefrom and pay a fine of $2,000.</p> <p>Held, that the action was in the nature of a quo was'ranto, and that the attorney-general was authorized, by section 1948 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to maintain the action in the name of the people, and to designate the county in which the action should be triable.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 397Beyer v. Wilson (1887)
Lawrence County Special Term, denying a motion to compel plaintiffs’ attorney to receive an answer returned by ltim because of defective verification.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 399Munsion v. Reid (1887)
The action was brought to establish the right of the plaintiff to maintain and use a drain or sewer leading from his own premises across the premises of the defendant, and to enjoin the defendant from obstructing the same.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 404Murray v. Usher (1887)
Lawrence county on the verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon the minutes of the justice before whom the action was tried. The action was brought to recover damages from the defendants for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate. John Blanchard, the deceased, was employed as a day laborer at the saw mill of the Racket River Lumber Company, a partnership composed of the defendants Usher and Watkins.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 408People ex rel. Williams v. Corey (1887)
Corey, and awarding the custody of said infant child to the relator. The proceeding in which the order appealed from was made, was commenced by writ of habeas corpus, issued by Hon. Clarence W. Smith, county judge of Hamilton county, on the 21st day of Juné, 1886, directed to the defendant, Anthony Corey.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 411Crandall v. Eldridge (1887)
Upon the trial evidence was given by the plaintiff tending to-show that in the fall of 1884, the time at which the horse in question was killed, and for many years previous, the plaintiff and defendant were and had been in occupation of contiguous farms in the town of Easton, Washington county, N. Y., between which was a division fence.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 414Messelback v. Norman (1887)
This was an action against the defendant, as treasurer of an insurance company, upon a policy of insurance issued hy the company to plaintiff. The defense was two-fold, viz.: First. That at the time of issuing the policy, and at the time of the fire, the plaintiff was not the owner, and that her interest in the property was not stated in the policy. Second. That the property was unoccupied at the time of the fire. The first is the more important defense.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 418Whitmarsh v. Littlefield (1887)
The action was brought to recover damages for the breach of a ■contract, by which the defendants hired the plaintiff to assist in loading ice boats at an agreed price of two dollars per day while the old ice lasted, and one dollar and seventy-five cents per day for the balance of the season, until the close of navigation, on or about December 5,1886. The complaint alleged the defendants discharged the plaintiff on or about August 30,1886
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 421Cross v. Devine (1887)
Tins is an action to recover damages for false and fraudulent representations in the sale of real estate. On the 2d day of April, 1878, plaintiff purchased of defendant certain real estate, situated in the town of Fallsburgh, Sullivan county, N. Y., and described in the complaint. The defendant, at the time the said purchase was made, represented the said property to be free and clear from all incumbrances.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 423Van Wagoner v. Terpenning (1887)
<p> An injunction restraining a person from disposing of op interfering with personal pn'operty, does not pn'ement him from bringing am action for its conversion, so as to stop the running of the statute of limitations. </p> <p>This action was commenced in January, 1883, to recover certain articles of personal property belonging to the plaintiff which were in the possession of the defendant, who was alleged to have wrongfully seized them in March, 1875, a demand having been made in April or May, 1875, and another just before this action was commenced. To avoid the defense of the statute of limitations the plaintiff proved that his wife brought an action for separation, in which an injunction was served, in June, 1874, restraining him from disposing of, or in any manner interfering with, her personal property and the personal property now in question; and that this injunction continued in force until April, 1881, when the action was dismissed and the injunction was dissolved.</p> <p>Held, that the injunction order did not forbid the plaintiff to bring an action against the defendant, or any one else who had taken and converted the personal property, and that the running of the statute of limitations was not suspended during the time he was enjoined.</p> <p>McQueen v. Babcock (41 Barb., 337) followed; Finche v. Funke (25 Hun, 616) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 426O'Brien v. Home Benefit Society (1887)
The action was brought upon a certificate of membership for $2,000, issued by the defendant to the plaintiff’s intestate. The defenses were that no recovery could be had in this form of action; that the only remedy was by action in equity to compel defendant to make an assessment and pay over the money realized ; and that the certificate was procured by fraud and misrepresentation by the assured, as to his having, prior to that time, been afflicted with rheumatism.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 432Van Gelder v. Hallenbeck (1887)
Appear by the defendant from a judgment entered in Greene county, upon the report of a referee. The action was'.brought originally to recover.a'penalty under section 1436, of the Code of Civil Procedure, for an irregular sale of real property -by the defendant, as sheriff, under an execution issued upon a judgment recovered against the plaintiff.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 442Brackett v. Griswold (1887)
, Appeal from an order made at Special Term, and entered in Essex county, denying a motion made by defendant, tbat the plaintiff execute a bond for costs, on the ground that the action was not originally brought by the plaintiff. The action was originally brought in May, 1873. by Samuel Bonnell, Jr., the plaintiff’s intestate, who, at that time, was a resident of New Jersey.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 444People ex rel. Warren v. Carter (1887)
Appeal by tbe relators from an order entered in Rensselaer county, on tbe 16tb day of September, 1887, vacating tbe taxation of costs bad before tbe county clerk of Rensselaer county, and directing liim to tax tbe costs of an appeal from a final determination in tbe above entitled matter at ten dollars and disbursements.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 448Record v. Village of Saratoga Springs (1887)
