Paige v. Gray’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““. . ’ . Clearly, it is not enough to prove a mere disparity between the number of minority residents and the number of minority representatives. Where it is apparent that a minority is afforded the opportunity to participate in the slating of candidates to represent its area, that the representatives slated and’ elected provide representation responsive to minority’s needs, and that the use of a multi-member districting scheme is rooted in a strong state policy divorced from the maintenance of racial discrimination, . would require a holding of no dilution. (Dilution would exist, however) where the state policy favoring multimember or at-large districting schemes is rooted in racial discrimination. Conversely, where a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in' general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The fact of dilution is established upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of these factors.” Accord: Paige v. Gray, 5 Cir., 538 F.2d 1108, 1110 ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Greater Houston Civic Council v. Mann · 422 F. Supp. 1014 - Connor v. Finch

2. ““Notwithstanding Gomillion’s ‘inevitable effect’ language, it is likely that the Supreme Court will require circumstantial proof of unlawful motive. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Thus absent an express finding of discriminatory purpose, the application of Gomillion to the assessment of an at-large election plan’s validity may be incomplete. Since we conclude that any evaluation of the 1947 law should be made more recent and less ambiguous precedents, we do not reach the question of whether the sequence of events leading passage of the 1947 Act was sufficiently suspect to compel a finding of racial motivation.” 538 F.2d at 1110.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 437 F. Supp. 137 - Paige v. Gray

3. “[t]he weighing of these factors is ordinarily a trial court function which we will not undertake initially unless the record is so clear as to permit of only one resolution.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. David v. Garrison