¶1(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
¶2I concur in the result reached by the court in today’s decision. I respectfully dissent, however, from that part of the court’s decision which holds that Williams was equivocal in invoking his right to remain silent when he broke off the interrogation with Detectives Christensen and Bozovsky.
¶3The United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), recognized the need to protect a defendant’s right to both consult with an attorney and remain silent. Specifically referring to the invocation of the right to remain silent, the Court stated “[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added). The invocation of the right to remain silent requires that all questioning cease in order to prevent “police from ‘persisting in repeated efforts to wear down [the accused’s] resistance and make him change his mind.’ ” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493 n. 2, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105-06, 96 S.Ct. 321, 327, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)).
¶4Here, the manner utilized by Williams to indicate that he did not wish to be interrogated further was to remove himself from the interrogation room. The court’s argument appears to be that in standing up, turning toward Detective Christensen, and saying “I don’t have to take any more of your bullshit,” then walking out of the room, Williams left some doubt as to whether he wanted the interrogation to continue. I believe, however, that there was nothing equivocal, uncertain, or doubtful in the manner he chose to invoke his right to remain silent. By leaving *291the interrogation room, Williams made a clearer and stronger statement of his desire to remain silent than any verbal statement he could have made. The message to be taken from Williams’ walking out of the interrogation room in the manner he did was that he did not want to talk to the officers any longer and that he did not want the officers to talk to him any longer. While the court emphasizes that Williams never stated that he wanted to stop answering questions, the fact is that by walking out of the interrogation room he made a far more effective statement. By leaving the room, Williams made further questions from the officers and further answers on his part impossible.
¶5In support of its conclusion that Williams was equivocal in invoking his right to remain silent, the court makes much of the fact that Williams appeared to be angry with Detective Christensen and not with Detective Bo-zovsky. The fact that he may only have been angry with Detective Christensen does not aid the analysis of whether the right was properly invoked for two reasons: first, and most important, is the fact that Williams walked out on both officers, not just Detective Christensen; and second, the fact that Williams may have been angry when he invoked his right to remain silent does not make an unequivocal invocation of the right any less effective.
¶6Having unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, Williams was entitled to have the right “scrupulously” honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326-27, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Davis v. United States, Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, noted that “[w]hen a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored * * ⅜ in contravention of [his] ‘rights’ just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.” — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2362, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).
¶7Detectives Christensen and Bozovsky failed to scrupulously honor Williams’ right to remain silent. Williams was approached in his cell within five minutes of the time he invoked his right to remain silent. When the detectives entered his cell, Detective Bozov-sky informed Williams that Matthew Hage was expected to live and, without any factual basis, informed Williams that Matthew Hage would be able to identify him. It was at that point that Williams broke down and admitted he had been in the house. By failing to wait a significant period of time before continuing the interrogation, the officers failed to scrupulously honor Williams’ invocation of the right to remain silent and implicated the concerns raised by Justice Ginsburg in Davis.
¶8Thus, I believe it was error for the trial court to have admitted into evidence any statements Williams made during the interrogation after he invoked his right to remain silent. I also believe, however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the other evidence of Williams’ guilt produced at trial was overwhelming. See State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 (Minn.1988). Therefore, Williams’ conviction is properly affirmed.