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered at the Saratoga Circuit upon • a verdict for $5,000 against the defendant, for an alleged injury to the plaintiff, occasioned by a fall upon one of the sidewalks of the village of Saratoga Springs, on October 1, 1885, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon the minutes of the justice before whom • the action was tried.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 454Peck v. Doran & Wright Co. (1887)
This count alleges that at different times between December 1, 1885, and September. 15, 1886, plaintiff had business transactions witli defendant, by wliicli defendant (in consideration of commissions paid and to be paid by tlie plaintiff) undertook, promised and agreed to and witli plaintiff to deal and traffic upon tbe market-value of wheat; tliat tlie plaintiff and defendant did deal, traffic and trade upon tlie market-value of wheat in form and manner as follows:…
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 458In re the Probate of the Alleged Last Will & Testament of Freeman (1887)
Freeman, deceased. Tbe two witnesses to tbe will were physicians and surgeons. These were tbe only witnesses sworn on tbe bearing, and tbe main question involved on this appeal is whether their evidence was properly received as to mental capacity, under section 834 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure. Tbe case, as settled by tbe surrogate, contains tbe statement that tbe subscribing witnesses to tbe will were, at tbe time, duly qualified and practicing physicians and surgeons.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 469Trebilcox v. McAlpine (1887)
The claim was for the amount of a judgment, against the deceased in his lifetime, entered at a term of the Common Pleas Court of Bradford county, Pennsylvania, in favor of Joseph Trebilcox, and transferred to, and held by respondent. An exemplified copy of the record of the judgment was put in. evidence, which showed that the judgment was recovered upon anote, so-called, of which thefollowing is a copy: “ $300.00.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 476People ex rel. Decker v. Police Commissioners (1887)
<p>The police commissioners of the city of Albany — sec. 88 of tit. 12 of chap. 77 of 1870, as amended by chapters 298 of 1885, and 448 of 1886 — the board has power to establish a veteran grade of patrohnen at a reduced salary.</p> <p>Section 38 of the act creating the defendant, the Police Commissioners of the City of Albany (chap. 77 of 1870, as amended by chapter 298 of 1885,and chapter 443 of 1886) fixes the salaries of the various officers connected with the police force, some of them at fixed sums,others at not over the sum respectively specified for each class; the direction as to patrolmen of the police force being that each “ shall receive an annual salary of not over nine hundred dollars.” At a meeting, held on January 25, 1887, the board passed a resolution, providing that, upon February 1, 1887, there should be established, for special day or night duty, a police grade, to be known as the veteran grade, and, that after ten years’ service, by a vote of a majority of the board, any patrolmen then on the force, or who might thereafter be appointed, might be assigned to duty on the veteran grade, and should receive a salary of $600 per year.</p> <p>Held, that while the act did not, in express terms, confer upon the board power to fix the salaries of patrolmen, the other provision of the act showed that it did possess the power to do so, and that in the absence of proof of any abuse in its exercise in this case, the court perceived no objection to this regulation, either in point of its justice or legality.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 479People v. Palmer (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment of a Court of Oyer and Terminer of Clinton county, entered upon the verdict of a jury finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree and sentencing Mm to be confined at hard labor at the State prison for the rest of his natural life.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 486Palmer v. President of the Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. (1887)
The action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by the negligence- of defendant. The injuries were to plaintiff’s eye, and were received while he whs a passenger on the defendant’s train, and riding in a passenger car.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 492Putman v. Van Allen (1887)
It does not appear, what the action was for._ It was tried before a jury, who rendered a verdict for the defendant, and it seems to have been a ease where the costs could not exceed five dollars besides the fees of witnesses attending from another county. Section 3015 of the Code Civil Procedure, provides, that where a verdict is rendered by a jury the justice must forthwith render judgment, and enter it in his docket book.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 497Thorn v. New York City Ice Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 500In re Estate of O'Neil (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 502McNaier v. Manhattan Railway Co. (1887)
The action was brought to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff, alleged to have been the result of the falling of a clinker or coal from an engine of the defendant.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 504Henderson v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order and interlocutory judgment, entered at'a Special Term held in Westchester county, sustaining a demurrer interposed by the defendant to the complaint, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p> <p>The complaint, after alleging that the plaintiff was an attorney and counselor-at-law and a notary public, duly appointed and commissioned under the laws of the State aforesaid, and was of good name, credit and standing, as such officer and in such official capacity, and was a man of good standing, reputation and character, alleged that on the 16th day of February, 1887, the defendant maliciously, libelously and wrongfully published, concerning the plaintiff, in the said newspaper called “ The Commercial Advertiser,” which it caused to be circulated and sold in the city of New York and elsewhere, a cei’tain article coxxtaixxing the false and defamatory matter following, to wit: “ A month ago Mr. McGrory refused, as supervisor-, to approve Mr. Muffin’s bond, * * * Counselor Henderson, acting for Muffin, took the matter to the board of supervisors. In the meantime Coxxnselor Keogh investigated matters for McGrory and learned that ten of the sureties did not know they were on the bond, although Henry C. Henderson, notary public, had acknowledged them as sureties,” thereby chai’ging and meaning that this plaintiff, as a notary public, had willfully certified falsely that the execution of the said bond (which was an instrument to be recorded by law) was acknowledged by ten of the parties thereto, or intending to clxax-ge that this plaintiff had fraudulently and wrongfully obtained the signatures of ten of said sureties to said bond, and to chax-ge the plaintiff with forging or causing to be forged, the names of ten of the parties to said bond.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 506In re Compelling Payment of the Amount of Tax, Upon the Property Given by the Will of Enston (1887)
