¶1join, concurring.
¶2I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that concludes that appellant’s purse is not a “tool[ ], implement ] or outfit” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-94, and therefore concur in the judgment it reaches. I write separately to *413express my view that Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953), and the legislative history of Code § 18.2-94, constrains this Court to construe Code § 18.2-94 as prohibiting only the possession, with the requisite intent, of “burglarious tools,” i.e., those tools, implements, or outfit that are “suitable and appropriate to accomplish the destruction of any ordinary hindrance of access to any building, or to a vault or safe.” Burnette, 194 Va. at 790, 75 S.E.2d at 486.
¶3The statute creating the crime of possessing “burglarious tools, implements or outfit” was part of legislation first adopted by the General Assembly in 1878 (Acts of 1877-78, p. 288), and as the BurnetteCourt noted, the statute read:
“Any person who shall be guilty of burglary, shall be punished with death, or, in the discretion of the jury, by confinement in the penitentiary for a period not less than five nor more than eighteen years. If a person break and enter the dwelling-house of another in the night time, with intent to commit larceny, he shall be deemed guilty of burglary, though the thing stolen, or intended to be stolen, be of less value than twenty dollars. If any person ha[v]e in his possession any tools, implements, or other outfit known as burglars’ tools, implements, or outfit, with intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny, he shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than five nor more than ten years. The possession of such burglarious tools, implements, or outfit, shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny.”
¶4Burnette, 194 Va. at 787-88, 75 S.E.2d at 484.
¶5The 1878 statute codified burglary as it then existed and created a statutory offense to possess “burglarious tools, implements, or other outfit known as burglar’s tools, implements, or outfit, with the intent to commit burglary, robbery or larceny....” The “burglarious tools, implements or outfit” in the statute were “known as burglar’s tools.” Id.
¶6The statute continued in that form without change in the Code of 1887 as section 3704. However, in 1919 the language *414of the statute was altered by transposing several sentences, and included the definition of common law burglary and omitted the descriptive phrase “known as burglar’s tools, implements, or outfit.” The 1919 Code Revisors’ note to the amended code section stated: “The phraseology of this section has been changed so as to include common law burglary in the definition of burglary under the statute, and there is a transposition of sentences at the beginning of the section, but no material change has been intended.” Burnette, 194 Va. at 788, 75 S.E.2d at 484.
¶7At its 1950 Session, the General Assembly recodified the earlier statute as Code § 18-159. The recodified statute included the same two criminal provisions, burglary and the possession of “burglarious tools” with the requisite intent, as was in the 1919 statute.
¶8In 1953, in Burnette, the Supreme Court, considering a constitutional challenge to the evidentiary presumption contained in Code § 18-159, noted that:
[t]he statutory crime with which defendant is charged consists of two essential elements: (1) possession of burglarious tools; and (2) an intent to commit burglary, robbery, or larceny therewith. The burden was upon the Commonwealth to prove possession of such tools by defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute makes possession prima facie evidence of the criminal intent.
¶9Id. at 792, 75 S.E.2d at 487 (emphasis added). There the Supreme Court clearly declared that
[t]he mere possession of burglarious tools is not a crime under the statute. It is possession with intent to use them to commit a crime. The tools or implements may be, and usually are, designed and manufactured for lawful purposes. But it is unusual for a person, on a lawful mission, to have in his possession a combination of tools and implements suitable and appropriate to accomplish the destruction of any ordinary hindrance of access to any building, or to a vault or safe.
¶10*415Id. at 790, 75 S.E.2d at 486. It concluded that the combination of tools at issue there,
a loaded 32-caliber Colt’s blue steel revolver, two new 10 inch hacksaw blades ..., [ ] one pair of white cotton gloves[,] ... one 36 inch pick, one 30 inch wrecking bar[,] one 3 pound sledge hammer[,] one 18 inch screw driver[,] one two-cell flashlight, one 1/2 inch steel drill bit, one 7/16 inch steel drill bit[,] ... four 1/4 inch steel drill bits[,] ... [and] one pair of work gloves with buck palms and cotton baeks[,]
¶11while designed for, and adaptable to, lawful uses, “were implements and tools commonly used by house breakers and safe crackers,” which “prove[d] that they were ‘burglarious tools’ within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 791, 792, 75 S.E.2d at 486, 487.
