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537 F.2d 835

Docket No. 75-3331

United States v. Yeager

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Aug. 26, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1976.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1976-08-26

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently March 1988

5 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“in a perjury prosecution a defendant may not use the privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for suppressing the very grand jury testimony that prompted the perjury charge.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Olmeda

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1623

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York · United States v. Mandujano

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1976-08-26

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Summary Calendar.*

¶2Edward J. David, Fayetteville, N. C., for defendant-appellant.

¶3Robert W. Rust, U. S. Atty., William R. Northcutt, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

¶4Before BROWN, Chief Judge, GEWIN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

¶6PER CURIAM:

¶7Carson Robert Yeager appeals from his conviction on two counts of making false declarations to a grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a).

¶8Yeager’s principal argument is that his testimony before the grand jury should have been suppressed in the perjury trial because he was not given a Miranda1 warning prior to the grand jury testimony. A Miranda warning was required, he contends, because he was a “putative defendant” at the time he gave the grand jury testimony.

¶9We held our decision on this issue pending the Supreme Court’s review of our decision in United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974), because the Mandujano case involved the same issue as presented here by Yeager. On May 19, 1976, the Supreme Court reversed Mandujano, holding that in a perjury prosecution a defendant may not use the privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for suppressing the very grand jury testimony that prompted the perjury charge. United States v. Mandujano, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). The defendant in Mandujano was not entitled to suppression of his grand jury testimony even though he may have been a “putative defendant” and was not given a full Miranda warning:

[A] witness sworn to tell the truth before a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call for suppression of false statements made to that jury. . Assuming, arguendo, that respondent was indeed a “putative defendant,” that fact would have no bearing on the validity of a conviction for testifying falsely.

¶10-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. at 1789, 48 L.Ed.2d at 226. Mandujano controls here.

¶11We have examined Yeager’s remaining contentions and have found them without merit.

¶12AFFIRMED.

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