Hannah Enston, a resident of Pennsylvania, domiciled in Philadelphia, sent to an agent residing in Brooklyn, to be loaned in this State, moneys in all amounting to about a million of dollars. Such moneys were invested, partly on bond and mortgage in the city of Brooklyn, and partly in the purchase of stocks and bonds of foreign municipal and business corporations.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 509Henderson v. Henderson (1887)
<p>Power given to an executor to make pa/rtition of the residuary estate — when void as unlawfully suspending the absolute ownership of personal property — when^ void for violating the provisions of the statute, as to contingent remainders created on a term for yea/rs.</p> <p>By the residuary clause of his will the testator authorized, empowered and directed his executor to partition, divide and apportion ’all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate, both real and personal, equally among all his children living at the time of such partition and division, and the child or children of such as might then be dead, leaving issue (the latter to take the share their parent would have taken if living). He also directed his executor to assign, transfer, set over and deliver to such of the said children the share of personalty so apportioned, and to make, execute and deliver to each good and sufficient deeds of conveyance'of the real estate so apportioned to each in fee simple, and gave, devised and bequeathed to each of his said children the share or portion of his said estate so to be partitioned and apportioned to them, respectively, “provided, nevertheless, that 11 any of my children shall die without issue before such partition and division shall be made, then I give the portion of such deceased child equally to the brother and sisters of such deceased child; and provided, further, that it any of my said children shall die leaving issue, then the child or children, who shall be living at the time of such partition of such deceased child of mine, shall take and have the share or portion which the parent would have taken if living.”</p> <p>'The executor was to make the partition, division and apportionment as soon after the testator’s death as might be practicable, having reference to the condition of the estate, but could not be compelled to make it until after the lapse of five years from the date of the probate of the will. He was authorized to take charge of the estate, real and personal, to sell any or all of it, convert realty into personalty, and to invest and reinvest and erect and repair buildings.</p> <p>Meld, that the validity of the clause was to be determined by the legality of the ultimate disposition of the corpus of the estate for which the power of partition and division was given.</p> <p>'That, as the share of a child dying before the partition, leaving issue, was given to those only of such issue who should be living at the time the partition was made, and the interest of each of such issue was liable to be divested by his death prior to that event the absolute ownership of the personal property was unlawfully suspended in violation of the provisions of section 1 of 1 Revised Statutes, 773.</p> <p>That the ultimate disposition of the real estate was also illegal as in violation of the same provision, and also of section 20 of 1 Revised Statutes, 724, providing that a contingent remainder should not be created on a term of years, unless the nature of the contingency on which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest during the continuance of not more than two lives in being, at the creation of such remainder, or upon the termination thereof.</p> <p>.Robert v. Corning (89 N. Y., 225) distinguished.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 515Ferris v. Plummer (1887)
Reargument of an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant entered in Kings county, upon an order dismissing the complaint with costs. In this action brought for a specific performance of a contract for an exchange of real property it appeared that the plaintiff’s title to the property was derived through a foreclosure proceeding.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 519Tuller v. Beck (1887)
Appeals from an order made at tbe Orange Special Term and entered in Westchester comity, directing the sheriff of Westchester county to apply and pay upon the attachment and execution, issued in an action brought by one Frederick O. Pierce against the defendant in this action, certain moneys collected upon the sale of property sold under an attachment and judgment issued in the first of the above entitled actions.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 521Butler v. Cushing (1887)
The action was brought to recover as damages caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, the loss, by fire, on plaintiffs’ goods, which were burned on May 5, 1885, in a building of which the defendant was the owner. The contention of the plaintiffs’ is that the.fire was caused by the fall of the building.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 525In re the New Rochelle Water Co. (1887)
The petitioning corporation was formed under the act of the legislature of this State, entitled “An act in -relation to the formation of waterworks companies in towns and villages in the State of New York,” known as chapter 13 Y of the Laws of 1813, and the amendatory and supplemental acts (Laws 1816, chap. 415, and 1881, chap. 321), to supply the village of New Rochelle with water.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 526Hinz v. Starin (1887)
On July 26, 1885, Oscar Hinz, the plaintiff’s intestate, while bathing at Glen Island, was killed while diving from the top of a trapeze structure.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 529In re the Estate of Bonnet (1887)
Appeal by a legatee and one of the heirs-at-law of Zalmon Bonnet from a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of Westchester county, so far as the same adjudges that the legacies given in the will of the deceased, which have lapsed by the death of the legatees without issue before the death of the testator, and the legacy declared to be void which was given to the wardens and vestrymen of St. John’s Protestant Episcopal Church at Wilmot, in trust, are payable to the wardens and…
