534 So. 2d 628 - Daniels v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Although Daniels does not contest the propriety of the trial court's written findings of fact pursuant to § 13-11-4, upon our review, we find the order inadequate for the following reasons. First, it does not contain a statement of the 'findings of fact from the trial' as required by § 13-11-4. Secondly, the court did not enter proper written findings concerning the existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 13-11-6. Essentially, the same errors were present in co-defendant Tomlin's sentencing order; thus we direct the trial court to our instructions in Tomlin , 443 So.2d [47, 58-59 *Page 566 (Ala.Cr.App. 1979), affirmed, 443 So.2d 59 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 954 , 104 S.Ct. 2160 , 80 L.Ed.2d 545 (1984)]. Thirdly, in regard to the specific findings concerning the presence or negation of the enumerated mitigating circumstances, we note that the court made no specific finding as to § 13-11-7(7) and that the court failed to determine whether Daniels had a significant history of prior criminal activity, even though the court concluded that Daniels did not have a 'long history.' In addition, in regard to the determination of § 13-11-7(4), we direct the court's attention to our Supreme Court's observations in [ Ex parte ] Tomlin , 443 So.2d at 64 . ". . . [D]ue to the deficiencies in the sentencing order, we remand this cause to the trial court with directions that the court correct its sentencing order in accordance with our observations”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Daniels v. State · 769 So. 2d 935 - Borden v. State

2. “" 'In order for the consent to be valid, the person giving the consent must have the authority to do so. Stoner v. California , 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). Permission may be obtained from "a third party who possesses common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164 , 171 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 993 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). "The authority which justifies the third-party consent rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched." Id. at 171, n. 7 , 94 S.Ct. at 993 , n. 7. It is clearly the law in Alabama that a wife, or other joint occupants of living quarters, may constitutionally consent to a warrantless search of the premises.' "”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Rieber v. State · 790 So. 2d 975 - Acklin v. State

3. “"The determination of what amounts to probable cause is based on a `reasonable man' standard. `Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed.'"”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. C.M.B. v. State · CMB v. State