Commonwealth v. Nolen’s Empirical Analysis
1993
Citation profile
68 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 70 later decisions — most recently December 2015 · most notably Commonwealth v. Counterman (1998), Commonwealth v. Paddy (2002)
68 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Commonwealth v. Story · Commonwealth v. Lark · Commonwealth v. Evans · Commonwealth v. Turner · Commonwealth v. Chestnut
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A]n error will be deemed harmless where the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Guidelines for determining whether an error is harmless include: (1) whether the error was prejudicial to the defendant or if prejudicial, whether the prejudice was de minimis; (2) whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other, untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) whether the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming as established by properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence that the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison to the verdict.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[W]henever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either on the present case or on other pending criminal matters, the witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the prosecution. And if that possibility exists, the jury should know about it. The jury may choose to believe the witness even after it learns of actual promises made or possible promises of leniency which may be made in the future, but the defendant, under the right guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution to confront witnesses against him, must have the opportunity at least to raise a doubt in the mind of the jury as to whether the prosecution witness is biased. It is not for the court to determine whether the cross-examination for bias would affect the jury’s determination of the case.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[F]rom the facts presented here, it can easily be inferred that at the time Boyer [the witness] agreed to testify for the Commonwealth, he had expectations of leniency with regard to his pending charges, and that when he did so testify, he was obliged to tailor his testimony in favor of the prosecution. The fact that the charges were no longer pending is of no moment. As Judge (now Justice) Montemuro so aptly stated in his opinion below: “If this were the test, then the Commonwealth need only ensure that its witness receive the favorable treatment before the start of the trial to avoid cross-examination challenging the witness’ bias.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.