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 530American Primitive Methodist Society v. Brooklyn Elevated Railroad (1887)
The action was begun prior to the operation of the defendant’s road, and upon the trial, on the defendant’s application, the damages were restricted to such as were sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the existence of the defendant’s elevated structure on said Park avenue prior to the operation of said road. Park avenue was opened as a public street under the provisions of chapter 132 of the Laws of 1835.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 534In re Taking an Easement in Land Required for the Wells Avenue Sewer (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order, made at tbe Dutchess Comity Special Term and entered in Westchester county, discontinuing these proceedings, instituted to acquire an easement in lands, owned by William F. Lawrence, for the purpose of constructing a sewer through them.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 536Clark v. Koehler (1887)
The action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants’ servant while driving a truck through Carroll street, in the city of Brooklyn.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 538Snyder v. Gorden (1887)
<p>Landlord — liability of, for letting premises contaminated with infectious diseases, without notifying the tenant.</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action brought by the plaintiff, as administrator of a deceased child, under section 1903 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he testified that he went to see a suite of vacant apartments in a tenement-house in Brooklyn owned by the defendant; that Mrs. McCart, who occupied, with her family, the rear suite on the same floor, told him that her children had scarlet fever and diphtheria; that he reported this to the defendant, who denied it and told him that the McCarts wanted to make it appear so because they wanted the rooms left vacant in order that they might have the use of the apartments, adding, that the plaintiff need have no fear, that the house was perfectly healthy and that there had never been any sickness there. The plaintiff’s wife testified as to a visit on the next day, resulting in a similar report to and denial by the defendant. They took the rooms and a few weeks later their children took sick of diphtheria and died.</p> <p>Held, that it was not the duty of the plaintiff to search or inquire who was the doctor of the McCarts in order to ascertain from him the nature of the disease from which the children were suffering, and that the case should have been submitted to the jury, and that the court erred in taking it from them.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 540Willis v. Sharp (1887)
Appeals from orders appointing a receiver of the estate of Fida :S. Sharp, in the hands of her executor, Aurelius S. Sharp, and ■directing him to pay the plaintiffs’ judgments out of the same. This case has been already considered by the General Term of this department, upon an appeal from a judgment overruling a demurrer interposed to the complaint, the decision being reported in 43 Him, at page 435. >
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 542Wolfskehl v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1887)
The plaintiff alleges in -his complaint filed in this case, that, on. the 23d day of July, 1886, while employed as a musician at .'Scranton, Pennsylvania, under an engagement which was to be continued for at least one year, and at a salary of $750 a year and board, he telegraphed to Myrtle Kingsland, at Rockaway Beach, ¡asking for an engagement for one year as a musician; that the said Myrtle Kingsland replied to the plaintiff’s application as follows: “ July 24, 1886. “To…
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 544Keenan v. Gutta Percha & Rubber Manufacturing Co. (1887)
<p>Liability of one who Jceeps a vicious dog with knowledge of its vicious disposition— one who keeps such a dog, although he does not own it, is liable to a person injured by it.</p> <p>While the plaintiff, who was in the employment of the defendant corporation, was preparing food on the defendant’s premises for a slut with a brood of pups, she seized one of his legs and bit it, and when she was beaten off with a water bucket' by another boy she seized the other leg of the plaintiff and bit that also. Upon the trial of this action, brought by him to recover damages for the injuries thereby sustained, proof was given showing that the slut had bitten another boy eight or ten months previous to this time, and that that fact was known to the foreman of the defendant.</p> <p>Held, that a judgment, entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, should be sustained.</p> <p>Tliat proof of the fact that the dog had bit another boy, and that the defendant’s foreman had notice of this fact, was properly received.</p> <p>That the question of the actual ownership'of the dog was not material in this action, as the basis of the action was the wrongful keeping of the dog with knowledge of its vicious disposition.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 548Cartwright v. President of the Village of Sing Sing (1887)
Appeal by tbe plaintiff from an order made at tbe Dutebess County Special Term and entered in Westchester county, denying a motion to restrain tbe defendant from raising a tax.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 552Olmsted v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Railroad (1887)
Brown and Thomas F. Wentworth, guilty of contempt in failing to comply with an order, made and entered on December 4, 1886, appointing a receiver of the said corporation, and directing the delivery to him of all the property and books of the corporation.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 555In re the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Muir (1887)
<p>Appeal from a decree of tlie surrogate of Kings county, rendered upon the final accounting of the executors of the last will and testament of John Wilson, deceased.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 557Bohn ex rel. Von Bielefeld v. Havemeyer (1887)
Appeal by tlie plaintiff from a judgment entered upon a verdict rendered at tbe Kings County Circuit in favor of tlie defendants. Tbe action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained to the plaintiff while employed in the defendants’ sugar refinery as a workma
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 561Dennerlein v. Dennerlein (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 562Cullen v. National Sheet Metal Roofing Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 564Van Winkle v. Brooklyn City Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 566In re the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Albertson (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 569Tracey v. City of Poughkeepsie (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 571Kaufman v. Schoeffel (1887)
