United States v. Thomas’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1952 · 18 U.S.C. § 2250 · 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (White-Slave Traffic Act of 1910 (Mann Act)) · 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (§ 40302 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006) · 42 U.S.C. § 16913
Relies on United States v. Lopez · Caminetti v. United States · M'Culloch v. State of Maryland · National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. · United States v. Morrison
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[SORNA’s] delegation was proper since Congress established a clear policy of protecting the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, was specific that the delegation was to the Attorney General, and established boundaries of the delegation by limiting the applicability of the Attorney General’s rules to those convicted before the enactment of SORNA and to those who were unable to comply with the initial registration.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The first [Lopez] category does not apply, because § 16913 is not an attempt to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. The second category does not apply, because § 16913 is not an attempt to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce. Unlike § 2250, § 16913 is not limited to persons who travel across state lines; the latter statute contains no jurisdictional element and reaches purely intrastate activity insofar as sex offenders who never cross state lines are required to register. The third category does not apply, because there is no evidence in the record that the registration of sex offenders has a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., there is no evidence that "sex offending" is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.... Any argument that Congress is permitted to enact § 16913 under the Commerce Clause would appear to be too attenuated and, if accepted, “would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized national government." [Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 , 115 S.Ct. at 1628-29 ] (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 , 37, 57 S.Ct. 615 , 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937)).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.