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← 534 F.3d 931 - Fowler v. Crawford

Fowler v. Crawford’s Empirical Analysis

534 F.3d 931 · 2008

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
2
states following
February 2016
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000B · 42 U.S.C. § 2000C

Relies on Woodford v. Ngo · City of Boerne v. Flores · Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party · Cutter et al. v. Wilkinson Director Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction · Grutter v. Bollinger

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . .. even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person — (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “... “[A] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike [a regulation] down.” Illinois State Bd. Elec, v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 , 99 S.Ct. 983 , 59 L.Ed.2d 230 ... (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the least restrictive means test as a “slippery slope” of uncertainty). But such a draconian construction of RLUIPA’s least restrictive means test would render federal judges “the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every religious accommodation problem” in state penal institutions. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 215 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). And, as we have seen, this would be inconsistent with congressional intent. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722-23 , 125 S.Ct. at 2122-23 , 161 L.Ed.2d at 1034-35 .... We must remain mindful that Cutter counsels restraint in this realm. There, the Supreme Court repeatedly instructed us to provide “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators” in construing RLUIPA. Id. at 723 , 125 S.Ct. at 2123 , 161 L.Ed.2d at 1034 ____ Otherwise, “religious accommodation in the penological context threatens to become the tail that wags the dog. Absent due restraint, ‘inmate requests for religious accommodations [may] become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning o”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “[T]he lower court got off on the wrong foot ... by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement____ [Judgments regarding prison security are “peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.