¶1I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth by Wasserstrom, J., writing for a unanimous panel of the court of appeals, Kansas City district, which court reversed the order granting a new trial and remanded with directions to reinstate the jury verdict. Judge Wasserstrom said, in part, as follows:
“There remains for consideration, however, the much more troublesome question of whether this error [Judge Wasserstrom is referring to the erroneous argument] resulted in prejudice to the defendants. Plaintiff argues that any error in a jury argument concerning damages can be prejudicial only if it results in an excessive verdict; that the argument here in question did in fact go only to damages; and that since the trial court did not find the amount of damages to be excessive, it follows that there was no prejudice. We agree.
“The beginning point of this argument by plaintiff rests upon solid bedrock of deci-sional law. The rule is firmly establish that any argument going to the question of damages can be prejudicial only if it resulted in an excessive verdict. McCormick v. Smith, 459 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo.1970); Schneider v. Dannegger, 435 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo.App.1968); Corley v. Andrews, 349 S.W.2d 395, 403 (Mo.App.1961). This rule has been applied in a situation such as the one here where the claim of error respected plaintiff’s counsel having been permitted to make a jury argument which constituted a plea for punitive damages. Sparks v. Auslander, 353 Mo. 177, 182 S.W.2d 167, 173 (1944). It was held that this was not reversible error, because there was no complaint as to the amount of the verdict. The rule applies equally whether no complaint of excessiveness is made by the party or if the lack of excessiveness is found by the court. Nichols v. Blake, 395 S.W.2d 136, 141 (Mo.1965); Schneider v. Dannegger, supra; Arroyo v. Keller, 433 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo.App.1968); Smiley v. Bergmore Realty Co., 229 Mo.App. 141, 73 S.W.2d 836, 841 (1934).
“The next step in plaintiff’s argument is equally sound, namely that the argument had to do solely with the matter of damages. Strictly as a matter of interpretation of the argument made, counsel’s words can only be understood as a plea for a high award of damages. This construction upon the argument is especially compelled in view of the fact that under the evidence there was no substantial issue in the case as to liability. Plaintiff’s complaint here is that two operations, culminating in the removal of a portion of two ribs, were occasioned by the negligence of one of the defendant partners. Just before the operations plaintiff had gone to his family doctor with a complaint of pain in his left side. This family doctor referred plaintiff to defendants for diagnostic x-rays. As a result of these x-rays, Dr. Courier (one of the defendant radiologists) submitted a report stating that the x-rays showed a lesion ‘in *750the anterior end of the 11th rib’ and further recommended ‘that this lesion should certainly be biopsied.’ As recommended, a portion of the eleventh rib was removed by surgery, but it was discovered that there was nothing wrong with this rib. Subsequently it was found that Dr. Courier had incorrectly reported the eleventh rib as having the lesion, whereas the lesion referred to was actually in the tenth rib. The discovery of this error then led to the second operation for removal of the affected portion of the tenth rib. A senior member of the defendant group admitted in the course of his trial testimony that Dr. Courier's mistake in reporting the eleventh rib instead of the tenth rib was not ‘good medical practice.’
“Still further, at the time that Dr. Courier was undertaking to interpret the x-rays above referred to in 1967, the defendant group had in its files under plaintiff’s code number an x-ray taken previously in 1965, showing substantially the identical lesion in the tenth rib. The reason for the surgery undertaken in 1967 was to test a potential diagnosis of cancer, but this verification of non-malignancy would have been unnecessary had the 1965 x-rays been consulted. The surgeon who performed the two operations in 1967 testified that if he had been aware of the 1965 x-ray and that it showed that there had been no growth of the lesion for a period of 33 months, ‘we would have been pretty reluctant to accept this as being a lesion related to a possible cancer’ and he further stated, T would not have operated on this man’s rib if I had known what I know now because of the possibility of it being metastatic from cancer of the stomach.’
“Looking at all of this evidence as a whole, the liability of the defendants for failure to exercise ordinary care was overwhelming. Consequently, it is far more reasonable to construe plaintiff’s jury argument as referring to the issue of damages rather than to the matter of negligence liability which had virtually ceased to be an issue in the case by the time all the evidence was in.
“The necessary next step in plaintiff’s argument is to establish that the verdict was not excessive. This conclusion also follows inexorably from well settled principles of law. The first of these principles is that when a trial court grants a new trial on a specified basis, that ruling is deemed to constitute an overruling of the motion for new trial on all other grounds. Burnett v. Johnson, 349 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Mo.1961); Took v. Wells, 331 Mo. 249, 53 S.W.2d 389 (1932); Hoehn v. Hampton, 483 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Mo.App.1972). In the present case, the defendants in their motion for a new trial did complain, among other things, that the verdict was excessive. However, under the rule stated above, the action of the trial court in granting the new trial solely on the ground of error in the jury argument in effect overruled the contention that the verdict was excessive.
