Holton v. Pfingst’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “. It is our view that the cases considering the extent of required disclosure have failed in many instances to relate the requirement to the overall policy consideration. If it is the law, and it surely is, that a physician ordinarily is not liable for an honest mistake in judgment, when he follows acceptable medical standards for examination and diagnosis and treatment, then the extent of disclosure relevant to securing the patient’s consent must'be evaluated in terms of what the physician knew or should have known at the time he recommended the treatment to the patient.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bennett v. Graves · Keel v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center

2. “for negligence in failing to conform to a professional standard....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gregory v. Poor Md · Gene T. Gregory v. Marshall Poor, M.D.

3. “Some courts categorically require the patient to produce expert testimony as to what disclosure of risks or hazards should be made. Other courts hold that experts are unnecessary and that lay witness testimony can establish a sub-missible case of failure to disclose a risk or hazard of treatment which a physician knew or should have known. Other courts have ordinarily required expert evidence by the plaintiff on the issue of the extent of disclosure required except in those instances where the court determined that the necessity of disclosure of the risk involved was ‘too clear to require expert medical testimony.’ Some of the text discussions although unsupported by decided cases have advocated a shift of burden approach whereby if the patient produces evidence of a failure to disclose a particular risk or hazard, then the burden shifts to the physician to excuse the failure by proof of professional standards which would seek to establish disclosure was either not required or was regarded as not in the best interest of the patient under the peculiar fact situation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sargent v. Shaffer