¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority does not cite any direct authority for the position taken. The majority cites the case of Slaton v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 1343 and then proceeds to distinguish that case from the present case. I recognize that there is a valid distinction between Slatonand the case at bar; I, however, do not perceive it as a distinction which justifies the reversal of this case.
¶3The majority does not cite the case of Beard v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 1078 which is cited in the State’s brief. Beardmore nearly parallels the case at bar in that the defendant had broken a window in the home and then fled the scene. This Court held in Beardthat “otherwise ambig*213uous circumstantial evidence of the of the intruder may be rendered unambiguous by the additional circumstance flight or the possession of burglar’s tools.” Id. at 1080.
¶4In the case at bar, the burglar tool used in the attempted break-in was recovered by the police near the scene and appellant’s flight was well established. This Court has held that the State’s burden of proof on each element of the offense charged may be established by circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Watkins v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1049.
¶5This Court also has held that even though the evidence be circumstantial the trier of fact may draw reasonable inference-es from that evidence, and it is not necessary for the State to overcome a reasonable hypothesis of innocence but only that an inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence which supports the verdict. McCann v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 421.
¶6I would follow the foregoing authorities in this case and affirm the trial court.
¶7PIVARNIK, J., concurs.