Langner v. Simpson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared: * * * * * . Malpractice. Those founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against any physician and surgeon, osteopath, osteopathic physician and surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor, or nurse, licensed under chapter 147, or a hospital licensed under chapter 135B, arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first, but in no event shall any action be brought more than six years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in the action to have been the cause of the injury or death unless a foreign object unintentionally left in the body caused the injury or death. [Emphasis supplied.]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Doe v. Cherwitz · McClendon v. Beck

2. “Two rationales support the continuous treatment doctrine. Under the first rationale, it is not reasonable to expect a patient under continuing care of a doctor to discover that the doctor’s acts may be the cause of the injury. Four interrelated concerns underlie this rationale. First, a negligent doctor may conceal important information from a patient dining treatment. Second, a confidential relationship between doctor and patient might inhibit the patient from questioning the care given during the existence of the relationship. Third, the chance that investigating the cause of an injury will interrupt care weighs against requiring a patient to discover an injury during the course of continuous treatment. Last, the need for flexibility in determining the cause of a latent injury supports the rationale. The second rationale holds that it is absurd to expect a patient who is being treated by a doctor or hospital to interrupt corrective treatment by instituting suit against either while under their continuing care. This rationale recognizes that a patient’s relationship with those caring for the patient is based upon trust in their medical skills. So if corrective treatment is necessary, it would be contrary to the patient’s own interest in the patient’s cure and recovery to disrupt the relationship by suing those caring for the patient. In these circumstances, it would make no sense to require the patient to sue.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Juarez v. Nelson

3. “Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specifically declared: [[Image here]] 9. Malpractice. a. Except as provided in paragraph “b ”, those founded on injuries to the person ... against any physician and surgeon ... arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known ... of the existence of, the injury ... for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ratcliff v. Graether