Gwynn v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A party who moves for sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 must follow a two-step process. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(1)(A). The party first must serve the motion on the opposing party and then, at least twenty-one days later, file the motion with the court. Id. This process provides a “safe harbor” in which the offending party can avoid sanctions by withdrawing or correcting the challenged document or position after receiving notice of the alleged violation. Although this Circuit has never addressed whether a motion for sanctions under Rule 9011 may be filed after a court has ruled on the offending motion, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have concluded that a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which is “substantially identical” to Rule 9011, Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1572, cannot be filed “[i]f the court disposes of the offending contention before the twenty-one day ‘safe harbor’ period expires.” Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 295 (6th Cir.1997); see also Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385 , 389-90 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 , 89 & nn.1-2 (2d Cir. 2003). As the Sixth Circuit explained, “any other interpretation would defeat the rule’s explicit requirements.” Ridder, 109 F.3d at 295 . Under that interpretation of Rule 9011, Walker’s argument on cross-appeal fails. ⅜ * ⅜ We agree with the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits that the service and filing of a motion for sanctions “mu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Madoff v. Amaral (In re Amaral)

2. “Federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, have the inherent power to impose sanctions on parties and lawyers. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 , 1121 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1572. To impose sanctions under these inherent powers, the court first must find bad faith. Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575. “A finding of bad faith is warranted where an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent. A party also demonstrates bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order.” Byrne, 261 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted). Sanctions are "especially appropriate where counsel takes frivolous legal positions supported by scandalous accusations.” Amlong & Amlong, P.A. [v. Denny’s, Inc.], 500 F.3d [1230] at 1238 [ (11th Cir. 2007) ], The court must afford the sanctioned party due process both in determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing fees. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 , 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2135 , 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Madoff v. Amaral (In re Amaral)

3. “We agree with the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits that the service and filing of a motion for sanctions must occur prior to final judgment or judicial rejection of the offending motion. Any argument to the contrary renders the safe harbor provision a mere formality. The provision cannot have any effect if the court has already denied the motion; it is too late for the offending party to withdraw the challenged contention.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 341 F. App'x 621 - Orenshteyn v. Citrix Systems, Inc.