07/11/2023
DA 22-0727
Case Number: DA 22-0727
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2023 MT 134N
RASTA K. DOUGLAS WALID,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE,
Defendants and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-22-835(A)
Honorable Amy Eddy, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Rasta K. Douglas Walid, Self-Represented, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellees:
Justin Kraske, Department of Public Health and Human Services,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 21, 2023
Decided: July 11, 2023
Filed:
ir,-6ts•—if
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Petitioner Rasta K. Douglas Walid appeals the Eleventh Judicial District Court’s
Order dismissing his complaint against the State and various entities (collectively “the
Department”) and declaring him to be a vexatious litigant. The court held that Walid’s
complaint was barred by principles of claim and issue preclusion and for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies with the Child Support Enforcement Division, as all claims were
based on the Administrative Law Judge’s child support calculations, payment plan, and
license suspensions and should have been pursued through the administrative hearing
process. Because Walid’s complaint was the fourth groundless action he had commenced
arising from the same child support calculation and license suspensions, the District Court
on its own motion found it “necessary . . . to exercise its discretion and declare Walid a
vexatious litigant.” It accordingly imposed filing restrictions on any attempt Walid may
make to sue the named defendants in future actions or proceedings. Upon review of the
record and application of our precedent and appropriate standards of review, we agree that
the District Court properly dismissed Walid’s complaint but conclude that it must allow
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Walid the opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions against him as a vexatious
litigant.
¶3 Walid’s dispute with the Department began when the Child Support Enforcement
Division (CSED) refused to accept his tendered payment of child support arrears and future
support payments. Walid had sent to CSED in December 2016 two homemade, self-issued
cashier’s checks purportedly drawn on his own issuing financial institution. CSED refused
to accept this tender and notified Walid that if he did not send a $600 payment by January
6, 2017, it would suspend his driver’s and professional licenses. After CSED did suspend
his licenses for nonpayment, Walid filed suit in Flathead County against the CSED. The
district court dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that CSED properly
suspended his licenses when Walid was more than $42,000 in arrears on his support
payments, that Walid presented no credible evidence of a timely and valid support
payment, and that his appeal of the license suspensions was untimely. Walid did not
appeal.
¶4 Walid filed another Petition for Judicial Review in June 2019, challenging CSED’s
suspension of his licenses for nonpayment and arguing that his child support obligation had
been cancelled through payment of his taxes. Following CSED’s response, the Eleventh
Judicial District Court dismissed the case and affirmed the underlying administrative
orders. Walid did not appeal.
¶5 Walid submitted his third Flathead County complaint in April 2022, again
challenging his license suspensions. The district court dismissed the complaint three
months later, ruling that Walid’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and he
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had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Walid did not appeal but filed a week later
a Verified Complaint the District Court characterized as nearly identical to the previous
two. Through counsel for the Department of Public Health and Human Services, the named
respondents moved to dismiss. Walid filed a response, as well as a motion to amend his
complaint. The Department again moved to dismiss, incorporating by reference its
previous brief, “as the issues presented rely upon determinative facts previously
adjudicated by this Court, most recently on July 22, 2022.” Walid again responded, urging
the court to deny the motion as moot because his Second Amended Verified Complaint set
forth “multiple causes of action” and issues not previously litigated. The District Court
entered its order dismissing the case a week later. From this order, Walid appeals.
¶6 We review de novo a district court’s conclusions of law. Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins.
Co., 2012 MT 184, ¶ 13,
366 Mont. 78,
285 P.3d 494 (citations omitted). “This includes a
district court’s application of claim preclusion or issue preclusion, which is an issue of law
that we review for correctness.” Brilz, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). We review for abuse of
discretion a pre-filing order entered against a vexatious litigant. Boushie v. Windsor,
2014
MT 153, ¶ 8,
375 Mont. 301,
328 P.3d 631 (citation omitted).
¶7 The law favors a definite end to litigation, “whereby we seek to prevent parties from
incessantly waging piecemeal, collateral attacks against judgments.” Adams v. Two Rivers
Apts., LLLP,
2019 MT 157, ¶ 7,
396 Mont. 315,
444 P.3d 415 (quoting Baltrusch v.
Baltrusch,
2006 MT 51, ¶ 15,
331 Mont. 281,
130 P.3d 1267). “A final judgment may
have a preclusive effect on future litigation by way of either res judicata or collateral
estoppel.” Adams, ¶ 7. Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from
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relitigating a matter that the party already had the opportunity to litigate, including claims
that could have been litigated in the first action. Adams, ¶ 8. This doctrine applies if the
following five elements are satisfied:
(1) the parties or their privies are the same; (2) the subject matter of the
present and past actions is the same; (3) the issues are the same and relate to
the same subject matter; (4) the capacities of the persons are the same in
reference to the subject matter and to the issues between them; and (5) a final
judgment has been entered on the merits in the first action.
