Commonwealth v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

193 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 200 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “There is evidence in this case that the deceased died of two gunshot wounds that pierced the kidney and the liver. As to that, the law holds that where anyone, without sufficient cause or provocation, unlawfully kills another by using a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body with the manifest intention to so use it, an inference may be drawn, once again, as was the inference of malice, that could arise by the use of deadly weapon on the vital part of a body. This is a permissible evidentiary inference and you don’t have to draw it. It may be drawn in the absence of qualifying circumstances. By common knowledge, such use of a deadly weapon is likely to cause death. Thus, an intent to kill may be inferred by reason of the killer’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body of the victim. You will recall the definition of a deadly weapon and what constitutes a vital part of the human body. Note well, you are not to infer this intent to kill if the facts and circumstances indicate a contrary intent. In shori, you are not bound by this inference of the intent to kill arising from the killer’s use of a deadly weapon upon a vital pari of the body, but you may or may not apply it under the facts and circumstances as you find them and as you see fit in your intelligence and mutual and collective wisdoms. Further, the nature of the weapon used may be quite material in ascertaining whether there was or was not an intent to kill, but that intent must still, in every”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Fletcher

2. “It is well established that a motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.... Although the possibility of conflicting defenses is a factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant severance, it is clear that more than a bare assertion of conflict is required. “The mere fact that there is hostility between defendants, or that one may try to save himself at the expense of another, is in itself not sufficient grounds to require separate trials.” Further, “[d]efenses become antagonistic only when the jury, in order to believe the essence of the testimony offered on behalf of one defendant, must necessarily disbelieve the testimony of his co-defendant.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Lee

3. “Remarks in a prosecutor’s opening statement must be fair deductions from the evidence which [s]he in good faith plans to introduce and not mere assertions designed to inflame the passions of the jury. The prosecution-is not, however, required to prove conclusively all statements made during the opening [statement]. As- long as there is a good faith and reasonable basis to believe that a certain fact will be established, reference may properly be made to it during the opening [statement]. Even if an opening [statement] is improper, relief will be granted only where the unavoidable effect is to so prejudice the finders of fact as to render them incapable of objective judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 2017 Pa. Super. 156 - Commonwealth v. Hutchison