¶12Subsequently, at its 1960 session, the General Assembly recodified Code § 18-159, creating two separate statutes embodying the two substantive offenses formerly contained in Code § 18-159: Code § 18.1-61 (burglary) and Code § 18.1-87 (possession of “burglarious tools, implements or outfit”). At its 1975 session, the General Assembly again recodified Code § 18.1-87, this time as Code § 18.2-94, the code section under which appellant was convicted. It placed Code § 18.2-94 in Chapter 5, Article 2 of Title 18.2, entitled “Burglary and Related Offenses.”
¶13Since its inception in 1878, the crime of possession of “burglarious tools” has been combined with and associated with the crime of burglary. That the General Assembly has since 1878 continually placed the statutory offense of possession of “burglarious tools” in that part of the Code pertaining to burglary demonstrates, in my view, that the General Assembly intended to retain the close historical connection between the offenses of the possession of “burglarious tools, implements or outfit” and burglary. Expanding the meaning of “burglarious tools, implements or outfit” beyond “a combination of tools and implements suitable and appropriate to accomplish the destruction of any ordinary hindrance of access *416to any building, or to a vault or safe,” is, in my view, a departure from its historical mooring, particularly considering the legislative history of the “burglarious tools” statute and the Supreme Court’s analysis of Code § 18.2-94’s predecessor, Code § 18-159, in Burnette.
¶14In my view, this Court, in Mercer v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 380, 512 S.E.2d 173 (1999), erroneously began a journey away from the established construction of the “burglarious tools” statute, finding that an altered pair of pants, used to facilitate shoplifting, was a “larcenous outfit.” While I concur in the judgment of the majority overruling Mercer“to the extent that it defines ‘outfit’ [under Code § 18.2-94] as ‘wearing apparel,’ ” in my view, the majority errs in not overruling our holding in Mercerin its entirety.
¶15Accordingly, while I concur in the judgment of the majority in concluding that appellant’s purposefully emptied purse, used to conceal merchandise which she had stolen, was not a “tool” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-94, I am unable to join in its rationale, which in my view unnecessarily expands those items made criminal by Code § 18.2-94 to include items not “suitable and appropriate to accomplish the destruction of any ordinary hindrance of access to any building, or to a vault or safe.” Burnette, 194 Va. at 790, 75 S.E.2d at 486. If the General Assembly had desired to expand the statutory definition of “any tool[ ], implement ] or outfit” beyond that which, in my view, is compelled by the existing statute, it clearly could have done so.
¶16join, dissenting.
¶17Although I agree with the majority that Code § 18.2-94 does not solely criminalize possession of just “burglarious” tools, implements, and outfits, I would find here, given appellant’s preparation of her purse before she entered the store so that it better assisted her with her plan to commit larceny by inconspicuously stealing merchandise, that the trial court did not err in convicting her under Code § 18.2-94. Therefore, I must dissent from the majority opinion.
¶18*417Code § 18.2-94 criminalizes the possession of “any tools, implements or outfit, with intent to commit burglary, robbery or larceny” (emphasis added), as a Class 5 felony. The legislature’s use of the term “or” twice in this statute is important, both linguistically and conceptually, because the placement of “or” in these lists creates two sets of disjunctive variables, thus creating nine combinations of words: burglary tools, larcenous outfits, robbery implements, and so on. Thus, the statute by its plain language prohibits the possession of nine categories of items, if the perpetrator possesses any of them with the requisite criminal intent. The one thing the statute clearly does not do—as its title misleadingly suggests
¶19However, after reviewing the facts in this case and the relevant law, I must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that possession of this purse was not criminal behavior as defined by Code § 18.2-94. In the case currently before us, appellant chose a particular purse, emp*418tied it, and carried it into the store with the admitted intention to use the purse to hide items that she was stealing from the store. Thus, the issue in this case is whether a purse, purposefully emptied of everything that it would ordinarily contain so that it can be used for shoplifting, can be considered a larcenous “outfit.” As opposed to the majority opinion’s definition of “outfit,” I define “outfit” by reference to the plain meaning of the term and our previous precedent, and, therefore, I would find the trial court did not err in finding appellant violated Code § 18.2-94 when she prepared and carried the purse into the store with the intention to use the purse as an aid to her plan to steal from the store. Therefore, I must dissent.