Adams, ¶ 8. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars the reopening of an
issue that has been litigated and resolved in a prior suit. Adams, ¶ 9.
Collateral estoppel has four elements: (1) the identical issue raised was
previously decided in a prior adjudication; (2) a final judgment on the merits
was issued in the prior adjudication; (3) the party against whom the plea is
now asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication;
and (4) the party against whom preclusion is now asserted was afforded a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
Adams, ¶ 9.
¶8 Based on the claims Walid made in each of his three prior actions, the District Court
concluded that his fourth attempt was barred by these doctrines. Walid takes issue with
this ruling, contending that the court failed to permit his proposed Second Amended
Verified Complaint, which should not have been barred by res judicata or collateral
estoppel. Walid maintains that the prior action was not a final judgment on the merits
because it “was not rendered after argument and investigation as to which party is in the
right.”
¶9 The Department responds that, like his 2019 and April 2022 actions, Walid’s
complaint in this action challenged the April 16, 2019 Administrative Order Denying
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Obligor’s Motion to Review and Final Order Modification of an Administrative Order, and
that his proposed Second Amended Verified Complaint did the same. We agree with the
Department.
¶10 Walid’s claims in the present case focus on the Department’s actions in response to
his January 2019 Request for Review of CSED’s child support determinations. On appeal,
Walid argues the merits of that administrative proceeding and the propriety of the
Department’s decision. His arguments pertain to the same administrative order and
processes that formed the basis for his 2019 petition for judicial review and his April 2022
complaint in district court. The parties to those two actions—Walid and the Department—
are identical to the parties in this action, and Walid had the opportunity to raise and litigate
the claims he makes here. Walid’s Second Amended Verified Complaint in this action did
not allege any substantive facts other than those raised in his April 2022 complaint, which
the district court found barred by either res judicata or failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Walid did not appeal that order but simply filed a new action. Walid is incorrect
that there was no final judgment on the merits of his 2019 or 2022 district court actions.
As the District Court observed, the court affirmed the CSED’s underlying administrative
orders in the judicial review proceeding. Walid does not contest the other elements of
claim or issue preclusion, and we conclude that the District Court was correct when it found
his present claims barred under those doctrines.
¶11 When it declared Walid a vexatious litigant, the District Court examined Walid’s
history of litigation and related conduct in light of the five factors we have considered in
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reviewing the imposition of pre-filing orders. See Boushie, ¶ 19.1 As the Department
acknowledges, the court made this declaration sua sponte. The Department had not
requested such relief in its motion to dismiss. We review a vexatious litigant order to
determine: “[w]hether the litigant was given notice and a chance to be heard before the
order was entered; whether the trial court has compiled an adequate record for review;
whether the trial court has made substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature
of the plaintiff’s litigation; and whether the vexatious litigant order is narrowly tailored to
closely fit the specific vice encountered.” Boushie, ¶ 19 (citing Motta, ¶ 20).
¶12 Here, the District Court did not give Walid notice that it may declare him a vexatious
litigant or an opportunity to be heard before imposing a pre-filing restriction. Because the
restriction burdens Walid’s right of access to the courts, due process requires such an
opportunity. See Motta, ¶¶ 18-20. We accordingly reverse that portion of the District
Court’s order and remand with instructions for the court to give Walid an opportunity to
be heard on the matter.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
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These factors are: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and, in particular, whether it has entailed
vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation;
e.g., whether the litigant has an objective good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the
litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other
parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other
sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Motta v. Granite County
Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20,
370 Mont. 469,
304 P.3d 720 (citation omitted).
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applicable standards of review. The District Court correctly applied the law when it
dismissed Walid’s complaint. We affirm the dismissal, reverse the vexatious litigant
determination, and remand for further proceedings on that issue.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE
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