<p>Husband and wife may hold personal property in common— right of a sheriff to take possession of and deliver goods owned by a firm, to a purchaser at a sale under an execution issued upon a judgment recovered against one member thereof — when the designation by the judgment-debtor of certain goods to be levied upon operates as a pav'tition of the property — evidence—written statements made by.a pan-ty are., admissible to contradict his testimony.</p> <p>This action was brought by the plaintiff, as the executor of his wife, who died oh April 30, 1883, against the defendant for wrongfully converting, on or about September 28, 1883, certain liquors and barrels to his own use. The answer-alleged that the goods were levied upon and sold by the defendant, as sheriff, under an execution issued upon a judgmenbrecovered against the plaintiff, individually, and that at the time of the levy the goods were owned by him or that he had an interest therein liable to levy and sale under execution. Evidence-having been given upon the trial, which was sufficient to authorize the jury to-find that the plaintiff and his wife had been carrying on business as partners for several years prior to her death, the trial judge submitted that question to the jury and instructed them that if the plaintiff had a personal interest in the goods, or if he and his wife owned the property together, the verdict should be for the defendant.</p> <p>Hdd, that he did not err in so charging; that while a husband and wife cannot be copartners in trade or business they may own personal property in common.</p> <p>The former decision made by this court in this case (37 Hun, 140) distinguished.</p> <p>'That a claim made by the appellant’s counsel that, conceding that the plaintiff might lawfully be, and was in fact, the owner of an undivided part of the goods, the attempted justification failed, for the reason that the sheriff levied upon and sold the entire property and not merely the plaintiff’s interest therein, could not be sustained for the following reasons:</p> <p>Hirst. That the sheriff, for the purpose of making his levy upon the interest of the plaintiff, was entitled to take possession of the whole property, and upon a sale ■deliver it to the purchaser, who would take it subject to the rights of the plaintiff, as the executor of his wife, and that the evidence in this case did not show that he had exceeded his authority in making the sale in question.</p> <p>Second. That there was no evidence before the court which showed that this objection was raised at the trial.</p> <p>The deputy sheriff testified that after he had levied upon the goods in the store the plaintiff said that the value of the goods far exceeded the amount of the execu tion, and that the witness replied that he only wanted to take enough goods to satisfy the execution and costs, and told him that if he would point out goods to a sufficient value to cover that he would let him go on and sell the rest, and that the plaintiff then showed'him the goods upon which the levy was made.</p> <p>It seems, that this evidence would justify the jury in finding that the transaction amounted to an agreement between the plaintiff, representing’ the estate of his wife, and his judgment creditors, for whom the sheriff was acting, that the portion of the goods levied on should be treated as the sole property of the plaintiff, and was, in effect, a partition of the common property. (Per Smith, P. J.)</p> <p>Upon the trial a return, filed by the plaintiff with the collector, as required by the statute, signed by him “ Leander W. Kaufman, of the firm of Kaufman & Co.,’’ stating, among other things, that the said firm consisted of Leander W. Kaufman and Mary I. Kaufman, was received in evidence. The return was made upon a printed blank, at the foot of which was a blank jurat, but the jurat was not filled up or signed. It appeared from the language of the judge, in his charge to the jury, that he treated the return as having been sworn to.</p> <p>Held, that the plaintiff was not prejudiced thereby for the following reasons:</p> <p>Mrst. That as the return contained a statement that the “undersigned” had been duly sworn, it was, on its face, equivalent to a statement by the plaintiff that he had verified it by his oath, but that the officer who administered the oath had omitted to sign the jurat.</p> <p>iSecond. That if there was error it was waived by the omission of the plaintiff’s counsel to call the attention of the judge to it.</p> <p>Third. That the jurors had the paper before them in the jury room, and an opportunity to read it deliberately and see its contents.</p> <p>Hourth. That, whether sworn to or not, the paper was a written statement deliberately made by the plaintiff, and was properly received to contradict him as a witness.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 580Swift v. Wheeler (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order of the Monroe County Court, denying a motion made by the plaintiff to vacate an order requiring him to give security for costs.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582Chautauqua Assembly v. Alling (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered in Chautauqua county on the report of a referee.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 589Citizens' National Bank v. Shaw (1887)
The judgment in this and three other actions against the same defendant was entered July 29,188Y, upon offers made and accepted 'for amounts aggregating upwards of $60,000. And executions were issued upon them severally and levied upon certain personal property of the defendant. The affidavits of authority to make the offers, and annexed to them respectively, were made by the managing clerk of the attorneys for the defendant, who were the same in all the actions.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 594Thacher v. Hope Cemetery Ass'n (1887)
<p>„Statute of limitations — it will not begin to run until the plaintiff has actual knowledge of facts— Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 410.</p> <p>'This action was brought, on October 5, 1888, by the plaintiff, as executor of Otis Thacher, deceased, upon a certificate, dated August 1, 1864, issued by the defendant corporation, under the provisions,of chapter 133 of 1847, as amended by chapter 163 of 1860, which reads as follows: “We certify that Otis Thacher has this day loaned to the Hope Cemetery Association $300. It is agreed upon the part of the said association that one-half of the receipts from the sale of lots shall he applied exclusively to the payment of the sum of $2,600 loaned to said association by divers persons, of which the said sum of $800 forms a part, and for the payment of the'interest thereon, said'interest to he payable annually, and the receipts to be so applied shall be. distributed on the first day of July and the first day of January, in each year, until said sum shall he fully paid.” Upon the trial it was shown that the defendant had received proceeds of sales of lots more than sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s demand, hut as it appeared that such receipts had been received more than six years before the action was commenced the plaintiff was nonsuited.