Uptain v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`[a] juror . . . who will unquestionably credit the testimony of law enforcement officers over that of defense witnesses is not competent to serve'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tuggle v. State · 629 So. 2d 729 - McCray v. State

2. “" 'A juror . . . who will unquestionably credit the testimony of law enforcement officers over that of defense witnesses is not competent to serve.' State v. Davenport , 445 So.2d 1190 , 1194 (La. 1984). See also State v. Nolan , 341 So.2d 885 (La. 1977); State v. Thompson , 331 So.2d 848 (La. 1976); State v. Johnson , 324 So.2d 349 (La. 1975); State v. Jones , 282 So.2d 422 (La. 1973); State v. Williams , 643 S.W.2d 832 , 834 (Mo.App. 1982). 'A juror who will not be governed by the established rules as to the weight and effect of the evidence is incompetent.' Watwood v. State , 389 So.2d 549 , 550 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte Watwood , 389 So.2d 552 (Ala. 1980). " 'A challenge for cause is proper where it is shown that the mind of a juror is not free to hear and impartially consider the evidence and render a verdict thereon. Garlitz v. State , 71 Md. 293 , 300 , 18 A. 39 (1889). The fact that a prospective juror would give more weight to the testimony of a police officer plainly indicates his lack of impartiality — assurances to the court of an ability to weigh the evidence impartially being patently inconsistent — and the two challenges for cause in the proceedings below should have been sustained. State v. Jones , 282 So.2d 422 (La. 1973), on rehearing at 430; Harvin v. United States , 297 A.2d 774 , 778 (D.C.App. 1972); Chavez v. United States , 258 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1958). In Harvin , the court observed: " ' "[The very purpose of the voir dire is to permit cou”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 536 So. 2d 127 - Mason v. State

3. “"When important testimony is anticipated from certain witnesses whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination should be permitted. . . . "Nothing could be plainer than that a predisposition to attach greater or less credence to a witness' testimony simply because of that witness' position as an officer is inconsistent with the defendant's constitutional and statutory right to an impartial jury. The denial of such a fundamental right cannot be countenanced. The trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would be inclined to give more weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because of that person's official status constituted an abuse of discretion. We find error and order a new trial."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 549 So. 2d 139 - Nodd v. State