¶20When “a statute contains no express definition of a term, the general rule of statutory construction is to infer the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language used.” See Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. Pshp., 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). I would hold that, looking at the plain meaning of the word, an “outfit” includes, among other things, “wearing apparel with accessories designed to be worn on a special occasion or in a particular situation or setting.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1601 (1981) (emphasis added); see American Heritage Dictionary 797 (2d ed. 1991); Mercer v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 380, 384, 512 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1999). Therefore, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant under Code 18.2-94.
¶21When I consider the archetypal burglar’s outfit, I imagine a black jumpsuit with multiple pockets for stowing tools, perhaps topped off by a black ski mask and a sack for carrying away the loot. Appellant, however, was a shoplifter, not a burglar. She had no reason to put on a conventional burglar’s outfit, which would have defeated her purpose by, contrary to her intention, actually drawing attention to her presence in the store rather than, as she hoped by carrying the purse, allowing her to blend into the crowd. Appellant wanted everyone to think that she was just another shopper out spending her paycheck. Rather than hiding in the shadows, appellant, as a shoplifter, needed an inconspicuous container in which to *419conceal stolen merchandise that also allowed her to blend in with the crowd. For appellant, as a female shoplifter, perhaps the most obvious and best option for an outfit that would assist in her larcenous intent was a large purse that she emptied before entering the store. Therefore, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must when a defendant appeals her conviction, I would find the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of violating Code § 18.2-94. See Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 330, 601 S.E.2d 555, 574 (2004).
¶22The majority opinion, instead of deferring to the ordinary meaning of outfit, proposes to define outfit as “the tools or instruments comprised in any special equipment; as a carpenter’s or a surgeon’s outfit.” This definition ignores the plain meaning of “outfit” and instead defines the term such that it has no meaning apart from “tool” or “implement.” This new definition of the term runs counter to the “elementary rule of statutory construction that every word in the statute must be given its full effect if that can be done consistent with the manifest purpose of the act.” Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm’n, 181 Va. 811, 819, 27 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1943). Under the analysis used in the majority opinion—despite the majority opinion’s assertion in footnote 4—clothing apparently is not actually included in the list of prohibited items under Code § 18.2-94, perhaps even if it is altered to conceal the theft, as occurred in Mercer
¶23In support of its definition, the majority opinion expresses concern that the every day definition of “outfit” would allow every instance of hiding stolen merchandise in a pocket to fall under Code § 18.2-94. I find this position unpersuasive and, thus, disagree with the majority opinion’s analysis on this point.
¶24First, I believe this concern is more appropriate to an argument in the policy context involving the appropriate lan*421guage to use in a statute, as opposed to a legal analysis in an appellate opinion addressing the actual language used in a statute. An appellate court examines the language of a statute to determine what behavior the General Assembly intended to criminalize; it is not the role of the courts to evaluate the wisdom of the language codified by the legislature. Watkins v. Hall, 161 Va. 924, 930, 172 S.E. 445, 447 (1934). Under the explicit language in Code § 18.2-94, only people possessing the criminal intent to commit burglary, larceny, or robbery can be convicted, since the legislature in its drafting of this statute placed that specific limitation on prosecutions under this statute. If the General Assembly had intended to restrict convictions under Code § 18.2-94, then that body could have deleted the word(s) “tool” or “implement” or “outfit.” The General Assembly also could have included only the intention to commit “burglary” and left out the intention to commit “larceny” and “robbery.” However, the General Assembly did not enact either of these versions of the statute. Thus, this Court must address the language actually used in the statute, which includes the term “outfit.”
