Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 532 SO2D 203 - State v. Boothe

State v. Boothe’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
1
states following
December 2016
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Edwards v. Arizona · Michigan v. Mosley · Nash v. Estelle · State v. Andrus

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “While the suspect has an absolute right to terminate station-house interrogation, he also has the prerogative to then and there answer questions, if that be his choice. Some persons are moved by the desire to unburden themselves to confessing their crimes to police, while others want to make their own assessment of what to say to their custodians. "[A] blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interest." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). When, as in the case at bar, a desire for immediate talk clearly appears from the suspect's words and conduct, but he also states he wants a lawyer (i.e.,) "I would like to have a lawyer, but I would rather talk to you"(,) it is sound and fully constitutional police practice to clarify the course the suspect elects to choose. The precedent of Priest [ 409 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir.1969) ] does not bar this clarification.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “When the issue in a ease on appeal is whether a defendant’s lack of intellectual ability precluded him from effectively understanding the essential nature of his constitutional rights, much weight is accorded the Trial Court’s assessment. State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983); State v. Coleman, 395 So.2d 704 (La.1981). | ^Moderate mental retardation or low intelligence does not vitiate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. State v. Thomas, 470 So.2d 413 (La.App.3rd Cir.1985). The critical factor is whether the defendant was able to understand the rights explained to him and make a knowing and voluntary statement. There was evidence presented from which the Trial Judge could determine that the defendant was able to understand his rights and validly waive them.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “The first category is the confession which admits the guilt of the crime charged. The second is the admission which involves the existence of criminal intent. The third is the admission or acknowledgment of facts which tend to establish guilt, but which do not involve the existence of criminal intent. The Court concluded that remarks which were not express admissions of guilt or facts showing criminal intent can be introduced without the foundation necessary for admitting a confession, despite the fact that the statements might be considered inculpatory.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.