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538 A.2d 247

In Re Thompson

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Decided December 30, 1987

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · decided 1987-12-30

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“knowingly assisting in the presentation of false statements”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including MATTER OF McBRIDE, In Re Cleaver-Bascombe

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990)

Relies on In Re Hutchinson · In Re Hines

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1987-12-30

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently May 2014

19 state decisions

1101987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PER CURIAM:

¶1This is a review of a report and recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (Board) which found Raymond B. Thompson violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by knowingly assisting in the presentation of false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in support of the application of his client for status as a permanent resident alien.2 The majority of the Board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. After a review of the record, we accept the Board’s findings but modify the Board’s recommended sanction. We conclude that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

¶2At the time of Mrs. Betty B. Dorsey’s application for permanent resident alien status, both she and her husband worked and lived in Pennsylvania. During a subsequent INS interview, Mrs. Dorsey reaffirmed a residential Maryland address and employment in Fairfax County, Virginia. Following further investigation by INS, respondent was indicted by a federal grand jury for the District of Maryland for violation of a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).3 Ultimately, he entered into an agreement with the prosecution which, among other things, provided that he would refrain from practicing law before the INS for one year.4

¶3*248Before the Hearing Committee, respondent denied knowing that Mrs. Dorsey did not live at the Maryland address or work in Virginia at the time of her INS interview; he also denied having any role in Mrs. Dorsey so stating to the INS, and further denied telling an INS investigator that he had leased his house to the Dorseys. The Hearing Committee credited the testimony of an INS official and Mrs. Dorsey, who testified in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The Hearing Committee discredited the testimony of respondent, finding that he knew the statements to be false when he proffered them to the agency. The Board found these conclusions were supported by substantial evidence and thus adopted them. We do the same.

¶4On appeal, respondent challenges the sanction of six months suspension recommended by the Board, as does the office of Bar Counsel, which argues that a stronger sanction is necessary.

¶5Our task in this instance is straightforward. Giving due deference to the recommendations of the Board, we must strive to impose a discipline that is consistent with other similar cases. In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 384 (D.C.1984); see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 7(3). In reaching a conclusion, we have often reiterated that among the relevant factors to be considered are, the nature of the violation, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, protection of the public, courts and the legal profession, and, to the extent it can be determined, moral fitness of the attorney. In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C.1987) (en banc).

¶6In addressing the particular circumstances of this case, we state at the outset that we appreciate that neither the Hearing Committee nor the Board had the benefit of our recent Hutchinsonopinion in reaching a decision. Nonetheless, we conclude that the present case, in all material aspects, is governed by that decision.

¶7We observe that misrepresentation to a federal agency is quite serious. As in Hutchinson, the respondent in this instance was required to confront federal prosecution. To be sure, the dishonesty attributed to respondent differed in some aspects from Hutchinson’s. However, it is beyond argument that there was a clear failure of the obligation to the public and to the profession to be scrupulously honest. Thirdly, we note that, unlike Hutchinson, respondent had a prior history of professional discipline.

¶8Accordingly, we therefore conclude that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. This order of suspension shall be effective 30 days from the date of this opinion. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 19(3).

¶9So ordered.

¶10. DR 1-102 provides:

Misconduct
(A) A lawyer shall not:
******
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

¶11. Under the statute, Thompson was charged with willfully aiding, abetting, counseling and procuring the making and use of false statements to INS.

¶12. The agreement also stated that Thompson admitted knowing at the time of the filing of the application that Mrs. Dorsey did not live at the Maryland address or work in Virginia.

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