Evans v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1975
Citation profile
36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 36 later decisions — most recently July 1993 · most notably Green v. State (1981), McCullough v. State (1985)
36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Katz v. United States · Aguilar v. Texas · Spinelli v. United States · Draper v. United States · Bumper v. North Carolina
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The issue thus presented is whether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that ‘consent’ has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses a warrant. We hold that there can be no consent under such circumstances. When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid. * * * * * * When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion— albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Id. 391 U.S. at 548-550 , 88 S.Ct. at 1791-1792.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“It is instantly apparent that this affidavit consists of nothing more than Sheriff Blanchard’s conclusion that appellant perpetrated the murder described in the complaint. [[Image here]] Thus it is clear that ‘[t]he magistrate here certainly could not “judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ... to show probable cause”.’ Judge Bolen necessarily accepted ‘without question’ Sheriff Blanchard’s ‘suspicion,’ ‘belief’ or ‘mere conclusion’ that appellant committed the offense described in Blanchard’s affidavit in the form of a complaint. * ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ We are constrained to conclude that the affidavit before us provided Judge Bolen with no basis for an independent determination of probable cause and the arrest warrant that issued pursuant thereto, was invalid.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Gordon v. State · McInnis v. State““PERSONALLY APPEARED before me the undersigned authority this affi-ant, who after being by me duly sworn, deposes and says your Affiant has good reason to believe and does believe that one Danny Lee Barber hereinafter styled Defendant, heretofore on or about the 9th day of October A.D. 1979 in the County of Dallas and State of Texas, did unlawfully then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an indiviual (sic), Janie Louise Ingram, by beating her with his fist and unknown objects; and the said Danny Lee Barber did then and there intentionally cause the death of the said Janie Louise Ingram in the course of committing the offense of burglary to wit; Kentech AM/FM Digital Clock Radio, (1) Large brown leather purse with shoulder strap, and unknown brand name of calculator.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Barber v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.