“Of course it is permissible for the defendants as respondents here to urge that the trial court should have found the verdict to be excessive. However, in order to do so it is incumbent upon defendants to assume the burden of demonstrating error on the part of the trial court in this respect. State ex rel. Sturm v. Allison, 384 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. banc 1964); Smith v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 328 Mo. 979, 43 S.W.2d 548 (banc 1931); Taylor v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 333 Mo. 650, 63 S.W.2d 69 (1933); Porter v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 325 Mo. 381, 28 S.W.2d 1035 (1930); Dietrich v. Cape Brewery & Ice Co., 315 Mo. 507, 286 S.W. 38 (1926); Reed v. Swift & Co., 117 S.W.2d 636 (Mo.App.1938).
“Defendants have wholly failed to assume the burden above referred to. The closest they come in this respect is a statement in one of their points that prejudice to the defendants ‘could have been determined either by the excessiveness of the verdict or the injection of improper issues into the trial, or both.’ However, defendants in their brief state that ‘[wjhether or not such finding be based on excessiveness of the *751verdict . . . is of no import.’ Unfortunately for them, the legal rule is to the contrary. If they seek to justify a finding of prejudice by a claim that the verdict was excessive, then that becomes a key issue upon which they have the burden of demonstration. It simply will not do for them to try to brush this matter off by saying that it ‘is of no import’.
“The ultimate reliance by the defendants with respect to this matter of prejudice rests on the fact that the trial court did find in the order granting the new trial that ‘defendants have been prejudiced and they were deprived of a fair trial.’ That ‘finding’, which is more properly merely a conclusion, cannot stand in face of the foregoing principles of law already discussed. The present contention is quite similar to the argument presented to and rejected by the Supreme Court in Mosley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 301 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Mo.1957). In that case, a new trial was granted for an alleged erroneous argument. The trial court further found that because of the alleged error, ‘plaintiff did not receive a fair and impartial verdict.’ Although the Supreme Court on appeal found that the argument had not been reversibly erroneous, the plaintiff nevertheless tried to sustain the ground for a new trial on the theory that the trial court had inferentially found the verdict inadequate and against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that no such inference could be drawn, in view of the rule that a stated ground for granting a new trial in effect overrules all other grounds, including those being argued by the plaintiff. In this respect, the court explained:
‘If the trial court had considered that these grounds were meritorious it is reasonable to assume that they would have been specifically included in the order granting the motion for new trial. Upon appeal, an order sustaining such a motion upon stated grounds is treated as having the effect of overruling the motion as to other grounds set forth therein. Smith v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 328 Mo. 979, 43 S.W.2d 548. It thus becomes apparent that we could not follow the foregoing contentions of plaintiff without placing the trial court in the inconsistent position of having overruled the motion upon the two grounds heretofore mentioned, and in the next breath having sustained the motion upon the same grounds by reason of the implications plaintiff contends are necessarily inherent in assignment No. 6.’
¶2That reasoning in Mosleyis applicable here.
“Under the facts of this case and the law applicable thereto, the closing argument did not legally prejudice the defendants. The order granting a new trial, therefore, cannot stand.”
¶3To what Judge Wasserstrom said above I would add these observations: We are affirming the giving of a new trial to defendants because of a possibly faulty argument (as the majority opinion says, it is debatable whether the argument truly is a call for punitive damages), even though no one is able to point out where defendants have been harmed or can be sure that the jury considered any of its verdict to be punitive rather than compensatory. We are insisting that defendants have a perfect trial. We are departing from what we have said time and time again about harmless error not requiring a reversal. Under the views espoused in the majority opinion, the same outcome would prevail had the verdict been $25,000 or $5,000 instead of $105,000. The argument still would have been improper, the trial court would not have ruled the verdict excessive, but again could have found the argument prevented defendant from having a fair trial and we would then have to affirm the action of the trial court in giving a new trial, even though the error was harmless.
¶4This was a case of conspicuous negligence on the part of the defendants. There could not have been any serious question as to liability. The injuries and damages were severe. There is no showing defendants have been harmed by the argument made *752and we should treat this as harmless error at most.
¶5I would return this case as having been improvidently transferred and would let stand the opinion of the court of appeals.