Eberhard v. Marcu’s Empirical Analysis
530 F.3d 122 · 2008
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 48 later decisions — most recently February 2023 · most notably In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (2011), Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc. (2013)
15 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corporations · Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg · BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation · Pernell v. Southall Realty · William Parsons v. Bedford Breedlove
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A 'Ponzi scheme’ typically describes a pyramid scheme where earlier investors are paid from the investments of more recent investors, rather than from any underlying business concern, until the scheme ceases to attract new investors and the pyramid collapses.” Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122 , 132 n. 7 (2d Cir.2008) (citing authorities). 2 . There are two Democratic committees — the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“In Scholes, Michael Douglas created three corporations and caused them, in turn, to create limited partnerships. The corporations were the general partners and sold limited partner interests to investors in a Ponzi scheme. In the civil enforcement action, the district court appointed one receiver to represent both Douglas and the corporations, who then sought to recover assets conveyed to third parties. Those third parties argued that the receiver was suing on behalf of the investors, not Douglas or the corporations, and lacked standing to do so. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that the corporations— “Douglas’s robotic tools” — were still distinct legal entities with separate rights and duties. “The appointment of the receiver removed the wrongdoer from the scene. The corporations were no more Douglas’s evil zombies. Freed from his spell they became entitled to the return of the moneys ... that Doug las had made the corporations divert to unauthorized purposes.” Once the “zombie” corporations were under the control of the receiver, the receiver’s only object was “to maximize the value of the corporations for the benefit of their investors and any creditors.” The receiver pressed a claim that the corporations had a right to a return of their assets that had been distributed by Douglas in his scheme. Because Douglas controlled the corporations completely, the transfers were, in essence, coerced.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“seeks to accomplish the ends sought and directed by the suit in which the appointment was made.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Klein v. Cornelius
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.