Commonwealth v. Kindler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As a general rule, we have concluded that defendants who are fugitives from justice during the appellate process have no right to any appellate review, even though they have been recaptured and returned to the custody of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611 , 476 A.2d 346 (1984). This rule is applicable to capital cases, and would normally require that we dismiss the various allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial court error that a defendant would normally wish to raise on a direct review of a death sentence. Here, however, Appellant's fugitive status did not take place during the pendency of an appeal before us. Rather, it took place while the trial court was considering Appellant's post-verdict motions and the question becomes whether the trial court has authority to dismiss such motions as a response to an Appellant's flight. The United States Supreme Court has recently reviewed its own case law which permits its appellate courts to dismiss pending fugitive appeals and has reaffirmed the principle that where there is a connection between a defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process, the sanction of dismissal of the appeal is a reasonable response. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. [____], 113 S.Ct. 1199 , 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). This rule, like our counterpart to it, rests in part on a recognition that one who invokes the jurisdiction of a tribunal and then flees has voluntarily waived ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In the Interest of J.J.

2. “We have studied this record and conclude that the sentence of death, being mandated, is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. See, Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428 , 475 A.2d 700 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 , 105 S.Ct. 360 , 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984) (and Appendix attached thereto). Finally, after our review of this record, we conclude that the sentence of death was a product of the evidence and not a product of “passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 291 F. Supp. 2d 323 - Kindler v. Horn

3. “the post-verdict motions of an ex-fugitive may be reinstated in the court's discretion if, after being returned to custody, the fugitive can show a compelling reason for having his post-verdict motions heard.” He did find, however, that under the facts of Appellant’s case, the trial court possessed full authority to dismiss his post-verdict motions. Justice Flaherty (now Chief Justice Flaherty) joined Justice Cappy’s concurring opinion and filed his own concurring opinion stating that he would go somewhat further and”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Kindler