</p> <p>Held,, that it was error to do so.</p> <p>■That the certificate was not a positive and unconditional promise to pay, but simply an undertaking to apply and distribute, in the manner and at the times therein specified, one-half of the receipts received from the sale of lots.</p> <p>'That as the proceeds received from such sales were held by the defendant in trust for the certificate holders, and the only remedy of the plaintiff was in equity, and there was no concurrent remedy at law, the case was one in which an action for relief could be brought within ten years from the time when the cause of action accrued.</p> <p>That as the receipt of the proceeds of sale was a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and not known to the plaintiff, notice to him of such fact was necessary to put him in default, and that as no notice was given in this case the plaintiff’s right to the relief sought was not barred by the statute of limitations.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 598Lineas Le Barren v. Babcock (1887)
<p>Tenants 'in common of a fa/rm, — a tenant who sows and cuts oats on a piece of land is entitled to them, as against his co-tenants — but not to hay curred from grass growing thereon mowed by him.</p> <p>This action was brought to recover damages from the defendants for carrying- away and converting to their own use a quantity of hay and unthreshed oats from a farm, of which one Le Barren died seized in 1882, leaving him surviving eleven ■ children, one of whom was the plaintiff and another was the wife of the defendant House. In 1885 the plaintiff cultivated a piece of land on the farm and sowed it with oats, and when they matured cut them. While they were lying on the ground the defendant House, acting by authority derived from his wife and the other defendants, raked up the oats and drew them away.</p> <p>Held, that, as it was to be assumed that all of the heirs of Le Barren were free and at liberty to go upon and occupy the premises jointly without being liable to each other for the use and occupation of the farm, the plaintiff was lawfully in possession and had the right to cultivate the ground and sow and harvest the oats, and that as the oats were the product of his labor, rightfully performed, he was entitled to maintain this action for their conversion.</p> <p>The plaintiff mowed some of the grass growing in the meadow on the farm, and was proceeding to cure and gather the hay so cut, when the defendant House went into the field and drew some of it away.</p> <p>Upon the trial of this action the court charged the jury that when the plaintiff entered upon the portion of the meadow on which he cut the grass he took possession of that part of the premises, and by force of it acquired the title to the grass which he cut, and that he had the right to protect such possession and the title thus derived to the grass mowed there by him.</p> <p>Held, that the court erred in so charging.</p> <p>That as growing grass is a part of the realty until severed, and unlike other farm crops is, in some sense, a self-supporting production, the hay in question was not the product of the labor of the plaintiff, and that he acquired- no additional right of property by the mere act of severing it from the land.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 603People ex rel. Stockwell v. Talmage (1887)
The defendants, who were by the county judge of that county appointed as referees to hear and determine such appeal, reversed by the decision of a majority of them the order of the commissioner. The writ was directed to the referees only; and the case is heard upon their return.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 607Vick v. City of Rochester (1887)
Appear from an order made at the Monroe Special Term so far as it denies a motion made by the defendants to vacate an injunction granted in this action.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 612Miner v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (1887)
Appeal froui a judgment'dismissing tlie complaint, entered upon decision rendered by the court on a trial without jury, at- the Genesee Circuit.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 617Munson v. Taylor (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment, in favor of tire plaintiff, entered upon the report of a referee in an action brought upon a promissory note.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 620In re Certain Freeholders (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order of tbe Cayuga Special Term, denying tbe application of certain inhabitants of tbe city of Auburn and tbe town of Owasco for an order compelling tbe said city and town to repair and construct a bridge over tbe Owasco outlet, under and in pursuance of tbe provisions of chapter 639 of tbe Laws of 1857.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 623Merrill v. Allin (1887)
William D. Chase was the original plaintiff in the action, and since the rendition of the judgment the appellant' has become the purchaser of the same and has been substituted as the plaintiff.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 628Dorthy v. Servis (1887)
<p>General assignment — the assignee cannot maintain am, action, under chapter 314 of 1858, to set aside a chattel mortgage because of a failure to file it — nor can it be set asido by a creditor, recovering a judgment after the assignment was made.</p> <p>This action was brought by a judgment creditor and the general assignee of the firm of Neudahl & Holwede to compel the defendants to account for and deliver over to the said assignee, for the benefit of the creditors of the assignors, certain goods and chattels seized and removed from the possession of the assignee, in January, 1887, by the defendant Servis, under a chattel mortgage given by the assignors, in November, 1883, to secure him for becoming, at that time, an accommodation indorser of the notes of the assignors. Pursuant to a request made by the mortgagors, at the time of its execution, the mortgage was not filed until November, 1886, about one month before the assignment was made. The referee found that the mortgage was given by the mortgagors and received by the mortgagee without any intention on the part of either of them to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of the mortgagors.</p> <p>Held, that the assignee could not take advantage of the omission of the mortgagee to file his mortgage and claim that it should be set aside, in an action prosecuted by him for that puruose, under the provisions of chapter 314 of 1858.</p> <p>Niagara County Bank v. Lord (33 Hun, 557); Steward v. Cole (43id., 164) followed.