536 F. Supp. 2d 523 - DeVito v. Aetna, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Count for breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3) is duplicative of their claim for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). Defendants direct the Court to Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 , 116 S.Ct. 1065 , 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996) to support their argument that a plaintiff may not bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty that is duplica-tive of her claim for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B). There is a split among circuits and within this district as to the effect of Varity Corp. and Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 , 122 S.Ct. 708 , 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002), on a plaintiffs ability to simultaneously pursue claims for benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) and for breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3). See, e.g., Wolfe v. Lu, No. 06-0079, 2007 WL 1007181 , -9 (W.D.Pa. Mar.30, 2007) (noting that “the issue has been addressed by many district courts within our circuit with differing results” and collecting cases); Tannenbaum v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-1410, 2004 WL 1084658 , (E.D.Pa. Feb.27, 2004) (noting that “[t]he courts of appeals are split over whether Varity ever permits a plaintiff who has been denied benefits to simultaneously bring an action for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) and an action for breach of fiduciary duty under § 1132(a)(3)(B)” and collecting cases). The Third Circuit has not expressly addressed this”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Li Neuroscience v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Of Fla. · 568 F. Supp. 2d 556 - Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of NJ

2. “Plaintiffs’ [ERISA] policies contain language substantially similar to that contained in the Parity Law. As a , result, even if the Parity Law provides a private cause of action, the parity language contained in Plaintiffs’ [ERISA] policies is coterminous with any privately enforceable right that might arise under the Parity Law. The Court therefore finds that [ERISA] Plaintiffs would have no private cause of action under the Parity law that they do not already have under the terms of their respective policies. This point is critical to the Court’s preemption analysis. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs’ alleged entitlement to benefits under either the Parity Law or ERISA arises “only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulat-ed employee benefit plan.... ” [Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 210 , 124 S.Ct. 2488 ] Stated differently, Parity Law “liability would exist here only because of [Defendants’] administration of ERISA-regu-lated benefit plans. [Defendants’] potential liability under the [Parity Law] in th[is] case[ ], then, derives entirely from the particular rights and obligations established by the benefit plans.” Id. at 213 , 124 S.Ct. 2488 . Further, because the parity language in Plaintiffs’ policies gives rise to the same rights as those arguably available under the Parity Law, “no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ... the plan terms [has been] violated.” Id. In other words, Defendants’ duties under the Parity Law are identical to their duties under the parity lang”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 568 F. Supp. 2d 556 - Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of NJ

3. “In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila the Supreme Court noted that “ERISA’s ‘comprehensive legislative scheme’ includes ‘an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’ This integrated enforcement mechanism, ERISA § 502(a) ... is a distinctive feature of ERISA, and essential to accomplish Congress’ purpose of creating a comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit plans.” 542 U.S. 200, 208 , 124 S.Ct. 2488 , 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (internal citations omitted). The [Supreme] Court went on to conclude that[:] [i]t follows that if an individual brings suit complaining of a denial of coverage for medical care, where the individual is entitled to such coverage only because of the terms of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan, and where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls “within the scope of’ ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). In other words, if an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 568 F. Supp. 2d 556 - Beye v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of NJ