Batten v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
18 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently December 1994
18 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · Furman v. Georgia · Chaffin v. Stynchcombe · United States v. Watson · Smith v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In the event of a retrial the appellant will not be able to waive trial by jury in light of Article 1.14, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. (set forth in the body of the opinion), and it is here noted that the doctrine of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), will not normally be involved so that death will be an applicable penalty upon retrial. Pearce held that neither the double jeopardy provision nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely bars imposition of a more severe sentence upon re-conviction of a defendant who has had original conviction set aside at his own behest, but that due process of law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his prior conviction must play no part in the punishment assessed after he received a new trial. Since a defendant’s fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant from attacking his earlier conviction, due process requires a defendant be freed of apprehension on the part of the sentencing judge. In order to insure the lack of vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge, the Pearce opinion required the judge to make certain findings before the punishment assessed at the second trial could be more severe than at the first trial. However, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the imposition of a higher penalty by a jury upon retrial afte”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Sorola v. State“In a capital felony case in which the State seeks the death penalty, the court shall propound to the entire panel of prospective jurors questions concerning the principles, as applicable to the ease on trial, of reasonable doubt, burden of proof, return of indictment by grand jury, presumption of innocence, and opinion. 7 Then, on demand of the State or defendant, either is entitled to examine each juror on voir dire individually and apart from the entire panel, and may further question the juror on the principle propounded by the court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Martinez v. State“the State may not waive the death penalty, but even in cases such as the instant one where such waiver has been improperly permitted, the capital case procedures, including the right to fifteen peremptory challenges, are still applicable even though the only possible penalty under the circumstances would be life imprisonment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.