</p> <p>The other plaintiff became the owner, by purchase, of two separate claims of indebtedness against the firm, in January, 1887, upon which he commenced actions and recovered judgments, upon which executions were issued, one of which was returned unsatisfied the other being in the hands of the sheriff at the time this action was commenced.</p> <p>Held, that the act of the judgment debtors in disposing by the general assignment of all their title and interest in the property embraced in the chattel mortgage, prior to the recovery of the judgments, prevented the judgment creditor from maintaining this action.</p> <p>Sullivan v. Miller (40 Hun, 516); Spi'ing v. Short (90 N. Y 538) followed.</p> <p>That the fact that when the assignment was made the defendant Servis had a leviable interest in the property, as the debt secured was past due, while in the case of Sullivan v. Miller (supra) the debt had not matured at the time of the assignment, did not change the legal principle involved, as an equity of redemption remained in the mortgagors although the debt secured was past due.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 632People v. Krank (1887)
The indictment contained three counts. In the first, it was charged that on the 3d day of July, 1886, the defendant sold strong and spiritous liquors, in quantity less than five gallons, to divers persons, to the grand jurors unknown, without having a license therefor; in the second count, he is charged with having on the same day sold strong and spiritous liquors, in quantity less than five gallons, to one Henry Yezie, and divers persons, to the grand jurors unknown,…
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 638Vought v. Williams (1887)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon the decision of tbe Monroe Equity Term, in favor of tbe defendant.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 643People v. Thornton (1887)
<p>On cross-examination of a witness questions as to admissions made by Mm affecting Ms credibility should be alloioed — evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show a motive on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.</p> <p>The defendant was convicted for willfully and corruptly swearing falsely upon the trial of a divorce action, in which Everett M. Crandall was plaintiff and Adelia R. Crandall defendant, to the effect that he had seen Everett M. Crandall, in company with George Peckham, in a house of prostitution at Coleville, kept hy one Jeannetta Y orkie, with whom Crandall made arrangements for illicit'intercourse upon his paying three dollars. Upon the trial, after Peckham had been called by the plaintiff and testified to the effect that the testimony of this defendant in the divorce action was entirely false and untrue, he was recalled by the defendant’s counsel and asked, but not allowed to answer, the following question: “ Did you, on the occasion of the trial of the Crandall case, at Norton & Church’s office, when Allen Peckham asked you if you had not previously told him that you and Mr. Crandall did visit a house of prostitution, at Coleville, and that you had loaned Crandall two dollars and afterwards one dollar to go up stairs with a girl, say that you might have said so, that you did a great many things that you could not now recollect ? ”</p> <p>Held, that the evidence should have been admitted as it would have had an important bearing upon the credibility of the witness.</p> <p>That evidence, as to the defendant’s intimacy with Crandall’s wife, was properly received as tending to show a motive on the part of the defendant for doing that which he was convicted of doing.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 645Williams v. Guile (1887)
<p>Motion for a new trial by tire plaintiff upon exceptions taken at tlie Monroe Circuit, ordered to be beard at tire General Term in tbe first instance.-</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 651Hamilton v. Smith (1887)
Smith, as executor, etc., of moneys arising from an award bereinafter mentioned. Iiiram Smith, up to the time of his death, owned mill premises and property, situate on Honeoye creek.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 657Surrogate v. Legatees of the Under the Last Will & Testament of Cager (1887)
<p>Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Cayuga county affirming the assessment of a tax upon the life estate of the testator’s adopted daughter and the estates in remainder of her children.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 661In re Soule (1887)
<p>Power of a surrogate to amend a citation — Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 738 — the recitals in a decree admitting a will to probate do not estop a pcvrty to it from petitioning to have the decree revoked— an order denying a motion to dismiss apetiiion presented under section 3647 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the pi’obate be revoked, is not appealable.</p> <p>Upon the presentation of a petition hy Cynthia D. Rood praying for a decree revoking the admission to prohate of a written instrument purporting to he the last will and testament of Lyman Soule, deceased, and that the executors devisees and legatees, and persons who were parties to the proceedings in which the prohate was granted, he cited to show cause why the prohate should not he revoked, a citation was issued hy the surrogate to the individuals named, who were duly served. The citation did not contain the names of the executors, as such, although their names twice appear among the names of the persons to whom the citation is addressed.</p> <p>On the return day of the citation the executors appeared by attorney, solely as legatees under the will and codicils, for the sole purpose of making a motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that they had not been served as executors, and upon the further ground that it appeared, hy the recitals in the decree admitting the will to probate, that the petitioner appeared hy counsel in such proceedings and consented that the same he admitted to probate.</p> <p>Upon this appeal hy the executors from an order made hy the surrogate denying the motion: »</p> <p>Held, that the surrogate had power, and under the circumstances it was his duty, to amend the citation hy adding to the names of the executors their representative character.</p> <p>That while the recitals in the decree were prima facie evidence of the facts recited, the petitioner had the right to show the existence of facts which would relieve her from any claim that she was barred or estopped from maintaining the proceedings.</p> <p>Held, further, that the order was not appealable, as it did not affect any substantial right of the appellants and the appeal should he dismissed.</p>
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 665Alexander v. Durkee (1887)
Appeals from an order of tlie Cayuga Special Term applying tbe sum of $199.47 upon tbe plaintiff’s judgment in part payment thereof. Both parties appeal.
