Beuke v. Houk’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Brady requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evi dence that is “material either to guilt or to punishment.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 , 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 ). “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A Brady violation has three elements: (1) the evidence “must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; (2) the “evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently”; and (3) “prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jalowiec v. Bradshaw · Bell v. Howes

2. “The remainder of the alleged Brady evidence — evidence regarding [the third victim’s] arguments prior to his disappearance, the sexual nature of the murders, and Fautenberry’s depression and suicidal inclinations — is not material for Brady purposes. In fact, the evidence is virtually insignificant in light of the overwhelming evidence both of guilt (i.e., the confessions to [a FBI agent, a Portland police officer, and an ex-girlfriend] and the physical evidence connecting Fautenberry to [the third victim’s] murder) and the sentencing specifications (i.e., the three-judge panel’s finding that the “mitigating factors pale before the simple fact that [Fautenberry’s] actions were plotted, vicious, persistente] and utterly callous”). Considering as we must the cumulative effect of all the alleged Brady evidence, we conclude that Fautenberry has failed to establish a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of this evidence would have altered either his decision to enter a no-contest plea or the three-judge panel’s sentence of death.... Because this evidence is not material under Brady, Fautenberry cannot show prejudice to excuse his procedural default---- And because Fautenberry cannot establish prejudice to excuse his procedurally defaulted Brady claim, he is not entitled to habeas relief on that basis.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 925 F. Supp. 2d 927 - Cone v. Colson

3. “[A]fter accounting for [the Petitioner’s] largely cumulative and otherwise unsympathetic evidence — we are left basically where we started. The balance of the aggravation — mitigation scale remains unchanged, and [the undersigned] do[es] not find that presenting this undisclosed mitigating evidence to the jury would have altered the result of these proceedings or that there is a reasonable probability that even one juror, having reviewed this evidence, would have reached a different result.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 638 F. Supp. 2d 514 - Jackson v. United States