Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

531 N.E.2d 461

Diggs v. State

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided December 7, 1988

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1988-12-07

Relies on Segura v. United States · Ludlow v. State · Tata v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1988-12-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently December 2018

1 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

601988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

DeBRULER, Justice,

¶1dissenting.

¶2The police made a forcible entry into appellant’s house at 3:55 p.m. without a warrant. The police agent, Joyce Howell, had made the drug purchase and exited that house at 3:38 p.m. During this seventeen (17) minute interval, Officer Kunkle went with Howell to the police station and returned. Kunkle had the drugs and Howell in hand.

¶3During this seventeen (17) minute interval, the house and its entrance were under constant surveillance by officers including officer Harris. Regarding his observations during this time period he testified as follows:

Q. Did you see anyone approaching the house or going towards the house during that time?
A. There was quite a few people walking in the area, so it was hard to tell if people were walking—where they were acutally [sic] walking to.
Q. Did you see any cars stop by the house or near the east side of the house where you had an observation point? A. There were vehicles in and out of that area.
Q. By in and out, do you mean they parked and got out of the car and went inside or?
A. Yes. I believe there was a vehicle, at least one vehicle, that stopped.

¶4Officer Kunkle supplied the following explanation of warrantless entry.

Q. Okay. Now, will you explain to the Jury why you decided to go into that house and make an arrest right away?
A. This house was—had a lot of traffic in it. We’ve had it under surveillance for a long time. There was people in and out of there constantly. The front door was barricaded shut at all times. The back door was the only entrance to this house, and people were, through our intelligence, people were coming and going here, buying drugs, gambling, buying cigarettes, buying alcoholic beverages, and I was afraid that our money was going to be made into change for one of these other things and our money could leave. We knew from the informant that there were drugs in this room (indicating). Drugs are very disposable. It is very common practice for people to keep drugs in containers that you can fill with water right away, so that if somebody knocks at the door and says police, run to the sink, fill it up with water, the drugs are gone.

¶5*466The burden was upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the conduct of the police in entering appellant’s house fell within one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a warrant. Tata v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1025. The State contends that exigent circumstances existed which justified their warrantless entry. The basis for this exception was set forth in Ludlow v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 266, 314 N.E.2d 750, in the following manner:

The rationale for the clearly defined exception to the warrant requirement in cases of destruction of evidence is based on the need for quick action because the evidence is actually in the process of being destroyed or is about to be destroyed.

¶6The testimony of the State’s witnesses showed that there was but a single entrance to appellant’s house. It was under surveillance by several officers following Howell’s exit. None testified directly that a single person entered or left through that door during the seventeen minute interval between Howell’s exit and Kunkle’s forcible entry. Surely the reality of this situation was that there could be no danger of loss of the marked money until someone tried to leave the apartment. The money and the drugs were bottled up in the house and there is no reason at all to believe that its occupants were alerted to the existence of the undercover operation. Clearly, the State has failed to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless entry.

¶7As the entry of the police into appellant’s house without prior judicial approval was unconstitutional conduct, those items of evidence which were the direct as well as indirect products of such entry, should have been suppressed. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).

/531/ne2d/461 · .json · Public domain