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 675Paul v. Paul (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 675In re the Commissioners to take Certain Lands at Niagara Falls (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 675White's Bank v. Farthing (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 676Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Everest (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Ackerman v. Betz (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Bennett v. Watson (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Bottum v. Scott (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677De Meli v. De Meli (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Finnern v. Heinz (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Germania Fire Insurance v. Francis (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Gross v. Bock (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Hooper v. Beecher (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Delaplaine (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Hoyt (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Lett v. Guardian Fire Insurance (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Massa v. Cutting (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Obart v. Simonds' Soap Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677People ex rel. Brady v. French (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Stebbins v. Hume (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Tucker v. Livingston (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Vogel v. Rhind (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Barry v. Lewis (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Clute v. Emmerich (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677First National Bank v. Halstead (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Goldsmith v. Glatz (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Cothern (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Katz v. Adams (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Kenney v. Kenney (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Ketteli v. Jones (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677People ex rel. Clark v. Grant (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Shaw v. Evans (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Agate v. Agate (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Allen v. Shepard (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Carr v. Risher (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Claflin v. Rothschild (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Clegg v. Aikens (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Hatten (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Wood (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Kolasky v. Nichols (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677National Steamship Co. v. Sheehan (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677New York, Lake Erie & Western Railway v. Robinson (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677People ex rel. McMackin v. Board of Police (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Post v. Cobb (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677Whitman v. Bowe (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re Kinnan (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 677In re the Southern Boulevard Railway Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Brown v. German American Insurance (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Cullen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Fanning v. Vrooman (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Ortman v. Burr (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Weber v. Schwartz (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Winne v. Ulster County Savings Institution (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Bollenbocker v. Finney (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Burhans v. Turck (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Carr v. Ilch (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Clute v. McCrea (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Goetchins v. Adams (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Hubbard v. Thorp (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679McCormick v. Stivers (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. Judge (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Raybold v. Carr (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Rogers v. Village of Peekskill (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Shuler v. Maxwell (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Silver v. Connolly (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Smith v. Dettinger (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Smith v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Thompson v. Stever (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Bowns v. May (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Hogle v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Hurd v. Burch (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Jones v. Hay (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Linderman v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679People ex rel. Waldorf v. Police Commissioners (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Adams v. Sullivan (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Allen v. Baldwin (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Baker v. Angell (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Hale v. Church (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679In re to Revoke Probate of Will of Havens (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Merchants' National Bank v. Parker (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Obery v. Miller (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Terrel v. Wheeler (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Whitelaw v. Jones (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 679Winants v. Blanchard (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Albrecht v. Davis (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Blake v. Crowley (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Collyer v. Collyer (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Conselyea v. Blanchard (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Flanagan v. Barker (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Gall v. Gall (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Goodfellow v. Wolcott (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Herrman v. Brooklyn, Flatbush & Coney Island Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680In re the Final Settlement of Atkinson's Accounts (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680King v. Barnes (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Sanders v. Downs (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Sproul v. Newman (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Trustees of the Town of Southampton v. Mecox Bay Oyster Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Christie v. Shankey (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Conklin v. Cooper (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Empire Hook & Ladder Co. v. Phœnix Insurance (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Felter v. Claffy (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Importers & Traders' National Bank v. Perine (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680King v. Post (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Nearpass v. Newman (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Abbott v. New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Parker v. Baker (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Smith v. Wortman (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Atwater v. Spader (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Blake v. CorBitt (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Cahill v. Hickey (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Downs v. Wells (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Fiske v. Bardeen (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Jenness v. Constantine (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Kene v. McAdams (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680McDowell v. New York & Sea Beach Railway Co. (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Murphy v. Owen (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Palmer v. Searing (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Parkhurst v. Berdell (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Stafford National Bank v. Underwood (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Todd v. Haeger (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 680Wood v. Simonson (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 681Shimer v. Kinder (1887)
- 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 682Warren v. Wilder (1887)