¶25Second, although a panel of this Court noted in Williams, 50 Va.App. at 346, 649 S.E.2d at 721, that “Had the General Assembly intended such a result, they would have punished the crime of concealment accordingly,” I do not believe that affirming this conviction here would result by any means in the punishment of every concealment. As noted in the panel dissent in this case, Edwards v. Commonwealth, 52 Va.App. 70, 78, 661 S.E.2d 488, 492-93 (2008), appellant here prepared the purse by emptying it of its contents, with the admitted purpose of using the now-empty purse to conceal stolen property and help her take that property out of the store. She had no other purpose for carrying the purse. To her, it existed solely as a means to commit larceny. When asked at trial why she had carried the empty purse into the store, appellant plainly admitted that she had the purse because she “wanted to go to the store and steal.” The evidence did not provide any other reason for her possession of the purse nor did the evidence even hint that the purse had any other use besides assisting appellant with her attempted larceny.
¶26*422To me, this fact differentiates appellant’s situation from a shoplifter who places a stolen item in a purse that is otherwise being used normally. The pocketbook in such a situation would not fall under the proscription in Code § 18.2-94 because the thief possessed it primarily for an innocent purpose. Here, in contrast, appellant went to some trouble before entering the store, planning this part of her outfit so that it served her criminal purpose rather than any innocent one. She had no innocent reason for possessing the purse when she entered that store—instead, she had it with her as “special equipment” to aid her in her larceny. Therefore, I do not believe we, as an appellate court, should second-guess both the trial court’s finding and appellant’s own characterization of the item as specifically intended, and only intended, so that she could “go to the store and steal.” Carter, 223 Va. at 532, 290 S.E.2d at 867 (“[T]he verdict of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it appears to be plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”). Based on the foregoing analysis, I would find that the evidence was sufficient to convict Edwards under Code § 18.2-94, and I would affirm her conviction. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶27. Although Code § 18.2-94 is titled "Possession of Burglarious Tools, Etc.,” that title does not add an additional element to the crime or dictate the actual elements of the crime proscribed by that statute. See Mason v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 321, 323, 228 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1976) ("[T]he summary title is not part, and does not determine the meaning, of the body of a statute.”); Brown v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 143, 146, 207 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1974) ("[U]se of the word ‘jurisdiction’ in the summary title is not controlling. The summary title is not part of the body of the statute____”). At most, "burglarious tools” provides a shorthand phrase for the behavior criminalized in Code § 18.2-94.
¶28. Contrary to the view expressed in the majority opinion, I believe Mercerwas properly decided. The holding in Merceris consistent with the plain language of the statute, allowing a conviction under Code § 18.2-94 if the person possesses an "outfit” intending to use it to commit "larceny,” one of the nine classes of objects proscribed under that statute. In addition, it is interesting to note that the appellate history of Mercerincludes the denial of Mercer’s petition for review by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Mercer v. Commonwealth, Rec. No. 990848 (Va. Aug. 2, 1999).
¶29. The majority opinion suggests in a footnote that "outfit” still has meaning because a collection of innocent items becomes an "outfit,” citing Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953), as an example. However, each of the items in the collection listed in Burnettewould become a burglarious tool based on the suspect’s intended use of the item, rendering the term "outfit” unnecessary even in this context. Cf. Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 290 S.E.2d 865 (1982) (affirming conviction for possession of a burglarious tool where the defendant possessed an unaltered screwdriver). And, it should be noted, the Burnetteopinion did not address burglarious outfits; instead, it addressed "burglarious tools,” since the Commonwealth argued only that the items possessed by Burnette were tools used to commit burglary. Id. at 791-93, 75 S.E.2d at 486-87 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth did not argue that Burnette possessed a burglarious outfit or implement, so the opinion did not address the meaning of those terms. Thus, the Court in Burnetteaffirmed a conviction for possession of a set of tools without recourse to the term "outfit.” Thus, contrary to the majority opinion’s suggestion, Burnetteactually proves, if the majority opinion’s definition of "outfit” is correct, that the term "outfit” is essentially meaningless as the term "tool” subsumes the term "outfit.” In other words, even if the statute did not include the word “outfit,” Burnette's conviction would have been affirmed as he possessed burglarious tools.