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537 F.2d 718

Docket Nos. 309, 313 and 315, Dockets 75-1246, 75-1280 and 75-1303.

United States v. Eucker

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Oct. 22, 1975.

Decided July 2, 1976.

Second Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1976-07-02

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently July 1976

1 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78H (§ 8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

Relies on United States v. Mitchell · United States v. Lombardozzi · United States v. Eucker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1976-07-02

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¶1Stanley S. Arkin, New York City (Stanley S. Arkin, P. C., Mark S. Arisohn, New York City, of counsel), for appellant Eucker.

¶2Audrey Strauss, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City (Robert B. Fiske, Jr., U. S. Atty., S. D. N. Y., Lawrence B. Pedowitz, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

¶3Before MOORE, FEINBERG and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Appellant Eucker pleaded guilty to a single count of the indictment which charged that he:

unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly, did, directly and indirectly, hypothecate and arrange for and permit the continued hypothecation of fully paid for securities carried for the account of customers of Orvis under circumstances that permitted such securities to be hypothecated and subjected to liens and claims of pledges in amounts up to $7,000,000.00. (Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78h and 78ff and 17 C.F.R. Section 240.8c-l; Title 18, United States Code, Section 2.)

¶6On appeal, Eucker insisted that he was charged with violating subsection 3 of 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) and that the indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to allege an essential element of the crime charged, to wit, that the total amount of securities hypothecated was in excess of the aggregate customer indebtedness to Orvis with respect to such securities. Because the Government insisted that it was proceeding under subsection 1 of § 78h(c), we remanded to the District Court for findings as to whether appellant’s plea was know*719ingly made. See United States v. Eucker, 532 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1976).

¶7On April 27, 1976, following a hearing at which appellant’s testimony was taken, District Judge Knapp found that Eucker knew at the time of his plea that the facts to which he pleaded guilty necessarily involved a violation of subdivision 1. He therefore denied appellant’s application to withdraw his guilty plea. Because this finding was not clearly erroneous, United States v. Lombardozzi, 436 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 1379, 28 L.Ed.2d 648 (1971), the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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