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532 U.S. 769

Arkansas v. Sullivan

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 2001-05-29

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Fertig v. State

“recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense. . . .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 92 Cal. App. 4th 561 - People v. Patterson

Relies on Whren v. United States · Vasquez v. Hillery · Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · 9–0 · Decided 2001-05-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 349 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2026 · most notably Devenpeck v. Alford (2004), Zellner v. Summerlin (2007)

50 federal appellate · 36 district · 174 state decisions — followed in 30 states

2390200120102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Justice Ginsburg,with whom Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Breyer join,

¶1concurring.

¶2The Arkansas Supreme Court was moved by a concern rooted in the Fourth Amendment. Validating Kenneth Sullivan’s arrest, the Arkansas court feared, would accord police officers disturbing discretion to intrude on individuals’ lib*773erty and privacy. See 340 Ark. 318-A, 318-B, 16 S. W. 3d 551, 552 (2000) (expressing unwillingness “to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity”). But this Court has held that such exercises of official discretion are unlimited by the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v. Logo Vista, ante, p. 318; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Given the Court’s current ease law, I join the Court’s opinion.

¶3In Atwater, which recognized no constitutional limitation on arrest for a fine-only misdemeanor offense, this Court relied in part on a perceived “dearth of horribles demanding redress.” Ante, at 353. Although I joined a dissenting opinion questioning the relevance of the Court’s conclusion on that score, see ante, at 372 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), I hope the Court’s perception proves correct. But if it does not, if experience demonstrates “anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,” ante, at 353 (opinion of the Court), I hope the Court will reconsider its recent precedent. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (observing that Court has departed from stare decisis when necessary “to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained”) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

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