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← 537 FSUPP 236 - Silverstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Aday

Silverstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Aday’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
August 2013
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently August 2013 · most notably Babbit Electronics, Inc. v. Dynascan Corp. (1994), 914 F. Supp. 964 - Houbigant, Inc. v. ACB Mercantile, Inc. (1995)

5 federal appellate · 2 district ·

1601982199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (§ 1 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (§ 5 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (§ 32 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (§ 39 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (§ 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (§ 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 28 U.S.C. § 1338 · 28 U.S.C. § 2201

Relies on Cappaert v. United States · United States v. Grinnell Corp. · T. B. Harms Company v. Edward Eliscu and Ross Jungnickel, Inc. · Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co. · 350 F. Supp. 1341 - Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Products Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... [T]he federal grant of a patent or copyright has not been thought to infuse with any national interest a dispute as to ownership or contractual enforcement turning on the facts or on ordinary principles of contract law. Indeed, the case for an unexpansive reading of the provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction with respect to patents and copyrights has been especially strong since expansion would entail depriving the state court of any jurisdiction over matters having so little federal significance, (citations omitted).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Even assuming Silverstar has standing to maintain an infringement action under § 1114, it does not have standing to maintain such an action against the registrant. MLE, as the registrant of the mark MEAT LOAF, has the right to sue for trademark infringement according to the terms of § 1114. Silverstar’s interest in the trademark arises solely from the contractual relationship between it and MLE, and such interest is secondary to the registrant’s. Any right Silverstar may have to sue under the Lanham Act, a fortiori, is derivative of the rights of the registrant MLE. Therefore, in the present case, Silverstar’s only standing under the Lanham Act would be on behalf of Meat Loaf [Aday] and MLE to enforce the trademark owner’s proprietary rights. In this action, Silverstar is not attempting to enforce the registrant’s proprietary rights. Rather, the licensee Silvers-tar is attempting to enforce its own rights under the License agreement. This is a contract dispute and should be brought under a contract theory. Such a suit cannot properly be maintained as a trademark infringement action under § 1114.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]his case is essentially a contract dispute between an exclusive licensee and a li-censor over the right to use the trademark MEAT LOAF. Silverstar’s dispute should be determined by the principles of contract law, as it is the contract that defines the parties’ relationship and provides mechanisms to redress alleged breaches thereto. The Lanham Act, in contrast, establishes marketplace rules governing the conduct of parties not otherwise limited. This not a case of either the licensee or licensor attempting to protect a trademark from unscrupulous use in the marketplace by third parties. Rather, this case involves the alleged breach of a license agreement.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.